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Today, a district court's habeas corpus review of the constitutional-
ity of a state criminal conviction and the Supreme Court's direct review
of the same question are nearly identical. Last Term, in Wright v. West,I
an otherwise mundane criminal procedure case, the Supreme Court re-
wrote the question presented to ask whether the parity between federal
habeas corpus and direct appellate review should be destroyed. The
Court proposed abandoning in habeas corpus an important trait shared
by the two modes of review-de novo consideration of legal and mixed
legal-factual questions.2
To those who value meaningful habeas corpus review,3 the Court's
order augured Apocalypse Now. The seeming momentousness of the
Court's action was enhanced by its timing. Just three weeks before, the
Senate had come within a few votes of ending a Republican filibuster
and passing a habeas corpus reform bill, previously adopted by the
House, that rejected a Bush Administration proposal to replace de novo
review with deferential review of state court determinations of law.
4
The Court's sua sponte order requesting briefing on a question
presented by neither the parties nor the case thus arrogated to the
Court an issue that the political branches otherwise might have, but
have not since, settled.
Despite ominous signals from the Court that pervasive change was
afoot, the Court unanimously dispatched Wright on the mundane crimi-
nal procedure issue initially presented by the parties. But the views
expressed injustice Thomas' plurality opinion (joined by ChiefJustice
Rehnquist and Justice Scalia) and the Court's nearly simultaneous
grants of certiorari in two cases raising similar issues may well portend
Apocalypse Next Time.5 That Justice O'Connor (joined by Justices
Blackmun and Stevens) responded to Justice Thomas' singular brief in
support of deferential review with a point-by-point refutation-sup-
ported on one of those points by Justice Kennedy's separate opinion-
only enhances the sense that battle lines are forming for an impending
habeas corpus Armageddon. It is against that possibility that this Arti-
cle is deployed.
1. 112 S. Ct. 2482 (1992).
2. See Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. 672 (1991) (mem.) (granting cert. to review West
v. Wright, 931 F.2d 262 (4th Cir. 1991)).
3. Myself included. I was co-counsel on the Brief Amici Curiae of Benjamin R.
Civiletti, Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Edward H. Levi, and Elliot L. Richardson, in
Support of the Respondent, Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. 2482 (1992) (No. 91-542)
[hereinafter Civiletti Amicus Brief].
4. See Brief Amicus Curiae of Joseph Biden & Don Edwards at 14-16, Wright v.
West, 112 S. Ct. 2482 (1992) (No. 91-542) [hereinafter Biden/Edwards Amicus Brief]
(describing these events).
5. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 112 S. Ct. 2937 (1992) (mem.) (No. 91-7358)
(granting certiorari to review 944 F.2d 1363 (7th Cir. 1991)); Withrow v. Williams, 112
S. Ct. 1664 (1992) (mem.) (No. 91-1030) (granting certiorari to review Williams v.
Withrow, 944 F.2d 284 (6th Cir. 1991)).
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Part I demonstrates the existing parity between habeas corpus re-
view in the district courts and direct review in the Supreme Court. Part
II analyzes the opinions in Wright, revealing among other things that a
proper determination of the Great Writ's future requires an accurate
understanding of its past. In response to that discovery, Part III ana-
lyzes Professor Bator's flawed tour deforce of 1963,6 which has greatly
influenced but also greatly distorted most contemporary views of the
writ's history. Part IV offers a new habeas corpus chronology. My con-
clusions are twofold. First, although Justices O'Connor and Kennedy,
taking the negative side, win the debate on Justice Thomas' proposal in
Wright to slash habeas corpus review, their failure to offer an affirmative
case leaves the writ vulnerable. Second, a new, more rounded and ac-
curate, history of the writ provides the affirmative case for a habeas
corpus/direct appeal parity that extends to de novo review of legal and
mixed legal-factual questions.
I. PARITY AND DISPARITY: A COMPARISON OF Two MODES OF FEDERAL
COURT REVIEW OF STATE COURT DETERMINATIONS OF
FEDERAL LAW
The police arrest Smith for armed robbery. After reading him his
Miranda rights and securing his permission to ask questions, two
groups of officers, each relieved by the other at intervals, interrogate
Smith for ten nighttime and early morning hours. Smith's requests for
water and coffee are honored; those for cigarettes, sleep, and a chance
to call a friend are not. The interrogation takes place entirely in words;
rubber hoses and bright lights are not in evidence. For hours, Smith
insists that he had no part in the robbery under investigation. At
length, the officers reveal their belief, supported by unspecified evi-
dence, that Smith and Jones previously have committed several other
armed robberies and that things will go hard for both Smith and Jones
in all the cases if Smith does not cooperate in the case at hand. At
Smith's suggestion, the officers promise to suspend proceedings
against Smith and Jones on the other robberies if Smith confesses to
the robbery at hand. Smith confesses.
After holding an evidentiary hearing on Smith's motion to sup-
press, the trial court finds the facts set out above and concludes that,
promises notwithstanding, the confession was voluntary and admissi-
ble. Smith's subsequent conviction rests on the confession. The state
supreme court affirms, ruling that a promise not to prosecute the de-
fendant and an associate for other crimes does not taint an otherwise
voluntary confession.
Smith asks the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari
to review the state supreme court decision, alleging, as the certiorari
6. See Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441 (1963).
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statute requires, (i) that he has been deprived of a "right... under the
constitution, treaties or statutes of... the United States ' 7 and (ii) that
he has exhausted his state remedies with regard to the federal claim in
the sense that he is asking the Court to review a ' judgment[] ... ren-
dered by the highest court of a State in which a decision [on the claim]
could be had" as of right.8 At any other time, the Supreme Court
would deny certiorari for lack of an important federal question.9 As it
happens, Smith's case is the first to reach the Court after a United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruling that police
promises not to prosecute the defendant and an associate for other
crimes if the defendant confesses to the crime under investigation
render the confession involuntary. Notified of the conflict, the
Supreme Court grants certiorari to resolve it and-by the way-to re-
view the constitutionality of Smith's conviction.
The type and scope of review Smith can expect from the Supreme
Court on direct review are no mystery. Should the Court's analysis of
the case turn on legal questions-for example, whether the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments' voluntariness requirement for admitting cus-
todial confessions can be satisfied by a statement induced by promises
not to prosecute other crimes-the Court's review will proceed de
novo.10 The Court will rely primarily on its existing constitutional
precedents, consistent with the degree of freedom to deviate from
those precedents that it exercises under the applicable prudential doc-
trines, most notably stare dsciis." Just as the Court may draw upon
other federal and state court opinions and the academic commentary, it
also undoubtedly will pay such attention to the state courts' opinions in
Smith's very case as their research, reasoning, and rhetoric and the re-
spect due their authors and joiners inspire.
If the Court accepts the long-established "voluntariness" standard,
and concludes that promises of nonprosecution do not necessarily vio-
late it, the Court also will review de novo the application of that (or any
other) mixed legal and factual standard to the historical facts of the case
as found by the state courts.12 If the Court's analysis of voluntariness
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (1988).
8. Id.; accord Robert L. Stern et al., Supreme Court Practice §§ 3.14-3.18 (6th ed.
1986).
9. See generally Stern et al., supra note 8, §§ 4.1-4.17 (discussing bases for
granting certiorari).
10. See, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1252 (1991).
11. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2609-11 (1991).
12. See, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1252; Norris v. Alabama, 294
U.S. 587, 589-90 (1935). See generally Stern et al., supra note 8, § 3.29, at 186-87
(collecting cases). Along a continuum running from pure questions of fact that have
little or no norm content (e.g., whether Smith uttered the words "I pulled that job"), to
pure questions of law that are suffused with legal norms (e.g., whether individuals have a
right to refuse to answer questions during custodial interrogation), are many
questions-sometimes called "law-application" questions-with intermediate levels of
norm content (e.g., whether Smith was in "custody" undergoing "interrogation" at
2000 [Vol. 92:1997
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turns on an historical fact-for example, whether the police had suffi-
cient evidence to proceed with investigations or prosecutions of the
other robberies-the Court generally will defer to the state courts' find-
ings with regard to that fact.' 3 Exceptions to this deferential rule arise
when there is no finding,' 4 the finding is inadequate (for example, be-
cause there is no or too little evidence to support it's), or the finding is
dependent on a legal question in the case (for example, the finding was
made in the process of applying an improper legal standard 16 or was
various junctures). See Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 229,
235-38 (1985). A well-established Supreme Court jurisprudence segments this
continuum into two categories, on which I draw here. In addition to purely factual
issues, the Court's "factual question" category includes partially norm-laden law-
application questions as to which the norms already are fully elaborated or are incapable
of further elaboration. See, e.g., Mu'Min v. Virginia, 111 S. Ct. 1899, 1907 (1991)
(whether juror is biased is matter of fact); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S.
526, 534 (1979) (whether school board intentionally maintained segregated school
system is matter of fact). In addition to purely legal issues (requiring that norms be
identified, and not simply elaborated), the Court's "legal question" category includes
so-called "mixed questions of fact and law," i.e., law-application questions involving
norms that require additional elaboration or that can only be elaborated by addressing
multiple examples. See, e.g., Yates v. Evatt, 111 S. Ct. 1884, 1893-94 (1991) (existence
of harmless error treated as question of law); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19
(1979) (whether rational juror could find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt is
question of law). Although the Court has the power to review all law-application (as well
as purely legal) questions de novo, see Monaghan, supra at 263-76, its categorization of
some law-application questions as matters of "fact" and not "mixed questions" has the
effect of forgoing independent review, apparently based on the difficulty or
undesirability of additional judicial norm elaboration.
13. See, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1252; Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89,
100-01 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 50-52 (1949)
(plurality opinion); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 597-98 (1948); Lisenba v. California,
314 U.S. 219, 238 (1941); supra note 12. See generally Stem et al., supra note 8, § 3.29,
at 185 (citing cases).
14. See, e.g., Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. at 92-93; Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143,
147-48 (1944); Carlson v. Washington ex rel. Curtis, 234 U.S. 103, 106 (1914);
Reynolds Robertson & Francis R. Kirkham, Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the
United States § 112 (Richard F. Wolfson & Philip B. Kurland eds., 2d ed. 1951) ("A
state court cannot, by omitting to pass upon evidence or to make findings of fact,
deprive a litigant of the benefit of a federal right .... ).
15. See, e.g., Vachon v. New Hampshire, 414 U.S. 478, 480 (1974) (per curiam);
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 545-49 (1965); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. at 238
("[W]e accept the determination of the triers of fact, unless it is so lacking in support in
the evidence that to give it effect would work that fundamental unfairness which is at war
with due process."); Stem et al., supra note 8, § 3.29, at 185. A version of this rule is
codified in Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a), which requires federal appellate courts to accept the
factfindings of lower federal courts in civil cases except upon a conclusion that those
findings are "clearly erroneous." The better view seems to be that the Supreme Court
has given, and ought to give, the same treatment to state and lower federal court
factfindings. See Alfred Hill, The Inadequate State Ground, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 943,
946-47 (1965).
16. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 516-18 (1963); Rogers v.
Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 547 (1961) ("Historical facts 'found' in the perspective framed
by an erroneous legal standard cannot plausibly be expected to furnish the basis for
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based on evidence that is inadmissible as a matter of federal law17 ).18
When one of these exceptional circumstances is present, the Court
has several options. If the existing record permits and the Court is so
inclined, it may make its own finding in service of a final resolution of
the case.19 If the Court is not so inclined, it may-and, if the record,
through no fault of the petitioner, is too incomplete to permit such a
finding, it must-remand the case so that (generally) the next nearest
court in the appellate chain with the capacity to find the facts may do
so, and then resolve the remaining legal and mixed legal-factual issues
on that basis.20 If the record is incomplete for reasons that are the peti-
tioner's fault (for example, he failed to present all the evidence he had,
correct conclusions if and merely because a correct standard is later applied to them.");
Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. at 236; see also Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 79
(1986) (civil procedure "Rule 52(a) 'does not inhibit an appellate court's power to
correct... a finding of fact.., predicated on a misunderstanding of the governing rule
of law,'" quoting Bose Corp. v. Consumer Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485,
501 (1984)).
17. See, e.g., Graham v. Gill, 223 U.S. 643, 644-45 (1912) (mem.); Dower v.
Richards, 151 U.S. 658, 667 (1894).
18. My "adequate and independent factfinding" terminology intentionally mimics
the analogous, but more familiar, "adequate and independent state grounds" doctrine.
The two doctrines are distinct, however. Unlike the "adequate and independent state
ground doctrine," the "adequate and independent factual ground" doctrine applies to
both state and federal court determinations, see supra note 15, and is dictated by statute
on the basis of prudential concerns (e.g., the comparative advantage of the prior state
courts as factfinders, see infra note 48) rather than by constitutional limitations on
federal court jurisdiction. Compare Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 463-70 (1963) (Harlan,
J., dissenting) (discussing the constitutional-jurisdictional nature of the adequate and
independent state grounds doctrine), questioned on other grounds in Wainwright v.
Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87-88 (1977), and overruled on other grounds by Coleman v,
Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2565 (1991) with Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 181
(1953) (Court is not "completely bound by state court determination of any issue
essential to decision of a claim of federal right, else federal law could be frustrated by
distorted fact finding."); Republican River Bridge Co. v. Kansas Pac. Ry., 92 U.S. 315,
317 (1875) ("[T]his court can review the decision of [a state] court on both the law and
the fact, so far as may be necessary to determine the validity of the right set up under the
act of Congress ...."). Linking the established "adequate and independent state
grounds" doctrine to what I here call the "adequate and independent factfinding"
principle are Dower v. Richards, 151 U.S. at 667, and Quimby v. Boyd, 128 U.S. 488,
489 (1888) (writ of error must be dismissed when the "alleged errors involved questions
either of fact, or of state and not of Federal law").
19. See, e.g., Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 92-93 (1964); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322
U.S. 143, 145 (1944) (undertaking own factual analysis because "[t]he record discloses
that neither the trial court nor the Tennessee Supreme Court actually held as a matter of
fact that petitioners' confessions were 'freely and voluntarily made' "); Brooklyn Say.
Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 703 (1945); Carlson v. Washington ex rel. Curtiss, 234
U.S. 103, 106 (1914).
20. See, e.g., Stern et al., supra note 8, § 3.29, at 187 ("Court may leave open the
factual issue, allowing state court to make the necessary findings on remand following
reversal for error of law."); see also United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v.
Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 717 (1983) (remanding because original factfinding may have
been influenced by erroneous view of law).
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contrary to state procedural rules), and if the state courts forbore fur-
ther inquiry because of that default (for example, those courts noted
the existence of a legal issue not resolvable on the facts before them,
but did not address it because the defendant waived the inquiry), the
Court must deny relief because of that state procedural ground, assum-
ing the Court finds it to be both "adequate" and "independent of fed-
eral law."
'2 1
Vary the scenario in one minor respect. The Ninth Circuit decision
is deferred for two months, so that counsel for Smith has no directly
conflicting decision to cite in his certiorari petition. The Court denies
certiorari, leaving Smith to his habeas corpus remedies. 22 Smith ac-
cordingly asks a federal district court for a writ of habeas corpus to
review the legality of his state court conviction, alleging, as the habeas
corpus statute requires, (i) that he "is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States," 23 and (ii) that he
has exhausted his state remedies with regard to the federal claim. 24
As of this moment, at least, the type and scope of review that Smith
can expect from a federal district court 25 on habeas corpus are no mys-
tery either. Should the federal court's analysis of the case turn on legal
questions, its review will proceed de novo.26 The federal court will rely
primarily on the Supreme Court's constitutional precedents, as well as
its own and those of the appropriate circuit court of appeals, consistent
with the degree of freedom to deviate from those precedents that the
court may exercise under the applicable prudential doctrines, most no-
21. See, e.g., James v. Kentucky, 466 U.S. 341, 348-52 (1984); Michigan v. Long,
463 U.S. 1032, 1037-44 (1983); Hathom v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255, 262-63 (1982).
22. The Court and its individual members often combine denials of certiorari with
reminders of the availability of habeas corpus as an alternative. See, e.g., Spencer v.
Georgia, 111 S. Ct. 2276, 2276 (1991) (mem.) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the denial of
certiorari) ("This case appears to present important questions of federal law, and if I
thought our [case law] . . . would prevent us from reaching those issues on federal
habeas review, I would have voted to grant certiorari."); Irvin v. Indiana, 353 U.S. 948,
948 (1957) (per curiam) (denying certiorari "without prejudice to filing for federal
habeas corpus after exhausting state remedies")J.
23. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a) (1988).
24. See id. § 2254(a)-(b). See generally 1 James S. Liebman, Federal Habeas
Corpus Practice and Procedure § 5.3b (1988) (discussing habeas corpus exhaustion
requirements under the Act).
25. Smith initially must file his petition in a federal district court. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2242 (1988); Fed. R. App. P. 22(a); S. Ct. R. 20.4(a); Dixon v. Thompson, 429 U.S.
1080, 1080-81 (1977). An appeal to the appropriate United States Court of Appeals
thereafter is available if the state appeals the district court's grant of the writ or, upon
the issuance of a "certificate of probable cause" to appeal by the district court or court
of appeals, if the petitioner appeals the district court's denial of the writ. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253 (1988). The Supreme Court may review the court of appeals' decision on
certiorari. See 2 Liebman, supra note 24, §§ 32.1-35.2.
26. See, e.g., Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 373-83 (1986); Miller v.
Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 112-13, 115 (1985); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 318 (1963).
19921 2003
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
tably the nonretroactivity principle. 27 Just as the federal court may
draw upon the opinions of other federal circuit and district courts,
other state courts, and academics, it also undoubtedly will pay such at-
tention to the state courts' opinions in Smith's case as those opinions
inspire on their merits and on the strength of their authors' and joiners'
reputations.
If the federal court accepts the long-established "voluntariness"
standard (as, no doubt, it will28 ), and concludes that promises of non-
prosecution do not necessarily violate it, the court also will review de
novo the application of that mixed legal and factual standard to the his-
torical facts of the case.29 If the federal court's analysis turns on an
historical fact, the federal court in most cases will defer to the state
courts' findings with regard to that fact. 30 Exceptions to this rule arise
when there is no finding,3' the finding is inadequate (for example, be-
cause there is no or little evidence to support its2 or because the
factfinding procedure was unfair3 3), or the finding is dependent on a
legal question in the case (for example, the finding was made in the
process of applying an improper legal standard 34).
When one of these exceptional circumstances is present, the fed-
eral court has several options. If the existing record permits, the court
27. See, e.g., Stringer v. Black, 112 S. Ct. 1130, 1135 (1992); Teague v. Lane, 489
U.S. 288, 305-07 (1989) (plurality opinion); infra notes 42-43, 581-585 and
accompanying text.
28. Recently, the Supreme Court unanimously reaffirmed that standard in Arizona
v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1252 (1991); id. at 1261 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); and,
in a habeas corpus context, in Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. at 112.
29. See, e.g., Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. at 112, 113-14; Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S.
at 318; Thomas v. Arizona, 356 U.S. 390, 393 (1958); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 507
(1953) (Frankfurter, J.); supra note 12; infra notes 161-178 and accompanying text.
30. An adequate state court factfinding is presumed correct absent a showing "by
convincing evidence" that it is erroneous. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1988); see, e.g., Burden
v. Zant, I llS. Ct. 862, 864 (1991) (per curiam); Parker v. Dugger, 111 S. Ct. 731, 739
(1991); Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 550 (1981); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. at 318.
31. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1988); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,
410-11 (1986) (plurality opinion); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. at 314, 320; 1 Liebman,
supra note 24, § 20.3c & n.16.
32. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(8), 2254(d) (1988) (no deference due state
court factfindings "not fairly supported by the record" or shown "by convincing
evidence" to be "erroneous"); Parker v. Dugger, 111 S. Ct. at 739; Cabana v. Bullock,
474 U.S. 376, 389-90 (1986); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. at 316; see also I Liebman,
supra note 24, § 28.1, at 440-41 & nn.15-17 (analogizing § 2254(d)'s "convincing
evidence" standard to the "clearly erroneous" standard in Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)).
33. State court factfindings are presumed correct only if made using a "full [and]
fair" procedure. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(6) (1988); accord Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S.
Ct. 1715, 1720 (1992); id. at 1723 (O'ConnorJ., dissenting); Ford v. Wainwright, 477
U.S. at 410-11, 416-18; id. at 427 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 430-31 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74-75, 78 (1977).
34. See, e.g., Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. at 315 n.10.
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must make its own findings in service of a final resolution of the case.35
If, through no fault of the petitioner, the record is too incomplete to
permit such findings, the court then must relegate to the next nearest
responsible tribunal with the capacity to find the facts-itself, or more
often, a federal magistrate-the task of doing so and then of resolving
the remaining legal and mixed legal-factual issues on that basis.3 6 If
the record is incomplete for reasons that are the fault of the petitioner,
and if the state court did not inquire further because of that default, the
federal courts must deny relief because of that state procedural ground,
assuming the ground is both adequate and independent of federal
law.3
7
Albeit perhaps tedious, the foregoing comparison should demon-
strate the near parity between the review of claims of unconstitutional
incarceration secured by the few state prisoners whose certiorari peti-
tions to the Supreme Court are granted on direct review and by the
many state prisoners whose petitions are reviewed by federal district
courts on habeas corpus.38 To be sure, the two modes of revieiv are
not identical. But identical principles applied to courts with different
practical capacities explain the, in any event, rather modest differences.
First, unlike the federal district courts, whose jurisdiction is
mandatory, the Supreme Court only reviews constitutional issues aris-
ing in state criminal cases that it chooses to review. The Court's special
statutory capacity to determine its own docket is, in fact, the product of
two special incapacities-that of the Court to review the number of
cases it would face were review available as of right, and that of any
"Highest Court in the Land" to fulfill its peculiar unifying and conclud-
ing duties with more members than is consistent with efficient en banc
proceedings. Because these latter incapacities do not affect the numeri-
cally more elastic lower federal courts, those courts may more easily be
granted jurisdiction (on application by the aggrieved party) over all
constitutional issues arising in state criminal courts. Indeed, inside and
outside the habeas corpus context, it is precisely the right to lower fed-
35. See, e.g., Parker v. Dugger, 111 S. Ct. at 737, 739; Townsend v. Sain, 373 U.S.
at 310-12; Tague v. Puckett, 874 F.2d 1013, 1015 (5th Cir. 1989).
36. See, e.g., Hull v. Freeman, 932 F.2d 159, 170 n.9 (3d Cir. 1991) ("[I]f an
evidentiary hearing is necessary in a federal habeas case to resolve a disputed factual
question, it should be held in federal district court, rather than state court."); Smart v.
Scully, 787 F.2d 816, 821 (2d Cir. 1986); Grigsby v. Mabry, 637 F.2d 525, 528-29 (8th
Cir. 1980); J. Skelly Wright & Abraham D. Sofaer, Federal Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners: The Allocation of Fact-Finding Responsibility, 75 Yale L.J. 895, 906-19
(1966).
37. See, e.g., Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S. Ct. at 1717-19, 1720 n.5; Coleman
v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991); Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263-64
(1989); 1 Liebman, supra note 24, § 24.1 & nn.18-26 (Supp. 1992).
38. See, e.g., Paul M. Bator et al., Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and The
Federal System 1486 (2d ed. 1973) (it is "impossible" to draw a "logical distinction in




eral court review of even mundane federal questions that has been un-
derstood to justify limiting the Supreme Court's docket to the tiny
minority of especially important federal questions that warrant a discre-
tionary grant of certiorari. 39
In a federal system that for the most part disperses the responsibil-
ity to adjudicate questions of national law among a massive collection
of generalist state judiciaries, it makes sense for Congress to allocate to
the relatively small and expert lower national judiciary the unifying and
concluding function with respect to those legal questions that the High-
est Court ideally should, but in practice cannot manage to, review it-
self.40 And were it then found that, even thus dispersed, the unifying
and concluding function outstripped the capacities of the federal judici-
ary as a whole, it still might make sense to ration the federal judiciary's
performance of that function by concentrating it on cases of particular
national interest. Given the constitutional nature of the federal ques-
tions arising in criminal cases, and the important libertarian interests
jeophrdized by those questions' adverse adjudication, it makes further
sense to use the jurisdictional prerequisite of "custody," as does the
habeas corpus statute, as a proxy for the nationally important questions
whose prior resolution has in fact jeopardized nationally important'
interests. 41
Second, the lower federal judiciary on habeas corpus has less free-
39. See, e.g., Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 561 (1979); Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S.
200, 229 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (in the absence of federal habeas corpus
review, "[t]he burden of the Court's volume of business will be greatly increased, not
merely because a greater number of certiorari petitions would be filed, but by reason of
the effective pressure toward granting petitions more freely. For ... it would require
that every doubt be resolved in favor of granting certiorari, rather than leaving the case
to the District Courts"), overruled on other grounds by Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391
(1963); Patrick E. Higginbotham, Reflections on Reform of § 2254 Habeas Petitions, 18
Hofstra L. Rev. 1005, 1009-10 (1990); PaulJ. Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the
District Courts, 53 Colum. L. Rev. 157, 158 & n.11 (1953) ("[T]he exercise of federal
question jurisdiction by lower federal tribunals presumably permits the Supreme Court
to confine itself ... to the solving of new problems rather than the policing of old
solutions, without the loss that might otherwise be entailed in the effectuation of
national rights.").
40. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 336-39 (1816).
41. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c), 2254(a) (1988). Put differently, what is hypothesized
here and at later stages of my argument, see infra notes 212-217, 329-331 and
accompanying text, is a congressional policy favoring federal review as of right of claims
that simultaneously protect two kinds of liberty interests. First is an interest in not being
convicted and confined in violation of national law. Second is an interest in the
enforcement of national laws that are particularly "important" or "fundamental"
because they limit government interference through means other than conviction and
confinement with the moving party's liberty. For example, overturning a conviction
imposed under a law that violates the prisoner's First Amendment free expression
rights, or obtained through a procedure that violates her Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination, preserves her liberty interests not only in immunity from
federally unlawful conviction and incarceration but also in free expression, or in
protection from physical or psychological coercion.
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dom than the Supreme Court on direct review to deviate from existing
Supreme Court precedent. Formally, this discrepancy arises because a
"nonretroactivity" bar prevents habeas corpus petitioners from ob-
taining relief on the basis of new law declared after the conclusion of
direct review proceedings in their cases.42 In substance, however, the
nonretroactivity bar actually preserves parity between direct and habeas
corpus review. By cutting off access to legal developments after the
date on which the prisoner's direct appeal certiorari petition was de-
nied,43 the nonretroactivity doctrine simply limits the prisoner's habeas
corpus proceedings to the minimum level of review that she would have
received from the Supreme Court on direct review had it granted certi-
orari. All the nonretroactivity doctrine does, therefore, is to assure that
the fortuitous delay in federal review occasioned by a denial of certio-
rari gives the prisoner no more review on habeas corpus than she would
have received on direct review, without giving her any less-thus main-
taining direct review/habeas corpus parity.
Although the nonretroactivity doctrine assures parity from the per-
spective of individual prisoners, disparity still exists from the perspec-
tive of the courts involved. On direct review, only stare decisis constrains
Supreme Court law making; on habeas corpus review, the nonretroac-
tivity doctrine does as well. Again, this disparity arises from the differ-
ent institutional capacities of "supreme" and "inferior" courts. The
nonretroactivity doctrine simply maintains a proper division of labor by
diverting the lower federal courts from law-making to law-applying
tasks, in order to take best advantage of the High Court's law-making
capacities and avoid interfering with the High Court's law-unifying
capacities. 44
Finally, in the tiny and shrinking proportion of cases that turn on
unresolved factual issues requiring evidentiary procedures as opposed
to mere factfinding,45 the powers that federal district courts exercise on
habeas corpus differ from those available to the Supreme Court on di-
rect appeal. On direct review, the Supreme Court must remand to
some other court to take evidence; on habeas corpus review, the federal
42. See authority cited supra note 27; infra notes 581-585 and accompanying text.
43. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 237 (1990); Safflie v. Parks, 494 U.S.
484, 488-89 (1990).
44. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 315-16 (1989) (plurality opinion).
Elsewhere, I have discussed contrary policies that favor a law-making role for the lower
judiciary on habeas corpus. See James S. Liebman, More Than "Slightly Retro": The
Rehnquist Court's Rout of Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction in Teague v. Lane, 18 N.Y.U. Rev.
L. & Soc. Change 537, 564-77 (1990-91) [hereinafter Liebman, More Than "Slightly
Retro"]. But the existence of those competing policies does not undermine the point
being made here - that the current scope of habeas corpus can be explained as an effort
to use the lower federal judiciary as surrogates for the Court's law-applying functions.
45. See Report of the Subcommittee on the Role of the Federal Courts (Richard A.
Posner, Chair), in 1 Federal Courts Study Committee, Working Papers and
Subcommittee Reports 468-515 (July 1, 1990) (district courts hold hearings in only
1.17% of all habeas corpus cases).
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district courts must hear the evidence themselves (or, more usually, as-
sign a magistrate to hear it). This is not a discrepancy between direct
review and habeas corpus, however, but one between courts with only
appellate capacities and those that also have original (evidence-taking)
capacities. 46 Whether on direct or habeas corpus review, the Supreme
Court must remand questions requiring evidentiary proceedings, as
must the federal courts of appeal on habeas corpus.
47
That the Supreme Court on direct appeal remands the evidence-
taking duties to state evidence-taking courts, while the Supreme Court
and federal courts of appeals on habeas corpus remand those duties to
federal evidence-taking courts may appear to be another discrepancy. In
both cases, however the governing principle is the same: the universal
interest in expeditious resolution mandates that the court with evi-
dence-taking capacities highest in the chain of courts that have exer-
cised responsibility over the case resolve all outstanding issues.48
46. Calling habeas corpus an appellate procedure is controversial, although, as I
develop below, both descriptively and historically accurate. See infra note 349 and
accompanying text. Here, however, I am making a point that is not controversial: given
their obligations in, for example, social security cases, federal district judges exercise
significant appellate, as well as original, jurisdiction. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
(1988). As for the constitutional propriety of giving the inferior federal courts "[elvery
variety and form of appellatejurisdiction within the sphere of the [constitutional] power
[over federal questions], extending as well to [review of] the courts of the States as to
those of the nation," with "no distinction ... between civil and criminal causes," see
The Mayor v. Cooper, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 247, 252-53 (1867); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,
14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 338 (1816). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is not to the contrary.
See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462-79 (1983); Rooker
v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923). That doctrine does not hold that "[t]he
jurisdiction possessed by the District Courts [must be] strictly original," hence that the
lower federal courts may never hear appeals from state courts in the guise of adjudicating
collateral attacks on state court judgments. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. at
416. Rather, the doctrine simply forbids federal district court appellate review of state
courtjudgments in the guise of collateral attacks when no federal statute authorizes such
review, see District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 476, 482;
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. at 416, and such review would "interfere with
Congress's contemplated plan for [exclusive] review of state court judgments by the
Supreme Court under [28 U.S.C.] § 1257," Hart & Wechsler, 3d ed., supra note 38, at
1638. The doctrine thus does not apply in the habeas corpus context, because federal
habeas corpus review of state court determinations is statutorily authorized, and
Supreme Court review is not exclusive.
47. I develop these ideas more fully in 1 Liebman, supra note 24, § 28.1 &
nn.24-46.
48. Even Justices inclined to find federalism limitations on the power of the federal
courts have given pragmatic, not federalism, reasons both for the Court's reluctance on
direct review to act as trier of fact in criminal cases arising from the state courts and for
the Court's endorsement of the use of federal habeas corpus courts as triers of fact in
such cases. An excellent example isJustice Harlan's dissent in Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89
(1964). Justice Harlan notes that, unlike direct review in the Supreme Court, which is an
unfit forum for rehearing factual questions that turn on "demeanor and credibility of
witnesses, or contemporaneous understandings of the parties," federal habeas corpus,
"which allows a federal court in appropriate circumstances to develop a fresh record,
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Putting aside, then, these modest differences in technique-all
pragmatic, all stemming from the comparative functional advantages
and disadvantages of trial, appellate, and "highest" courts-the federal
review of state criminal cases available in the Supreme Court on direct
review currently is the same in substance and scope as that available in
the federal courts as a whole on habeas corpus.49 In each instance,
state prisoners have access to a limited form of appellate review. The
review is "limited" because only issues arising under the national con-
stitution, laws, and treaties are cognizable. The review is "appellate" in
the sense that one (federal) court is called upon to review the decisions
of another (state) court or set of courts,50 and, as is characteristic of
common law appellate procedures, the review of legal and mixed legal-
factual determinations is de novo, while review of "adequate and in-
dependent" historical-factual determinations is deferential. 51
Assuming only a congressional conclusion that questions of na-
tional law on which the lives and liberties of individuals depend deserve
final resolution in national courts, the system of parallel review just de-
scribed seems simple and logical. It gives all state prisoners the same
limited appellate review, but spreads out that review among the entire
provides a far more satisfactory vehicle for resolving such unclear issues, for the judge
can evaluate for himself the on-the-spot considerations which no appellate court can
estimate with assurance on a cold record." Id. at 100-01 (citation omitted); see also
Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 322 (1963) (noting comparative advantage of federal
district courts on habeas corpus in obtaining "demeanor evidence" and "adjudging
credibility").
49. In Part IV, I demonstrate that a type of parity has existed for most of American
history.
50. See, e.g., Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 97 (1868) ("(Ain appellate
jurisdiction [is one] to be exercised ... in the revision ofjudicial decisions."); see infra
notes 218-224, 349 and accompanying text.
51. What today is called an "appeal" actually came across the Atlantic and was
firmly ensconced in federal practice from 1789 until 1928 as the common law "writ of
error." In early common law practice, the writ of error was simply a means of reviewing
some, but not all, of the issues tried in a prior court. See Robertson & Kirkham, supra
note 14, § 104, at 194-95 (citing Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 410-11
(1821)). From the beginning, however, federal courts identified the writ of error-and
distinguished it from the civil law procedure that was then called an "appeal"-by
precisely the characteristic that continues to distinguish American appeals, namely, their
bringing up of legal, but not factual, claims for de novo review. See Wiscart v. D'Auchy, 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) 320, 327 (1796). So sacred was the distinction between the de novo
appellate review of legal questions and the limited appellate review of factual questions
that ratification of the Constitution, which provides in Article III, § 2, cl. 2, that the
federal courts' appellate jurisdiction extends to both "law and fact," was made
contingent upon promises to amend the document to preserve the common law practice
protecting jury verdicts from redetermination on appeal. See U.S. Const. amend. VII
("[N]o fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United
State, than according to the rules of the common law."). So firmly rooted was the same
distinction that it survived even after the writ of error was gradually replaced, during the
early part of this century, with the writ of certiorari in most situations and with an
"appeal" in a few situations. See Robertson & Kirkham, supra note 14, § 104, at 195.
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federal judiciary, allocating a small number of obviously important and
difficult cases to the Supreme Court on direct review; a smaller number
of less obviously important and difficult cases to that Court at the end
of the habeas corpus review process; and the rest to federal district
courts with the intermediate possibility of final review in the courts of
appeals in cases exhibiting intermediate levels of importance and
difficulty.
52
Simplicity and logic aside, some members of the Supreme Court
want to change this system by abandoning one of its central features-
de novo review of mixed legal questions in habeas corpus proceedings.
The next Part analyzes the arguments that Justice Thomas made in
favor of and that Justices O'Connor and Kennedy made against that
change in Wright v. West.
II. WRONG AND WRIGHT: THE OPPOSING VIEWS OF JUSTICE THOMAS
AND JUSTICES O'CONNOR AND KENNEDY
A. The Questions Presented and Prescribed
In May 1980, the Virginia Supreme Court summarily affirmed
Frank Robert West's conviction for stealing $3500 dollars worth of
merchandise from a cabin in Westmoreland County, Virginia. 53 The
evidence against West consisted entirely of his unexplained-or, in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, hisfalsely explained 54-posses-
sion of some of the stolen merchandise. As permitted by state law (and
longstanding common law), the trial court's instructions invited the
jury to infer West's theft from his possession of recently stolen
property.
On appeal, West argued that the evidence was insufficient to sup-
port a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. A year before, in
Jackson v. Virginia,55 the United States Supreme Court for the first time
had interpreted the Due Process Clause to require evidence sufficient
to convince a rational juror of the defendant's guilt beyond a reason-
able doubt.56 Jackson characterized this new constitutional sufficiency
standard as a "mixed legal and factual" question subject to de novo fed-
eral court reconsideration on direct appeal and (as in Jackson itself on
habeas corpus. 57
West did not seek certiorari. Seven years later, however, after ad-
ditional postconviction proceedings in the Virginia courts, West filed a
52. See supra note 25.
53. The facts and proceedings are described in Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. 2482,
2484-86 (1992) (plurality opinion).
54. West testified that, approximately two weeks before his arrest, he had
purchased the stolen merchandise "from a Ronnie Elkins" at a flea market, the location
of which "I don't remember." Id. at 2484 n.1.
55. 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
56. See id. at 324.
57. Id. at 318.
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habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the East-
ern District of Virginia, again alleging the constitutional insufficiency of
the evidence against him. On appeal from the district court's denial of
that petition, the Fourth Circuit concluded that, even as bolstered by
West's testimony, which elevated the premise of the inference of theft
from unexplained to falsely explained recent possession, the inference
did not provide sufficient evidence of West's guilt.58
On certiorari to review the Fourth Circuit's decision, Virginia
mainly relied on the mistaken application of Jackson to a case in which
negative inferences from the defendant's own testimony supplied suffi-
cient evidence of guilt.59 An amici curiae brief in support of certiorari
filed by a number of state attorneys general added some cachet to the
petition, arguing in defense of the widely used inference of theft from
possession of recently stolen goods.60 That cachet was enhanced both
by a nonretroactivity issue in Virginia's petition-that the Fourth Cir-
cuit's effective invalidation of the 400-year-old inference amounted to
new law61-and by the argument in the CriminalJustice Legal Founda-
tion's amicus curiae brief that Jackson and most other "mixed questions
of law and fact" should be relegated to a second tier of constitutional
claims that are not cognizable in habeas corpus proceedings.
62
On December 16, 1991, the Court granted certiorari on the ques-
tions Virginia presented. 65 Two days later, the Court, with Justices
Blackmun and Stevens dissenting, sua sponte directed the parties, and
invited the Solicitor General as amicus curiae, to address the following
additional question:
In determining whether to grant a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a
state court, should a federal court give deference to the state
court's application of law to the specific facts of the peti-
tioner's case or should it review the state court's determina-
tion de novo?64
The Court's order seemed to announce judgment day for the
Great Writ. The guts of the habeas corpus remedy is de novo review of
mixed legal and factual questions. Adoption of the Court's proposal
58. See West v. Wright, 931 F.2d 262, 268-70 (4th Cir. 1991), rev'd, Wright v.
West, 112 S. Ct. 2482 (1992).
59. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, 16-19, Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. 2482
(1992) (No. 91-542).
60. See Brief of Amicus Curiae on the Merits in Support of Petitioner at 2-7,
Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. 2482 (1992) (No. 91-542).
61. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 59, at 8-13.
62. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the CriminalJustice Legal Foundation in Support of
the Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, 3-12, Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. 2482 (1992) (No.
91-542). The Foundation abandoned this argument in its amicus curiae brief on the
merits after the habeas corpus modification the Court proposed in its order granting
certiorari leap-frogged the Foundation's less radical proposal.
63. See Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. 656 (1991) (mem.).
64. Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. 672 (1991) (mem.).
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would be a serious, perhaps mortal, blow to the writ's function as a
substitute for the review the petitioner would have received had the
Supreme Court the resources to review the case.
The Court took three paragraphs to reach the outcome of Wright,
which was pure anticlimax. 65 Whatever might have been the case had
West kept his own counsel, his trip to the witness stand to offer a less-
than-credible explanation for possessing the recently stolen items, cou-
pled with the possession itself, provided all the evidence needed to find
him guilty of theft. But the remaining fifty-five paragraphs of legal
analysis in four separate opinions, all of them dicta, most of them set
forth in the form and tone of legal briefs, are pure ante-climax-a call
to arms for the final battle to come.
B. A Critical Analysis ofJustice Thomas' Arguments Against De Novo
Habeas Corpus Review
1. Summary of (a Conservative's) Argument. A Radical Reform Rjected as
Too Much, Too Recent, Too Short-Lived. -Justice Thomas begins his argu-
ments against de novo habeas corpus review by arguing that it is a recent
phenomenon in the United States.66 For roughly the first eighty-five
years of the nation's existence, according to Justice Thomas, only the
rarest of legal claims-"challenge[s to] the jurisdiction of the court that
had rendered the judgment under which [the petitioner] was in cus-
tody"-were cognizable in habeas corpus.67 Thereafter, the number of
cognizable claims slowly mounted, stair-step fashion, beginning in
1874 with claims of punishment under a "sentence not authorized by
statute," 68 progressing in 1879 to claims of conviction "under [an] un-
constitutional statute," 69 and then in 1915 and 1923 to all "federal
claims by state prisoners if no state court had provided a full and fair
opportunity to litigate those claims." '70 Before 1953, however, "absent
an alleged jurisdictional defect, 'habeas corpus would not lie for [a
state] prisoner ... given an adequate opportunity to obtain full and fair
consideration of his federal claim in the state courts.' -71 Accordingly,
it was only in Brown v. Allen7 2 in 1953 that the Court opened up habeas
corpus to "constitutional claims [generally], even if the state court has
65. See Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. 2482, 2492-93 (1992).
66. See id. at 2486-87 (plurality opinion).
67. Id. at 2486 (citing In re Wood, 140 U.S. 278, 285-87 (1891), and Ex parte
Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 202 (1830)).
68. Id. (plurality opinion) (citing Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 176
(1874)).
69. Id. (plurality opinion) (citing Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 377 (1879)).
70. Id. (plurality opinion) (citing Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 91-92 (1923),
and Frank v. Magnum, 237 U.S. 309, 335-36 (1915)).
71. Id. (plurality opinion) (quoting Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 459-60 (1963)
(Harlan, J., dissenting), questioned in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87-88 (1977),
and overruled by Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2565 (1991)).
72. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
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rejected all such claims after a full and fair hearing." 73
Justice Thomas attributes this historical analysis to Justice Harlan,
but the analysis-down to the decisions whose names are inscribed on
each of the stair steps of expanded cognizability74-is Paul Bator's. 7
5
Although Bator's neat historical progression of ever-expanding judicial
cognizability has a pleasingly Whiggian cast to it, Justice Thomas uses
the point (as did Justice Harlan and Professor Bator) in a decidedly
anti-Whiggian fashion, to suggest that current conditions arrived too
recently, and preexisting conditions changed too much and too rapidly,
to give current conditions any precedential credence. 76
Professor Bator first made this point just ten years after Brown al-
legedly took the last, largest, and least credible step in the progression.
Making the same "too much change too recently" point tell today, some
forty years after Brown, obviously presents a problem. For that reason,
perhaps, Justice Thomas deviates at this point from the Batorian ortho-
doxy. What Bator saw as a giant stair step constructed in 1953, Justice
Thomas sees as only a smaller step attached to an imperceptibly rising
ramp that reached the existing level of habeas corpus review only in
Miller v. Fenton7 7 in 1985. Thus, in considering the question of how
carefully habeas corpus courts were to scrutinize the raft of state court
constitutional determinations newly thrust before them by Brown, Jus-
tice Thomas claims that Brown actually demanded only that "the state-
court adjudication 'ha[ve] resulted in a satisfactory conclusion.' ",78 In
support of the view that a "satisfactory" conclusion did not necessarily
mean "one that the habeas court considered correct, as opposed to
merely reasonable," Justice Thomas quotes Justice Reed's statement in
Brown that:
As the state and federal courts have the same responsibilities
to protect persons from violation of their constitutional rights,
we conclude that a federal district court may decline, without a
rehearing of the facts, to award a writ of habeas corpus to a
state prisoner where the legality of such detention has been
determined, on the facts presented, by the highest state court
with jurisdiction. 79
73. Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. at 2487 (plurality opinion) (citing Brown v. Allen,
344 U.S. at 458).
74. See supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text.
75. See Bator, supra note 6, at 465-507. Bator's article is acknowledged both in
Justice Harlan's dissent in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. at 449 n.1, and, via a "See generally"
citation, in Justice Thomas' opinion in Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. at 2486 (plurality
opinion).
76. See Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. at 2486-87 (plurality opinion); Fay v. Noia, 372
U.S. at 457-63 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Bator, supra note 6, at 500-07.
77. 474 U.S. 104 (1985).
78. Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. at 2487 (plurality opinion) (quoting Brown v. Allen,
344 U.S.443, 463 (1953) (opinion of Reed, J.)).
79. Id. at 2487-88 (plurality opinion) (quoting Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. at 465
(opinion of Reed, J.)).
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Justice Thomas also quotes Justice Frankfurter's statements in Brown
that "a 'prior determination may guide [the] discretion [of the district
court] in deciding upon the appropriate course to be followed in dis-
posing of the application'" and "that 'there is no need for the federal
judge, if he could, to shut his eyes to the State consideration.' "80
Justice Thomas acknowledges that de novo review of legal and
mixed legal-factual questions was the rule by the late 1980s, but he
characterizes that development as having taken place slowly and essen-
tially by accident:
In subsequent cases, we repeatedly affirmed Brown's
teaching that mixed constitutional questions are "open to re-
view on collateral attack," Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 342
(1980), without ever explicitly considering whether that "re-
view" should be de novo or deferential .... Nonetheless, be-
cause these [1960s, 1970s, and 1980s] cases never qualified
our early citation of Brown for the proposition that a federal
corpus court must reexamine mixed constitutional questions
"independently," Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 318 (1963)
(dictum), we have gradually come to treat as settled the rule
that mixed constitutional questions are "subject to plenary
federal review" on habeas. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 112
(1985).81
Relying on its curious chronology, this paragraph argues, in essence,
that de novo review arose only in 1985, when the Court transformed
Townsend v. Sain 's "dictum" into the holding of Miller v. Fenton. In this
way, Justice Thomas constructs an anti-Whiggian dream argument.
Miller v. Fenton endorsed the de novo review rule on the basis of stare
decisis.82 As such, Justice Thomas claims, the existing de novo review
rule deserves only minimal credence because the Court accepted it only
recently, by mistakenly treating as foregone what never previously had
occurred.
Next, having shortened the pedigree of broad habeas corpus re-
view from 1789 to late 1985, Justice Thomas proceeds to supplement
his "too much, too soon" attack on de novo habeas corpus review with a
80. Id. at 2488 (plurality opinion) (citations omitted) (quoting Brown v. Allen, 344
U.S. at 500, 508 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.)).
81. Id. at 2488-89 (plurality opinion).
82. See Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 115 (1985). The passage quoted in text
does not actually specify 1985 as the date on which de novo review first occurred, but only
as the date on which that reform can be said to have "gradually" come to be "settled."
Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. at 2489 (plurality opinion). But having initially said only that
de novo review arose sometime before 1985, Justice Thomas thereafter identifies 1985 as
the year in which it did occur, thus squeezing as many months and years as possible out
of the period in which the rule has been settled. See id. at 2491. Justice Thomas'
ultimate position seems to be that the de novo review rule was not even accepted as of
1985. See id. at 2489 (discussing Court's "apparent adherence to a standard of de novo




"too short" critique. He contends that the Court's 1989 nonretroactiv-
ity decision in Teague v. Lane 8 3 drastically-albeit only implicitly-lim-
ited the de novo review rule.8 4 For Thomas, the importance of Teague 's
nonretroactivity doctrine is not so much its preclusion of habeas corpus
claims premised on new rules of law as its definition of "new rules" as
"all rules 'susceptible to debate among reasonable minds.' "85 Thus, if
a state court applying existing law has reasonably rejected a claim, the
habeas corpus petitioner cannot thereafter secure relief on the claim
without gaining the benefit of a "new rule," which is forbidden under
Teague.8 6 "In other words," Justice Thomas continues, whatever may
have been the case between 1985 and 1989, today "a federal habeas
court 'must defer to the state court's decision rejecting the claim unless
that decision is patently unreasonable.' "87
Justice Thomas thus transforms the broad habeas corpus review of
federal constitutional claims that Justice Harlan and Professor Bator
found "too much" of and "too recent" a reform in 1963 into one that
did not even occur until 1985, and was thereafter rendered "too short"
by its emasculation in 1989.
Finally, the trap set by Justice Thomas' "incredible shrinking" his-
tory of the Great Writ slams shut:
In light of these principles, petitioners ask that we recon-
sider our statement in Miller v. Fenton that mixed constitutional
questions are "subject to plenary federal review" on habeas.
By its terms, Teague itself is not directly controlling, because
West sought federal habeas relief under Jackson [v. Virginia],
which was decided a year before his conviction became final
on direct review. Nonetheless, petitioners contend, the logic
of Teague makes our statement in Miller untenable. Petitioners
argue that if deferential review for reasonableness strikes an
appropriate balance with respect to purely legal claims, then it
must strike an appropriate balance with respect to mixed ques-
tions as well... [especially given] that under the habeas stat-
ute itself, a state-court determination of a purely factual
question must be "presumed correct," and can be overcome
only by "convincing evidence," unless one of eight statutorily
enumerated exceptions is present. It makes no sense, peti-
tioners assert, for a habeas court generally to review factual
determinations and legal determinations deferentially, but to
review applications of law to fact de novo.88
Encapsulated, Justice Thomas' argument runs thus: De novo review
of legal claims in habeas corpus? Sure, we accidentally stumbled into
83. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
84. See Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. at 2489 (plurality opinion).
85. Id. at 2489-90 (quoting Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 415 (1990)).
86. See Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. at 2490 (plurality opinion).
87. Id. (quoting Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. at 422 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
88. Id. at 2491 (plurality opinion) (citations omitted).
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that rule for a few years in the mid-to-late 1980s. But we corrected our
error implicitly in some decisions decided a few years later, and now
ought to correct it explicitly as well.
2. Surface Analytical Shortcomings. -Justice Thomas' classically con-
servative rhetorical strategy is unconvincing. First, consider only some
analytical problems that appear on the face of the opinion, beginning
with a rhetorical move that may have been designed to be transparent.
In his last paragraph on habeas corpus, Justice Thomas suddenly
switches from declaiming the plurality's own views about the history of
habeas corpus to reporting the views that "petitioners ask that we"
adopt.89 This trope gives Justice Thomas a speck of cover as he transits
from his nineteen-paragraph flight of dicta on habeas corpus to his
three-paragraph resolution of the case on a mundane criminal proce-
dure ground90-namely, that he was merely providing the usual sum-
mary of the parties' positions. Not least because ninety percent of this
not-so-usual summary is devoted to one side's position,9' there can be
little doubt of the ownership of the views that the Court's own order
directed "petitioners [to] ask" that the Court adopt.
Next consider Justice Thomas' deflation of the historical scope of
habeas corpus review. Notice that Justice Thomas' entire discussion of
pre-1953 habeas corpus review deals exclusively with the limited range
of cognizable claims.9 2 Not a word is said about the scope of review of the
claims that were, concededly, cognizable-the issue the Court put at
stake in Wright.9 3 On that question, Justice Thomas' opinion reveals
not a whit about the pre-1953 history.
Justice Thomas attempts to camouflage this discrepancy by stating
that before 1953, unless the state court decision implicated a cogniza-
ble claim, the decision was "entitled to 'absolute respect' " in habeas
corpus proceedings.9 4 This characterization is no more accurate, how-
ever, than a statement that, when a federal court refuses to hear a diver-
89. Id.
90. See id. at 2492-93.
91. See id. at 2486-91.
92. Justice Thomas' discussion of the pre-1953 history paraphrases Bator's and
Harlan's. Yet Professor Bator believed that the Court exercised de novo review of legal
claims (i.e., "ordinary review on the merits") from the moment it acquired jurisdiction
under the 1867 habeas corpus act in 1885. See Bator, supra note 6, at 479. Although
Bator opposed de novo review of mixed questions by the Supreme Court on direct review, he
argued forcefully that, if such review was available on direct review, it also, in fairness,
should be available on habeas corpus review. See id. at 502-11. Justice Harlan favored
de novo review of mixed questions in both situations. See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89,
100-01 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 459-60 (1963)
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoted infra at text accompanying note 168), questioned in
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87-88 (1977), and overruled by Coleman v.
Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2565 (1991).
93. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
94. Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. at 2486 (plurality opinion) (quoting Kuhlmann v.
Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 446 (1986) (plurality opinion)) (emphasis omitted).
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sity action in which less than $50,000 is in controversy, it is paying
"absolute" deference to any determination a state court with jurisdic-
tion might reach.95 Using this same approach, one could argue-based
on the rule that exclusively state-law claims are not cognizable in
habeas corpus proceedings96-that because the federal courts must pay
"absolute deference" to state courts' resolution of state law claims, fed-
eral courts also should be required to defer absolutely to state courts'
resolution of claims that are cognizable.
Nor do we learn anything from Justice Thomas' opinion about the
standard of review of cognizable legal claims after 1953. His quotation
of Justice Reed's conclusion in Brown, "'that a federal district court
may decline, without a rehearing of the facts, to award a writ of habeas
corpus to a state prisoner where the legality of such detention has been
determined, on thefacts presented, by the highest state court with juris-
diction,' ,,97 says exactly nothing about whether a federal court may de-
cline to award a writ of habeas corpus without a rehearing of the law.
Justice Frankfurter's statement, quoted by Justice Thomas, "that
'there is no need for the federal judge, if he could, to shut his eyes to
the State consideration' "98 is likewise uninformative on the desired
standard of review. The statement says only the obvious-that the re-
viewing court, in making its independent judgment, might find it edify-
ing to read what another court in the same case, on the same facts, has
said about the same legal issue. The same point can be made by draw-
ing on a more familiar context: That the Supreme Court on direct re-
view of constitutional legal questions does not blind itself to the
persuasive views of other courts and commentators does not mean that
it "defers" to their judgments.
Justice Thomas thus gives no clues to the Court's understanding of
the standard of review of cognizable claims even after Brown came
down in 1953. Indeed, cleared of the underbrush, all Justice Thomas'
habeas corpus history reveals about the standard of review is that, at
some time in or before 1985, the Court had "come to treat as settled
the rule that mixed constitutional questions are 'subject to plenary fed-
eral review' on habeas." 99
Coming then to Teague, Justice Thomas uses the connecting word
"Thus" to equate what on inspection are two quite different principles.
95. Ironically, having used the stratagem himself, Justice Thomas criticizes Justice
O'Connor for confusing cognizability and standard of review rules. See id. at 2489 n.7
(plurality opinion).
96. See, e.g., Estelle v. McGuire, 112 S. Ct. 475, 480, 481-82 (1991).
97. Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. at 2488 (plurality opinion) (quoting Brown v. Allen,
344 U.S. 443, 465 (1953) (opinion of Reed, J.)) (emphasis added); see supra note 80 and
accompanying text.
98. Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. at 2488 (plurality opinion) (quoting Brown v. Allen,
344 U.S. at 508 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.)).




First is the Teague principle that in deciding what rule of law to apply, a
habeas corpus court must discard any rule relied on by the petitioner
that was "susceptible to debate among reasonable minds" at the time
of the petitioner's direct appeal proceedings. 00 Second is the quite
different principle (not adopted in Teague) that, once having used the
"reasonable minds could differ" standard to ascertain the "old" rule of
law that governs, "a federal habeas court [additionally] 'must defer to
the state court's decision rejecting the claim unless that decision is pa-
tently unreasonable.' "101 The two principles are different, of course,
because "debate" over a rule's content is not the same thing as debate
over its application once its content has been ascertained.
Consider two more analytical problems. In support of a rule of
deferential legal review, Justice Thomas notes that, "under the habeas
statute itself, a state-court determination of a purely factual question
must be 'presumed correct,' and can be overcome only by 'convincing
evidence.' "102 The first problem is in leaving unsaid what any reader
of Civil Procedure Rule 52(a) or the Seventh Amendment, to name but
two sources, must know: Common law practice has long not only toler-
ated, but actually required, that reviewing courts exercise widely differ-
ent standards of review in examining the legal determinations and the
factual findings of a prior court.
103
The second problem in the same passage appears in the curious
word "itself" with which Justice Thomas modifies his lone reliance on
the habeas corpus statute. In that word lurks an assumption that the
statute is the last or, at least, not a very rewarding, place to look for the
standard of legal review that the statute adopts. In fact, the statute says
quite a lot about standards of review in habeas corpus proceedings. 0
4
Apart from the statute's requirement of deferential fact review, how-
ever, nothing it says appears in Justice Thomas' opinion.
On analysis, Justice Thomas' opinion supports only four limited
conclusions about habeas corpus review from 1789 to the present:
First, at points prior to 1953, there were fewer cognizable claims than
100. Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 415 (1990); accord supra notes 42-44 and
accompanying text.
101. Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. at 2490 (plurality opinion) (quoting Butler v.
McKellar, 494 U.S. at 422 (Brennan, J., dissenting)). Applied to confession claims,
Thomas' double-deference test would require federal judges not only to apply the
"voluntariness" test, because no reasonable jurist could think that any other test applies,
but also to defer to erroneous but "reasonable" state court applications of that test. In
effect, the double-deference rule says the following to the state court being reviewed:
"The rule you applied deviates from the rule that any rational jurist would have applied.
As a result, the petitioner is in prison (or will be executed). We uphold your decision
anyway, because the extent of your irrationality is 'reasonable.'"
102. Id. at 2491 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)
(1988)).
103. See supra notes 12-18, 28-34, 51 and accompanying text.
104. See infra notes 376-389, 516, 522 and accompanying text.
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after that year, to which some unspecified standard of review of legal
questions was applied. Second, at some unspecified point prior to
1985, that standard of review of legal and mixed legal-factual claims
was de novo. Third, since 1989, habeas corpus courts choosing between
the rule the state courts applied and a later rule on which the petitioner
relies have been forbidden to use the petitioner's rule if reasonable
judges could have disagreed about its applicability at the time the peti-
tioner sought direct review in the Supreme Court. Fourth, there is a
statute involved, which requires deferentialfact review.
Whatever else might be said about these four conclusions, they are
entirely consistent with the dual system of "limited federal appellate
review" of criminal convictions laid out in Part I above.
3. Analytical Shortcomings Slightly Below the Surface. - Justice
Thomas' discussion of the Supreme Court's habeas corpus decisions
makes no case for jettisoning the "settled" rule of de novo habeas
corpus review of legal and mixed legal-factual questions. But what of
the decisions themselves? Digging just below the surface of Justice
Thomas' opinion, do we find any support in those decisions for his anti-
Whiggian effort to isolate the de novo review rule as too much, too re-
cent, and too short-lived a reform to deserve any credence?
a. Before Brown v. Allen. - Justice Thomas' pre-1953 history is
Professor Bator's, and, in Parts III and IV, it will require going well
below the surface of the pre-1953 decisions to discover the flaws in that
analysis. Suffice it here to make two comments. First, Justice Thomas
accurately paraphrases the Batorian history for the limited point the
history supports-that the claims cognizable in habeas corpus were
originally few and expanded only slowly, stair-step style, through 1953.
Second, that history by now is eminently respectable-indeed black let-
ter, thanks to its enshrinement in opinions by Justices Harlan and Pow-
ell and in the Hart and Wechsler holy writ. 10 5
b. Brown v. Allen: Justice Reed's Majority Opinion. - Coming then
to Brown v. Allen,1 0 6 the first point to emphasize is that, fast approach-
ing its fortieth birthday, the decision has been the law of the land dur-
ing twenty percent of the nation's history. The rhetorical punch
Professor Bator derived from the decision's tender age in 1963 is lost
now, and the decision may well be the pre-1954 Supreme Court deci-
sion that lower federal courts most frequently have relied on since
then.10 7 Brown by now is a Supreme Court classic.
105. See, e.g., Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 453 (1986) (Powell, J., for the
plurality); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 476 (1976) (Powell, J., for the majority); Fay v.
Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 449-63 (1963) (Harlan,J., dissenting), questioned in Wainwright v.
Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87-88 (1977), and overruled by Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct.
2546, 2565 (1991); Hart & Wechsler, 2d ed., supra note 38, at 1428-29, 1465-77.
106. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
107. Lexis reports 1196 citations to Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953), in its
"Genfed" file of federal decisions. Citation is not reliance, of course, but even just
considering decisions since the mid-1980s, making no effort to be comprehensive, and
1992] 2019
COLUMBIA L4W REVIEW
Brown has two majority opinions-one by Justice Reed, another by
Justice Frankfurter. 08 The criticism often directed at Justice Reed be-
cause of the terseness of his opinion on the cognizability of claims and
the scope of review is unfair.'0 9 Twice before Brown, in Hawk v. 01-
son11 ° and Darr v. Burford,"' Justice Reed extensively laid out the
Court's views on the Great Writ. His terseness in Brown accordingly is
a manifestation, not of uncertainty, but instead of an explicit decision
to incorporate and rely on the Court's opinions in Hawk and Darr." 1
2
The cited passages in Hawk and Darr clearly reveal Justice Reed's
broad view of both the cognizability and standard of review issues. On
cognizability, the two decisions make clear that well before Brown,
"[t]he writ... command[ed] general recognition as the essential rem-
edy to safeguard a citizen against imprisonment by State or Nation in
violation of" apparently any and all of "his constitutional rights.' 11s
On the standard of review, Hawk and Darr likewise make clear that fed-
eral habeas corpus courts have "the responsibility to review the state
analyzing only one of several facets of Brown's meaning for modem federal courts, my
treatise collects 166 post-Brown circuit court decisions affording de novo review of mixed
questions of fact and law. See I Liebman, supra note 24, § 20.3d nn.24-57.5 (including
1992 Supp.).
108. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 452-65 (1953) (opinion of Reed, J.); id, at
488 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.). The reporter's syllabus, id. at 443, Justice Reed's
opinion, id. at 452, a reporter's note introducing the Frankurter opinion, id. at 488 n.*,
and Justice Frankfurter's opinion, id. at 497, all characterize the Frankfurter opinion,
including its discussion of the standard of review, as an opinion of the Court. See, e.g.,
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 79, 87 (1977); Henry M. Hart, Foreword: The Time
Chart of the Judges, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 84, 106 n.64 (1959). In addition to discussing
cognizability and the standard of review, Justice Reed's opinion resolves the cases
before the court, id. at 465-87 (opinion of Reed, J.), withJustice Frankfurter dissenting
in part, id. at 554 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), and Justice Frankfurter's opinion decides
the impact of a denial of certiorari on subsequent habeas corpus proceedings, id. at
489-97 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.), with Justice Reed dissenting, id. at 456-57 (opinion
of Reed, J.).
109. See Hart & Wechsler, 2d ed., supra note 38, at 1473 ("On the question of the
appropriateness of exercising habeas corpus jurisdiction, Justice Reed simply assumes
that the federal habeas court must redetermine the constitutional issue on the merits.");
Brief Amicus Curiae of the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation, at 15, Wright v. West,
112 S. Ct. 2482 (1992) (No. 91-542) [hereinafter CJLF Brief] (calling Reed's opinion on
the standard of review "opaque").
110. 326 U.S. 271 (1945).
111. 339 U.S. 200 (1950), overruled on other grounds by Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391
(1963).
112. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. at 452 (citing Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. at 274;
Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. at 203).
113. Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. at 203 (citing Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. at 274).
Bator notwithstanding, all nine members of the Brown Court believed that habeas corpus
had opened up to all constitutional claims well before 1953. See Brown v. Allen, 344
U.S. at 452 (opinion of Reed, J.); id. at 498-501 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.), id. at 549
(Black, J., dissenting); id. at 532-33 & n.4 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (acknowledging the
availability of habeas corpus for all due process violations but lamenting Court's
expansion of Due Process Clause).
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proceedings."1 4 When the "[p]etitioner states a good cause of action
... that through denial of asserted constitutional rights he has not had
the kind of trial in a state court which the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment requires," and when he "prove[s] his allega-
tions," relief is required."15
In only one instance did Justice Reed believe that the prior adjudi-
cation of the legal issues in the prisoner's habeas corpus petition might
deserve deference. If on prior applications to the federal courts, "the
merits ... have already been decided against the petitioner," a federal
court entertaining a second application "may," but need not, "decline
to examine further."116 In Reed's view, these potentially preclusive
prior federal adjudications on "the merits" included not only review of
prior federal habeas corpus applications 1 7 and prior Supreme Court
grants of certiorari on direct appeal,"18 but also-in a view subse-
quently rejected in Brown' ' 9 -- the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari
on direct appeal.'
20
Incorporation by reference aside, Justice Reed's discussion of the
standard of review issue in Brown itself is far less elliptical than often is
claimed. Indeed, a three-page passage in his opinion is a veritable com-
pendium of progressively more muscular standards of federal review
applied in different habeas corpus contexts. According to Reed, in
habeas corpus review of state court decisions, total deference is due a
decision premised on an adequate and independent state ground;' 2 1
substantial deference is due a fairly achieved state court determination
of fact;1 22 and "some" deference is due a priorfederal determination of
the same claim in an earlier petition in the same case, including a prior
Supreme Court denial of certiorari on direct appeal.' 23 Then, at the
most muscular end of the standard-of-review conitinuum, comes the cru-
cial sentence covering the standard of review of legal claims previously
adjudicated by state courts: "In other circumstances, the state adjudica-
114. Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. at 276; see Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. at 216-18.
115. Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. at 278-79; see also Bator, supra note 6, at 479 (as
early as 1886, Court "seemingly equate[d] the substantive scope of the habeas
jurisdiction with ordinary review on the merits"); Hart, supra note 108, at 105-06
(charting development of de novo habeas corpus review of state court resolution of due
process challenges).
116. Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. at 215.
117. See id. at 214-15 (discussing Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224 (1924)); see also
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 456-57 (1953) (opinion of Reed, J.) (discussing same).
118. See Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. at 224 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (reading
Justice Reed's majority opinion to require deference to prior Supreme Court
adjudications on grant of certiorari).
119. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. at 489-97 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
120. See Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. at 214-15 (citing Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S.
224 (1924)); cases cited infra note 519.
121. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. at 458 (opinion of Reed, J.).
122. See id. at 458.
123. See id. at 456-57.
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tion carries the weight that federal practice gives to the conclusion of a
court of last resort of another jurisdiction on federal constitutional is-
sues. It is not resjudicata.'
24
Reed obviously knew well how to prescribe a rule of deference, and
this passage was the perfect place to do so, if he thought that a defer-
ence rule should apply to habeas corpus review of state court legal de-
terminations. Yet he prescribed nothing of the sort.
More importantly, consider what Reed actually said: The state
supreme court's resolution of the federal legal question in the case at
hand is due exactly as much attention as the decision of any other state
supreme court on the same point. Either decision is what used to be
called "persuasive legal authority," a category that includes-among
many other things to which "respect" but not "deference," strictijuri, is
due-Blackstone's Commentaries, Justinian, dissenting opinions by
Holmes, Brandeis and both Harlans, all manner of English decisions,
and (in desperation) even law review articles. Indeed, Justice Reed di-
rected lower federal courts to pay to state court legal determinations
exactly the attention that state courts often claim to pay lower federal
court precedents in the course of politely refusing to defer to them. 125
In short, Justice Reed's opinion invites federal habeas corpus
courts to behave towards state court legal determinations exactly as the
Supreme Court behaves on direct review. It was no doubt for that rea-
son that Justice Reed indiscriminately annotated his discussion of the
standard of review issue with citations not only of habeas corpus cases
but also of Supreme Court opinions on direct review of state criminal
judgments.126
Reed did not just prescribe de novo review; he exercised it. Noting
that the resolution of the particular cases before the Court depended
on whether "petitioners received [trials] consonant with standards ac-
cepted by this Nation as adequate to justify their convictions" because
they "lie in the compass of the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment,"' 127 Justice Reed reviewed the
constitutional issues in a microscopic fashion that can only be called de
novo.1 28 Indeed, Reed overlooked the lower federal courts' erroneous
124. Id. at 458.
125. See Bradshaw v. State, 286 So. 2d 4, 6 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 919
(1974) ("[A] decision of a federal trial court, while persuasive if well-reasoned, is not by
any means binding on the courts of a state."); Dugas v. State, 277 A.2d 620, 621 (Md.
App. 1971) ("[A]lthough a decision of the Fourth Circuit is entitled to respect, it is not
binding upon us [i.e., upon a Maryland appellate court]."); see also Robert M. Cover &
T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 Yale
LJ. 1035, 1052-53 & n.82 (1977) (citing cases).
126. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. at 458-59 & n.8 (citing Malinski v. New York,
324 U.S. 401 (1945) (direct review); Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944) (habeas
corpus); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935) (same)).
127. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. at 465 (opinion of Reed, J.) (emphasis added).
128. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. at 465, 465-87 (opinion of Reed, J.); see also
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expressions of deference to the Court's prior denials of certiorari 29
only because the lower federal courts did not defer to the state court
judgments, but instead "recognized the power of the District Court to
reexamine federal constitutional issues even after trial and review by a
state."130 Perhaps most tellingly, Reed held that, even if the admission
of the confession in Brown were harmless, habeas corpus relief was still
required if the confession was unconstitutionally secured.13' It is hard
to imagine less deference to an erroneous state court legal determina-
tion than a decision to reverse the determination though it made no
difference to the outcome.
How much of Justice Reed's pointed remarks on the standard of
review question makes it into Justice Thomas' paraphrase forty years
later? By expositional sleight of hand, the core of Justice Reed's analy-
sis disappears. Justice Thomas dutifully reprises Justice Reed's lesser-
included-conclusion that "a state-court judgment of conviction 'is not
res judicata,' " but leaves out the greater-including statement just pre-
ceding it-that respect, but not deference, is due the state court judg-
ment.13 2 Equally troubling is Justice Thomas' diligent quotation of
Justice Reed's views on the deference due state courtfactual findings-
misleadingly described as Justice Reed's views on "the federal courts[']
... discretion to take into consideration the fact that a state court has
previously rejected the federal claims asserted on habeas"13 3-at the
same time as he ignores Reed's quite differently formulated views on
the deference due state court legal determinations.
c. Brown v. Allen: Justice Frankfurter's Majority Opinion. - Because
Justice Reed so clearly ensconced a de novo review rule in his opinion
for the Court in Brown, the imprecision Justice Thomas claims to find in
Justice Frankfurter's second majority opinion hardly matters. But be-
ing in fact even more explicit, Frankfurter's reiteration deserves
attention.
Having emphasized his "sharp" disagreement with Justice Reed's
view of the weight due prior Supreme Court denials of certiorari in
habeas corpus proceedings, Justice Frankfurter was at pains to express
his agreement with Justice Reed's view of "the bearing of the proceed-
ings in the State courts upon the disposition of the application for a
writ of habeas corpus in the Federal District Courts"134 -that such
United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 344 U.S. 561, 565-70 (1953) (affording de novo
review to case decided same day as Brown).
129. Having expressed, but acknowledged defeat on, his view that prior denials of
certiorari deserve deference, Justice Reed then applied the majority's view that no
deference is appropriate. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. at 452,459 (opinion of Reed,J.).
130. Id. at 459 (emphasis added).
131. See id. at 475.
132. Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. 2482, 2487 (1992) (plurality opinion) (quoting
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. at 458 (opinion of Reed, J.)).
133. Id. at 2487 (plurality opinion) (emphasis omitted).
134. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. at 497 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
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proceedings merit not deference, but the same respect that the federal
court would give to a state court opinion on the same point announced
in any other litigant's case. Notwithstanding Justice Thomas' claim in
Wright that the Brown Court "had no occasion to explore in detail"
whether state-court adjudications of legal questions "were [to be] re-
considered de novo," 35 Justice Frankfurter's majority opinion expressly
treated Brown as an occasion to explore, "explicit[ly] and [in] de-
tail[],"' 136 exactly that question. Let's consider, then, how successfully
Justice Frankfurter accomplished that task.
As Henry Hart wryly commented in 1959, "Mr. Justice Frank-
furter... never seems to be wanting in deference to the states." 137 It is
hardly surprising, then, to find Justice Frankfurter commencing his dis-
cussion of standards of review by protesting that "no one can feel more
strongly than I do" about the importance of leaving states free to pur-
sue "the sturdy enforcement of their criminal laws."' 38 What does
seem surprising, however, is Justice Frankfurter's repeated identifica-
tion of a yet higher responsibility-the mandate of the habeas corpus
statute-that pulled him reluctantly in the opposite direction: "It is not
for us to determine whether th[e habeas corpus review] power should
have been vested in the federal courts," for " 'there seems to be no
escape from the law.' "139
What statutory compulsion, then, warranted all these apologies
from the great deferrer? "Our problem," Justice Frankfurter ex-
plained, "arises because Congress has told the District Judge to act on
those occasions, however rare, when there are meritorious causes in
which habeas corpus is the ultimate and only relief and designed to be
such."' 140 The deferrer's "problem," thus, was precisely that constitu-
tional merit itself, rather than the reasonableness of the state courts'
inattention to it, was the statutory trigger for federal court intervention.
From the following passage, which intervenes at about this point in
Justice Frankfurter's opinion, Justice Thomas extracts a sentence-the
second sentence italicized below-and presents it as emblematic of
Frankfurter's views:
135. Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. at 2487 (plurality opinion).
136. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. at 497 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
137. Hart, supra note 108, at 107 n.68.
138. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. at 498 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
139. Id. at 499 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.) (quoting Ex parte Bridges, 4 F. Gas. 98,
106 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1875) (No. 1,862) (Bradley, Cir.J.)).
140. Id. at 501. By Congress, Justice Frankfurter meant, specifically, "the [Habeas
Corpus] Act of 1867," ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385 (1867) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2241 et
seq.). Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. at 499 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.). Justice Reed agreed
both that "[j]urisdiction over applications for federal habeas corpus is controlled by
statute," id. at 460 (opinion of Reed, J.), and that it was "the adoption in 1867 of a
statute which empowered [the] federal courts" to reexamine state court determinations,
Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271, 274-75 (1945); see Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204
(1950), overruled on other grounds by Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
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In exercising the power thus bestowed, the District Judge
must take due account of the proceedings that are challenged
by the application for a writ. All that has gone before is not to
be ignored as irrelevant. But the prior State determination of a
claim under the United States Constitution cannot foreclose considera-
tion of such a claim, else the State court would have the final say which
the Congress, by the Act of 1867, provided it should not have .... A
State determination may help to define the claim urged in the
application for the writ and may bear on the seriousness of the
claim. That most claims are frivolous has an important bear-
ing upon the procedure to be followed by a districtjudge. The
prior State determination may guide his discretion in deciding upon the
appropriate course to be followed in disposing of the application before
him. The State record may serve to indicate the necessity of
further pleadings or of a quick hearing to clear up an ambigu-
ity, or the State record may show the claim to be frivolous or
not within the competence of a federal court because solely
dependent on State law. 14
1
In light of the first italicized sentence, Justice Thomas' emblemization
of the second italicized sentence is problematic.
In any event, this passage says nothing about deference. Rather, it
simply directs that opportunistic use be made of, and polite respect
paid to, the persuasive authority of a state court decision that happens
to be directly on point. Indeed, the first italicized sentence, omitted by
Justice Thomas, says rather clearly that giving state courts the final say
on questions close enough that they reasonably might go either way is
exactly what Congress did not permit federal habeas corpus courts to
do.
But whatever one makes of this passage, it was only Justice Frank-
furter's opening shot at the standard of review question. Justice Frank-
furter then proceeded to set forth his own compendium of habeas
corpus standards of review-to exactly the same effect as Justice
Reed's: when faced with a prior "denial of relief by afederal court," the
district court "may, [but] need not inquire anew" into the previously
adjudicated factual and legal questions.' 4 2 "When ... the issue turns
on basicfacts ... [, u]nless a vital flaw be found in the process of ascer-
taining such facts in the State court, the District Judge may accept their
determination in the State proceeding and deny the application."' 143
But when the case "calls for interpretation of the legal significance" of
the historical facts, "the District Judge must exercise his own judgment ....
141. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. at 500 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.) (emphasis added)
(citation omitted); see Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. 2492, 2488 (1992) (plurality opinion).
142. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. at 508 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.) (emphasis added);
cf. id. at 497 (when the prior federal "adjudication" is merely the Supreme Court's
denial of certiorari on direct review, that denial "in habeas corpus cases, as in others....
cannot be interpreted as an 'expression of opinion on the merits'" and deserves no
attention (quoting Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 181 (1947))).
143. Id. at 506 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.) (emphasis added).
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[S]o-called mixed questions or the application of constitutional princi-
ples to the facts as found leave the duty of adjudication with the federal
judge."144 Likewise, state adjudications of purely legal questions "can-
not, under the habeas corpus statute, be accepted as binding. It is pre-
cisely these questions that the federal judge is commanded to decide."' 45
By way of example, Justice Frankfurter noted that in reviewing the
state court determination of a denial of counsel claim, which then re-
quired case-by-case adjudication of the need for representation, the
district judge should rely on the state courts for the historical facts.
"But it isfor the federal judge to assess on the basis of such historical facts the
fundamentalfairness of a conviction without counsel in the circumstances."'146 In
a passage Justice Thomas only half quotes, Frankfurter continued as
follows: "Although there is no need for the federal judge, if he could,
to shut his eyes to the State consideration of such issues, no binding
weight is to be attached to the State determination.... The State court
cannot have the last say when it, though on fair consideration .... may
have misconceived a federal constitutional right."1 47
The Court designed these standards of review to "give weight to
whatever may be relevant in the State proceedings," while
"preserv[ing] the full implication of the requirement of Congress that
the District Judge decide constitutional questions presented by a State prisoner even
after his claims have been carefully considered by the State courts." 1 48 Congress
"has seen fit to give this Courtpower to review errors offederal law in State
determinations, and in addition to give to the lower federal courts power
to inquire into federal claims, by way of habeas corpus."1 49 Through the
writ, Congress thus has empowered "district courts to be the organ of
the higher law rather than a Court of Appeals, or exclusively this
Court."150
Again, exegesis is hardly warranted. Reading for sense suffices.
The Supreme Court on direct review is an important "organ of the
higher law," with "power to review errors of federal law in State deter-
minations." But the Court's direct review responsibility is not "exclu-
sive"; Congress has equally invested lower federal courts with "power
to inquire into federal claims." In making that inquiry, priorfederal ad-
judications may bind the decision, as may prior state court adjudica-
tions offact. But, as would a Supreme CourtJustice in the direct review
cases Justice Frankfurter deems not merely illustrative but controlling,
a federal district judge on habeas corpus review of a legal or mixed
legal-factual question arising from the state courts "must exercise his
144. Id. at 507 (emphasis added).
145. Id. at 506 (emphasis added).
146. Id. at 507-08 (emphasis added).
147. Id. at 508 (emphasis added).
148. Id. (emphasis added).
149. Id. at 508-09 (emphasis added).
150. Id. at 510 (emphasis added).
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own judgment," "independent" of the state court ruling.' As such,
relief is triggered by a "meritorious" federal constitutional claim-a
"Federal constitutional right" that a state court so much as "miscon-
ceived." The fact that "claims have been carefully considered by the
State courts" is no defense.
Were exegesis necessary, it would proceed from the very cases that
Justice Frankfurter (and Justice Reed 152) cited as illustrative-the fa-
mous set of decisions on direct review of state criminal judgments, be-
ginning with Fiske v. Kansas'5 3 and Norris v. Alabama,
154 in which the
Supreme Court developed "the so-called mixed question[]" doctrine of
de novo review of dispositive issues in which factual and federal legal
questions are "intertwined." 15 5 No one doubts that the review the
Supreme Court affords in such cases is de novo.
156 And the phrases with
which the Court has described its de novo review throughout the de-
cades proceeding and following Brown-for instance, "independent
judgment,". "exercise his own judgment,". "duty of adjudication," "for
the judge to assess," duty "to decide," and the like-are the very ones
that Justice Frankfurter deployed in Brown.
157
Justice Frankfurter's own classic statement of the mixed question
doctrine in the direct appeal context, written just a few years before
Brown, amply demonstrates the identity of the standards of review in
the two contexts: issues of historical fact "are for conclusive determi-
nation by the State courts," but "a conclusion drawn from uncontro-
verted happenings, when that conclusion incorporates standards of
conduct or criteria for judgment which in themselves are decisive of
constitutional rights," is an "issuef] for this Court's adjudication "-"the
very issue[] to review which this Court sits."
1 58
151. Id. at 500-01.
152. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
153. 274 U.S. 380 (1927).
154. 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
155. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. at 507 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
156. See, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1252 (1991) (citing Miller v.
Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 110 (1985)); id. at 1261 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting on other
grounds).
157. See, e.g., id. at 1252 (" 'independent federal determination'" (quoting Miller
v. Fenton, 474 U.S. at 110)); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 100 (1964) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) ("the Court is free to draw its own inferences" and to exercise "independent
judgment"); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 316 (1959) ("the responsibility of
making our own examination"); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 589-90 (1935) ("duty
to determine whether in truth a federal right has been denied"); see also Cedar Rapids
Gas Light Co. v. Cedar Rapids, 223 U.S. 655, 668 (1912) (questions "open to
reexamination" or "reexaminable"); Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 684 (1892)
("[Tihis court ... must decide for itself....").
158. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 50-51 (1949) (plurality opinion of Frankfurter,
J.) (emphasis added). Likewise Justice Reed, in Gallegos v. Nebraska, stated:
As state courts also are charged with applying constitutional standards of due
process, in recognition of their superior opportunity to appraise conflicting
testimony, we give deference to their conclusions on disputed and essential
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Primarily because of the broad range of claims it recognized as
cognizable, Brown met intense scrutiny, not only in Congress and in the
lower federal courts, but also in the writings of the Federal Jurisdiction
titans of the 1950s and 1960s. Although these authorities disagreed
about other aspects of Brown, they all, from the beginning, understood
Brown to require de novo review of legal and mixed legal-factual ques-
tions. 159 Indeed, even Virginia and its amid in Wright understood
Brown as mandating de novo review and thus identified Brown as the de-
cision they wanted the Court to overrule. 160 So far as I know, Justice
Thomas is the only observer to miss Brown's de novo review
requirement.
Justice Thomas' analysis thus reveals nothing more than did Ba-
tor's, except for the passage of thirty additional years. Whatever may
have come before 1953, as of that year it was the firm conviction of a
unanimous Court that all constitutional claims were cognizable in
issues of what actually happened.... Its duty compels this Court, however, to
decide for itself, on the facts that are undisputed, the constitutional validity of a
judgment that denies claimed constitutional rights.... [A] contrary rule would
deny to the Federal Government ultimate authority to redress a violation of
constitutional rights.
342 U.S. 55, 61 (1951) (emphasis added).
159. The following is a sampling of the legislative sources: 104 Cong. Rec. 19,338
(1958) (statement of Sen. Morse) (Under Brown, "it is a primary responsibility of the
United States courts to pass upon the Federal constitutional aspects of State action,
regardless of what the views of the State courts may be."); 114 Cong. Rec. 12,832 (1968)
(statement of Sen. Tydings) ("The Supreme Court [in Brown] held specifically ... that a
Federal districtjudge sitting in habeas corpus was authorized to grant a new hearing on
the merits of a State prisoner's claim, even though the State court had litigated the issue
on the merits adversely to the petitioner .... ); S. Rep. No. 226, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
22 (1983) (recommending that Congress change "current law [under which] a Federal
habeas corpus court.., is automatically required to make an independent determination
of questions of law, and to re-apply the law to the facts, no matter how fully and fairly
that has been done in the State proceedings."); 130 Cong. Rec. 1862 (1984) (statement
of Sen. Baucus) ("[M]y amendment would leave law on this issue as it now exists. That
is, State prisoners would continue to be entitled to a full and independent review of
their Federal claims in Federal courts."); Habeas Corpus Issues: Hearings before the
Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. 173 (1991) (statement of Andrew G. McBride, Assoc. Deputy Att'y
Gen.) ("[U]nder present law, the legal determinations of the state courts are entitled to
no weight at all in a federal habeas corpus proceeding.").
Among the academic sources are Hart & Wechsler, 2d ed., supra note 38, at 1465,
1486 ("whatever may have been the pre-1953 law, Brown v. Allen in 1953 squarely
established the proposition that federal constitutional questions litigated in state
criminal cases may be relitigated on habeas corpus"; Brown made state court
adjudication "but a prelude to dispositive federal adjudication") and Bator, supra note
6, at 444 & n.4, 462, 474, 500 (Brown "explicitly enthroned the principle that all federal
constitutional questions decided in state criminal cases may be redetermined on the
merits of federal habeas corpus").
160. See Brief for the Petitioners at 9-10, 11-12 & n.5, 14-15, 18-19 n.10, Wright
v. West, 112 S. Ct. 2482 (1992) (No. 91-542); Brief for the United States as Amictis Curiae
at 12, 13, 22 & n.10, Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. 2482 (1992) (No. 91-542).
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habeas corpus and that each claim was due de novo federal review com-
mensurate with the direct review it would have received had the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider it.
d. The 1953-1985 Decisions. -Justice Thomas acknowledges that
the third set of decisions on which his analysis rests-the habeas corpus
cases between 1953 and 1985-'repeatedly reaffirmed Brown's teach-
ing that mixed constitutional questions are 'open to review on collat-
eral attack.' "1'6 Once the clarity of Brown's holding is revealed,
Justice Thomas' use of the post-Brown cases to prove that the Court
never substituted a new analysis for the analysis in Brown cuts directly
against his anti-Whiggian "too much, too recently" attack on the de
novo review rule.
Moreover, as Justice O'Connor's opinion comprehensively reveals,
lying just below the surface of Justice Thomas' citations of the 1950s-
1980s decisions-that is, in their language and holdings-is a wealth of
proof that the Court never wavered in its understanding of Brown as
requiring de novo review of legal and mixed legal-factual questions.1 62
In its 1958 decision in Thomas v. Arizona, 163 for example, the Court in-
discriminately cited direct appeal and habeas corpus precedents in sup-
port of "independent determination" of mixed questions on habeas
corpus. 64
In 1963, Townsend v. Sain 165 carefully reconsidered the Court's ex-
isting doctrine on habeas corpus standards of review, concluding that,
as under Brown, district judges should continue "defer[ring] to the state
court's findings of fact," but "may not defer to its findings of law. It is
the district judge's duty to apply the applicable federal law to the state
court fact findings independently."' 166 Dissenting on other grounds,
Justice Harlan endorsed the same standard, 167 stating approvingly in
his opinion in a companion case that, "[u]nder... Brown, if a petitioner
could show that the validity of a state decision to detain rested on a
determination of a constitutional claim, and if he alleged that determi-
nation to be erroneous, the federal court had the right and the duty to
161. Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. at 2488 (plurality opinion) (quoting Cuyler v.
Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 342 (1980)).
162. See id. at 2495-96.
163. 356 U.S. 390 (1958).
164. Id. at 393 (citing Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 404 (1945) (direct
review) and Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 507 (1953) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.));
accord Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961); Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504, 508
(1958); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 558-61 (1954); see also Spano v. New York, 360
U.S. 315, 316, 320, 321 & n.2 (1959) (direct appeal case in which Court derived the de
novo standard of review it applied-that the Court "cannot escape the responsibility for
making our own examination of the record"-from its habeas corpus decisions in Brown
and Leyra).
165. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
166. Id. at 318 (citing Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. at 506 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.)).




satisfy itself of the correctness of the state decision.' 68
In 1972, through Justice Powell, the Court reiterated "the princi-
ple that each [habeas corpus petitioner] is entitled.., to a redetermina-
tion of his federal claims by a federal court."1 69 Five years later, Justice
Stewart commanded a bare majority of the Court in overturning the
conviction of a self-confessed child murderer, based on the conclusion,
reached using a de novo review standard derived both from Brown and
from the Court's direct appeal decisions, that the defendant had not
waived his right to counsel before confessing. 170 The difficult facts of
the case, the vehemence of the dissents (which also applied a de novo
review rule' 71), and the close vote belie Justice Thomas' dismissal of
the decision's de novo review language as dictum on the theory that the
Iowa Supreme Court's conclusion that a valid waiver had occurred was
"[un]reasonable."' 72 It is likewise doubtfil that the Court's sharply di-
vided 1979 decision overturning a conviction because of discrimination
in the selection of grand jury forepersons would have been the same
had the Court not applied as it did a rule of "independent... review by
a federal court" on habeas corpus.
173
Indeed, several years before the Court reaffirmed the point in
Miller, then-Justice Rehnquist described as "long... established, as to
those constitutional issues which may properly be raised under § 2254,
that even a single federal judge may overturn the judgment of the high-
est court of a State insofar as it deals with the application of the United
States Constitution or laws to the facts in question."' 174 Justice
O'Connor's opinion in Wright quotes or cites two and one-half dozen
Supreme Court decisions decided between 1954 and 1991 to like ef-
fect. 175 Literally thousands of lower federal court decisions say the
168. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 460-61 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting), questioned
on other grounds in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87-88 (1977), and overruled on
other grounds by Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2565 (1991). Compare id,
(Brown requires review for "the correctness of the state decision" (emphasis added)) with
Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. at 2487 (plurality opinion) (Brown "had no occasion to
explore in detail whether a 'satisfactory' [state court] conclusion was one that the habeas
court considered correct, as opposed to merely reasonable.").
169. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 191 (1972). Justice Powell considered this
principle to have been established by Congress' 1948 recodification of the 1867 Habeas
Corpus Act, 14 Stat. 385 (1948).
170. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387,404 (1977) (citing, e.g., United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953); Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942)).
171. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 417-20 (Burger, CJ., dissenting); id. at
429 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 438 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
172. Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. at 2488 (plurality opinion).
173. Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 561 (1979); see id. at 580-82 (Powell, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
174. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 543-44 (1981) (emphasis added).





Thus, in 1985, when Justice O'Connor concluded for a unanimous
Court in Miller that "an unbroken line of cases, coming to this Court
both on direct appeal and on review of applications to lower federal
courts for a writ of habeas corpus, forecloses the Court of Appeals' con-
clusion that the 'voluntariness' of a confession merits something less
than independent federal consideration," and "nearly half a century of
unwavering precedent weighs heavily against any suggestion that we
now discard the settled rule in this area,"1 77 she was not, as Justice
Thomas contends, inadvertently adopting a new rule under the impres-
sion that stare decisis bound her to an old one. If a conservative's "too
much, too recently" charge is to be made with regard to the de novo
review "reform," it will have to be the argument of a True Conserva-
tive-that forty years of de novo review of mixed questions (if only the
habeas corpus cases are considered) or sixty years of the same thing (if
the direct review cases also are considered) is too short a time to settle
a rule.
e. Teague v. Lane and After. - What, then, of the "too short" flank
to Justice Thomas' "too much, too recently" attack on de novo review?
Have the Teague decisions unwittingly, or at least inexplicitly, unsettled
the de novo review rule?
The simplest answer to these questions is the one Justice Thomas
gave in the minuscule portion of his opinion that is not dictum-an
answer in which at least seven Justices concurred.' 78 Unless it is waived
by the state, Teague's nonretroactivity bar is treated by the Court as a
threshold issue that habeas corpus courts must address before reviewing
the merits of a petitioner's constitutional claim. 179 Accordingly, before
reaching the merits of West's Jackson claim, Justice Thomas first had to
reject Virginia's claim that Teague barred relief, which he did, acknowl-
edging that "[bly its terms, Teague itself is not directly controlling, be-
cause West sought federal habeas relief under Jackson, which was
decided a year before his conviction became final on direct review." 180
Then, without encountering any of the "logic[al]" difficulties that the
Teague rule assertedly creates for de novo review,' 8 1 Justice Thomas sim-
ply and easily applied the Jackson rule de novo to the facts of the case.
Thus, as Justice Thomas demonstrated, the Teague doctrine does
not neutralize the de novo review rule. The two doctrines are distinct
and apply at separate stages of the adjudication of a habeas corpus
176. See supra note 107.
177. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 112, 115 (1985).
178. Justice Kennedy did not reach the Teague question, see Wright v. West, 112 S.
Ct. at 2499-500; see also id. at 2502-03 (Souter, J., concurring) (finding Teague bar
different from one to which Justice Thomas alluded in discussing standards of review).
179. See, e.g., Collins v. Youngblood, 110 S. Ct. 2715, 2718 (1990).
180. Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. at 2491 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
181. Id. at 2492.
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case. As Justice Souter recently pointed out, the Court's nonretroactiv-
ity decisions in essence establish a temporal choice-of-law principle for
use by reviewing courts, namely, that as between different rules of law
in existence earlier and later in a case's progress through the courts,
the reviewing court must apply whatever rule of law the prior court was
legally authorized to, and did, apply-new legal developments notwith-
standing.' 8 2 The doctrine is utterly irrelevant to the standard the re-
viewing court should use in determining whether the prior court
properly applied the "chosen" rule of law-the question at issue in
Wright.'8 3
Beneath the surface of the Teague cases, in their language and
logic, lies the following answer to the question Wright did ask: Habeas
corpus is designed to deter state courts from misapplying federal law in
effect at the time the state courts acted. In words that resonate
throughout the nonretroactivity decisions, " 'the threat of habeas
serves as a necessary additional incentive for trial and appellate courts
throughout the land to conduct their proceedings in a manner consistent
with established constitutional standards.' "184 Just as the writ's deter-
rent purpose is ill-served by reversing state courts when they proerly
apply existing law but fail to predict legal innovations that lie in the
future, it is also ill-served by allowing state courts to misapply existing
law as long as they do so "reasonably." For this reason, the Teague
cases are replete with admonitions to federal habeas corpus courts to
" 'determine that the conviction rests upon correct application of the law
in effect at the time of the conviction' ";185 to " ' "forc[e] [state] trial
and appellate courts ... to toe the constitutional mark ".'" set by existing
law;' 8 6 to determine that "trials and appeals conformed to then-existing
constitutional standards"; 8 7 to require that " '[s]tate courts .. ,faith-
fully apply existing constitutional law' ,; 188 and to "ensur[e]", as their
182. See James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, III S. Ct. 2439, 2443 (1991)
(plurality opinion).
183. Indeed, by assuring that the same rule of law applies in both the reviewed and
the reviewing court, the nonretroactivity doctrine actually permits de novo "review."
Otherwise, the later court would be "applying" a different rule for the first time, rather
than "reviewing" the prior court's application of the same rule at an later time.
184. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 306 (1989) (plurality opinion) (quoting Desist
v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 262-63 (1969) (Harlan,J., dissenting) (emphasis added)).
185. Id., 489 U.S. at 306-07 (plurality opinion) (quoting Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S.
638, 653 (Powell, J., concurring) (emphasis added)); cf. Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. at
2487 (plurality opinion) (although Brown required habeas corpus courts to review state
court decisions to see that they reached a " 'satisfactory conclusion,'" Court has never
fully decided "whether a 'satisfactory' conclusion was one that the habeas court
considered correct, as opposed to merely reasonable." (quoting Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S.
443, 463 (1953) (opinion of Reed, J.))).
186. Teague v. Lane, at 489 U.S. at 307 (quoting Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. at 653
(Powell, J., concurring)) (emphasis added).
187. Id. 310 (emphasis added).
188. Id. (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982)) (emphasis added).
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"[floremost" task among the "underlying purposes of the habeas writ,"
that "state courts conduct criminal proceedings in accordance with the
Constitution"'18 9 and that "state convictions comply with the federal law
in existence at the time the conviction be[comes] final." 190 This is
hardly the language-or logic-of deference.
4. Summary of a Conservative's Argument, Analytical Shortcomings Aside.
- Now stripped as well of the analytical problems that lie just below
the surface of Justice Thomas' citations and quotations, the proposi-
tions his analysis supports are reduced to but two: First, at some point
prior to or in Brown v. Allen, the Court required de novo review of all
legal and mixed legal-factual issues arising in the adjudication of all
constitutional claims cognizable on habeas corpus. Second, on the
strength of Justice Thomas' "See generally" citation of Professor Ba-
tor's as yet unchallenged argument, it would seem that Brown v. Allen is
the earliest point at which the Court recognized the cognizability of the
full range of constitutional claims.
These propositions do not make a case for the repeal of the de novo
review rule. On just about any view of stare decisis, they make out pre-
cisely the opposite.
C. Victory on Points: A Less Critical Analysis of the O'Connor and Kennedy
Opinions
The opposite conclusion, premised primarily on stare decisis, is the
one towards which Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, with some analytic
help from Justice Souter, proceed. Justice O'Connor attacks mainly
Justice Thomas' "too much, too recently" critique, while Justice Ken-
nedy attacks his "too short" argument.
1. A Pre-1953 Draw. - Point one ofJustice O'Connor's nine-point
memorandum challenges the Bator orthodoxy. Like Professor Bator's
chief antagonist-Gary Peller19 '-Justice O'Connor argues that what
Bator describes as a progressively expanding range of cognizable
habeas corpus claims is actually the historically expanding range of
constitutional claims, all of which have long been litigable in habeas
corpus.192
Based on a comprehensive analysis of the cases, Parts III and IV
below conclude that the Bator-Peller debate ends in an uninformative
draw, as neither thesis can explain important decisions that both theses
must explain in order to convince. Of greater importance here is the
fact, not mentioned by eitherJustice Thomas orJustice O'Connor, that
the critical historical question in Wright was not "What claims were cog-
189. Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 488 (1990) (emphasis added).
190. Sawyer v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2822, 2827 (1990) (emphasis added).
191. See Gary Peller, In Defense of Federal Habeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 Harv.
C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 579 (1982).
192. See Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. 2482, 2493-94 (1992) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in the result).
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nizable when?" but, rather, "What standard of review governed the
claims that were cognizable?" Neither opinion sheds much historical
light on that question.193
2. A 1953-1985 Win. - I find Justice O'Connor's points dealing
with the 1953-1985 period convincing for the reasons discussed in sec-
tion B, above: Justice O'Connor correctly takes Justice Thomas to task
for mischaracterizing Justice Reed's discussion of the standard of re-
view governing issues offact as applying to the standard of review gen-
erally;194 for omitting Justice Frankfurter's statements giving federal
habeas corpus judges the duty of independently adjudicating mixed
questions; 195 for ignoring thirty years of post-Brown pronouncements
by the Court that federal habeas corpus courts " 'may not defer to [a
state court's] findings'of law' ",;196 and for failing to see that "de novo
review is not incompatible with the maxim that federal courts should
'give great weight to the considered conclusions of a coequal state judi-
ciary,' just as they do to persuasive, well reasoned authority from dis-
trict or circuit courts in other jurisdictions."'
197
3. Victory on Points on the Post-Teague Era. - Justice O'Connor's
"Seventh" point is Justice Kennedy's single point-that Teague does not
undermine a rule of de novo review of mixed questions. In a passage
endorsed by Justice O'Connor, Justice Kennedy argues that most appli-
cations of previously settled constitutional standards turning on mixed
questions of law and fact do not rely on "new rules," hence are not
193. Justice O'Connor's second, third, and ninth points also deal with the case and
legislative history of habeas corpus and are covered in Parts III and IV.
194. Justice O'Connor points out that Justice Reed's "'satisfactory conclusion'"
language, which Justice Thomas quotes as establishing the Brown Court's standard of
review of legal claims, comes from a portion of the Reed opinion labeled "'Right to a
Plenary Hearing'" that deals only with matters of fact. Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. at
2494 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (discussing id. at 2487 (plurality
opinion) (quoting Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 463 (1953) (opinion of Reed, J.))
(citation omitted)). Justice Thomas replies that Justice Reed's phrase-a "'satisfactory
conclusion' "--could not have referred to factual questions because "conclusion" is a
term of art for legal determinations. Id. at 2488 n.4 (plurality opinion). Justice Thomas
never explains how he can simultaneously chastise Justice O'Connor for her
nontechnical reading of the generic term "conclusion" in the midst of a passage fraught
with references to determinations of fact, yet himself read a sentence from the same
passage in which the Brown Court twice refers, in terms, to "'a rehearing of thefacts'"
as if the sentence refers to the review of legal questions.
195. Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. at 2495 (O'ConnorJ, concurring in the judgment)
(quoting Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. at 507, 508 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.)); see supra
notes 153-158 and accompanying text.
196. Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. at 2495 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment)
(quoting Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 318 (1963)); see supra notes 165-177 and
accompanying text.
197. Wright v. West 112 S. Ct. at 2497 (O'Connor, J, concurring in the judgment)




affected by Teague's nonretroactivity rule.'98 Justice Kennedy thus
clearly prescribes how Teague ought to work in mixed question cases.
He does not, however, as clearly explain why.
Justice Souter's concurring opinion in Wright brings Justice Ken-
nedy's nonretroactivity analysis into sharper focus. Whereas Justice
Kennedy dangerously risks eliding the law-choosing and law-applying
stages by subsuming " 'the application of an old rule in a manner that
was not dictated by precedent' " within his definition of a "new
rule,"199 Justice Souter suggests instead that novelty arises not from the
application of an old rule in a new setting, but rather from the use of a
new and different rule that broadens the old rule to reach situations in
which the old rule was not designed to apply.
200
Justice Souter's focus on the level of specificity intended by the
designers of the old rule helps explain Justice Kennedy's insight that
many mixed question situations are poor candidates for a nonretroac-
tivity bar. As Justice Kennedy notes, mixed question rules typically are
designed to apply generally, in a range of factual situations. Accord-
ingly, habeas corpus petitioners will rarely have the need-idiosyncrati-
198. Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. at 2499 (Kennedy, J., concurring in thejudgment).
There are two ways to define a "new rule." One possibility in this regard is to define a
rule as "new" if it gives criminal defendants more protection than the rule on which all
reasonable judges could have agreed as of the date when the prisoner's direct appeal
process ended, thus limiting habeas corpus petitioners to the rule of law that the most
prosecution-prone "reasonable judge" would have identified as the law on the relevant
date. See, e.g., Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 414 (1990). A second possibility is to
give habeas corpus petitioners the benefit of the rule that the average, rather than the
most prosecution-prone, "reasonable jurist" would have understood to be the law at the
relevant time. See, e.g., Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 263-64 (1969) (Harlan,
J., dissenting). The former rule discourages federal judges on habeas corpus from
skating as close as they can to the Court's law-making function, but allows state judges
to skate as close as they can to unconstitutionally prosecution-favoring rules. After
vacillating between both these poles, see Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989)
(plurality opinion) (using both definitions in same paragraph), the Supreme Court more
recently had been tending towards the former, "all reasonable judges agree"
formulation, see Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. at 414. In Wright, however, Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy moved towards the "average judge" approach. See Wright v.
West, 112 S. Ct. at 2498-99 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 2497
(O'Connor,J., concurring in thejudgment). Elsewhere, I advocate the "average judge"
approach. See Liebman, supra note 44, at 595-603.
199. Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. at 2499 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment)
(quoting Stringer v. Black, 112 S. Ct. 1130, 1135 (1992)).
200. AlthoughJustice Souter quotes the same passage from Stringer as doesJustice
Kennedy, id. at 2502 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment), Justice Souter generally
keeps his eye trained carefully on the "rule" to be applied, not on its application: "The
crux of the analysis when Teague is invoked, then, is identification of the rule on which
the claim for habeas relief depends." Id. at 2501. ForJustice Souter, the determinative
question, requiring "analytical care," is whether "a prisoner's invocation of a rule [is] at
too high a level of generality"-too high, apparently, when compared to the level of
generality intended by the framers of the rule. Put the other way around, the question is
whether the old rule on which the petitioner relies "is specific enough to dictate the rule
on which the conviction may be held to be unlawful." Id.
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cally presented to West by the hoary inference of theft from
possession-to demand application of a rule that is more general than
the one the framers of the old rule intended.20
1
Justice Souter thus managed to maintain the distinction between
the law-choosing and law-applying stages of habeas corpus adjudication
even while wielding an extremely broad definition of new rules.
20 2
That Justice Souter could press the law-choosing Teague rule to the hilt
without wounding the law-applying de novo review rule is the most con-
vincing proof of all that the two doctrines are distinct.
All this said, the critical fact here is that the opinions of Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy and (indirectly) Souter repel Justice Thomas' "too
short" assault on the de novo review rule: nonretroactivity rules and
standards of review are distinct, and the Court's use of a reasonable-
ness rule in the former context does not dictate a similarly deferential
standard in the latter context.
Arguing to a draw on the pre-1953 point, Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy, with some help from Justice Souter, win all the important
post-1953 points, and thus the debate as a whole. Indeed, they do so
on Justice Thomas' own anti-Whiggian terms, assuming only that a
forty-year-old rule deserves stare decisis respect.
D. Is to Ought.- The Search for an Affirmative Case
The problem with the O'Connor-Kennedy argument is that it
presents no affirmative case for preserving the de novo review rule apart
from the rule's venerable age. The argument thus may not be sufficient
to win the final battle that Justice Thomas' plurality opinion heralds.
After all, these are anti-conservative, as well as anti-Whiggian, judicial
times in which we live.
Can an affirmative case be made? Justice O'Connor's opinion in
Wright tangentially suggests two possibilities. Her claim that Congress
since 1966 has refused to amend the habeas corpus statute to incorpo-
rate a deference rule 20 3 suggests that Congress may have at least im-
plicitly adopted a de novo rule prior to that time. But apart from Justice
O'Connor's brief reliance on an argument of this sort in her 1985 opin-
ion for the Court in Miller v. Fenton,204 neither her nor the Court's views
on the statutory status of de novo review are clear.
A second possibility is suggested by Justice O'Connor's references
to the Court's frequent recourse, in its habeas corpus decisions, to the
201. ForJustice Souter, the problem in Wright was that West could not secure relief
unless he could turn Jackson's case-by-case rule analyzing the impact of all the evidence
into a categorical rule forbidding reliance on a particular type of evidence, namely, the
inference of theft from recent possession of stolen goods. See id. at 2502-03 (Souter,J.,
concurring in the judgment).
202. See id. at 2501.
203. See id. at 2498 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
204. See Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 111-12 (1985).
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Court's de novo review rule on direct appeal. 20 5 Might Justice
O'Connor find, as I do, an affirmative justification for de novo habeas
corpus review in its parity with, and federal-judiciary-wide surrogacy,
for, direct Supreme Court review?
From Justice O'Connor's perspective, the difficulty with this possi-
bility is her repeated rejection-whichJustice Thomas endorses and ex-
tends in Wright-of the writ's use "'"as a substitute for direct
review.' 206 But just as the alleged disparities between direct and
habeas corpus review that Justice Thomas identifies actually confirm
the two procedures' parity or surrogacy, so also can respectable appel-
late principles explain the apparent disparity Justice O'Connor
identifies.
Justice Thomas lists three "differences" between direct and habeas
corpus review.20 7 The first, the constitutional requirement of counsel
on direct review, but not in habeas corpus, is not a difference at all but
another point of parity. Habeas corpus has never been understood as a
surrogate for direct appeal to state supreme courts, which are constitu-
tionally obliged to provide counsel to indigent criminal defendants, 208
but rather for direct appeal to the United States Supreme Court, which
has never constitutionally obligated itself to provide counsel. 20 9 In-
deed, the statutory right to counsel on habeas corpus-which becomes
mandatory only if a hearing is ordered2 t°-is a near-perfect replica of
the Supreme Court's practice in regard to providing counsel to indi-
gent certiorari petitioners.
As discussed above, the second difference-the nonretroactivity
bar in habeas corpus proceedings-actually derives its chief justifica-
tion from its capacity to achieve parity between direct and habeas
corpus review and to render the latter a fair surrogate for the former,
by limiting habeas corpus petitioners to the same rule of law as applied
in their direct appeal certiorari proceedings. 2 11
The third difference, the Stone v. Powell212 bar to habeas corpus
consideration of exclusionary rule claims, is actually a difference, but
one that the Court achieved only by denigrating the exclusionary rule
to a less-than-constitutional, "merely prophylactic" status. 213 As
205. See Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. at 2495-96 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment).
206. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 306 (1989) (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.)
(quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 682-83 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring
in judgment in part and dissenting in part)), quoted in Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. at
2490 (plurality opinion).
207. See Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. at 2490-91 (plurality opinion).
208. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355-58 (1963).
209. See Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
210. See Rule 8(c) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases.
211. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
212. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
213. See, e.g., Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 379 n.4 (1986).
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noted, habeas corpus is a surrogate for Supreme Court review only of
state-prisoner claims sufficiently central to national legal policy to jus-
tify federal judicial review as of right. 21 4 By "de-constitutionalizing"
the exclusionary rule-in an opinion premised on distinctions between
the "personal" rights the Constitution directly affords criminal defend-
ants and the generalized societal interests the exclusionary rule pro-
tects2 15 -the Supreme Court placed exclusionary rule claims, like most
other nonconstitutional federal law claims, 216 outside the category of
nationally important claims as to which federal review as of right is
maintained.2 1
7
Before examining the support offered for Justice O'Connor's dis-
senting argument in the recent case of Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes218 that
"[h]abeas corpus is not an appellate proceeding, but rather an original
civil action,"'2 19 consider some of the ways in which-as Justice
O'Connor is careful to acknowledge-habeas corpus proceedings do
not resemble original civil actions. First, habeas corpus actions are af-
fected by prior judicial proceedings far too frequently to qualify as truly
separate or "original" actions. As Justice O'Connor notes, habeas
corpus petitioners face a "peculiar set of hurdles" that are unknown to
litigants pursuing "original civil action[s] in a federal court," including
that the habeas corpus petitioner "must, in general, exhaust available
state remedies,... avoid procedural default [of the claim in the state
courts], . . . and not seek retroactive application of a new rule of
law."' 220 Also unlike other civil litigants,221 habeas corpus petitioners
do not have the right to a hearing on all of the controverted factual
allegations that make out a federal cause of action. Instead, federal
courts are required to "defer[] to state court findings of fact where the
federal districtjudge [is] satisfied that the state court ha[s] fairly consid-
ered the issues and the evidence and . . .reached a satisfactory re-
sult."' 22 2 Furthermore, the one set of effects that prior proceedings
214. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
215. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 494 n.37.
216. See I Liebman, supra note 24, § 8.4 & nn.24-26.
217. See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. at 379 n.4; Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S.
545, 560 (1979). The exclusionary rule thus does not fully implicate one of the two
liberty interests that, together, motivate the policy favoring federal review as of right.
See supra note 41. As currently understood by the Court, a Fourth Amendment
violation offends the movant's rights only at the time of the unlawful search or seizure,
but not when the procedure's fruits are introduced in evidence. Consequently, the
exclusionary rule protects the movant's liberty interest only in securing person and
property from unlawful government intrusion and not her liberty interest in immunity
from conviction and incarceration in violation of federal law.
218. 112 S. Ct. 1715 (1992).
219. Id. at 1722 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
220. Id. (citations omitted).
221. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.




typically do have on "original civil action[s]," namely, resjudicata and
collateral estoppel, does not apply in habeas corpus proceedings. 223
Notice finally that each of these "differe[nces] from ordinary civil litiga-
tion" 224 -the exhaustion of prior remedies requirement, the adequate
and independent state grounds (i.e., procedural default) doctrine, the
limitation to law available at the time of direct appeal, the dichotomy
between de novo legal but only "clearly erroneous" factual review, the
absence of a claims- and an issue-preclusion bar-is easily explained
by, and indeed is a classic indicium of, an appellate relationship.
If the appellate analogy explains these myriad attributes of habeas
corpus review in a way the "original civil action" analogy cannot, then
what is left to commend the latter analogy? Justice O'Connor gives two
answers: Exparte Tom Tong 'S225 1883 characterization of habeas corpus
as a" 'new suit'" separate from the criminal prosecution, and the stat-
utory authorization of evidence-taking procedures in habeas corpus
courts.
2 2 6
As will be seen in Part IV, arrayed against Tom Tong's 100-year-old
"new suit" description of habeas corpus are numerous Supreme Court
holdings from the preceding century that the filing of a habeas corpus
petition initiates an "appellate" procedure-one court's review of an-
other-over which the Court could (and repeatedly did) take jurisdic-
tion without transgressing the strict constitutional limitations on its
jurisdiction to hear "original civil actions." 227 Tom Tong is the excep-
tion that proves the rule. It was one of the few habeas corpus cases
brought directly to the Supreme Court in which the "appellate" charac-
terization was inaccurate, because the petitioner's detention had no ju-
dicial authorization and had occurred at the behest of local law
enforcement officials acting on their own.
228
Nor is Tom Tong's distancing of habeas corpus from the "criminal
prosecution" inconsistent with the appellate analogy drawn here. It is
in the very nature of the "limited" federal appeal available both on cer-
tiorari and habeas corpus that the principal concern of the "criminal
prosecution"--the defendant's guilt or innocence--is not at issue.229
The case for the "original civil action" analogy thus comes down to
the evidence-taking procedures that the habeas corpus statute autho-
223. See id. at 1723 ("Habeas has always differed from ordinary civil litigation,
however, in one important respect: The doctrine ofresjudicata has never been thought
to apply. A state prisoner is not precluded from raising a federal claim on habeas that
has already been rejected by the state courts.").
224. Id. at 1723.
225. 108 U.S. 556 (1883).
226. Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S. Ct. at 1722 (quoting Ex parte Tom Tong 108
U.S. at 559-60; citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 2242, 2246, 2247, 2254 (d)).
227. See infra note 349 and accompanying text.
228. See Ex parte Tom Tong, 108 U.S. at 558-59.
229. See, e.g., Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 87-88 (1923) (Holmes, J.); 1
Liebman, supra note 24, § 2.2 & nn.42-46 (Main Volume and 1992 Supp.).
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rizes "reviewing" federal courts to undertake in the one or two percent
of cases in which the facts are controverted and the state court factfind-
ings are not controlling.23 0 Even if this evidence-taking capacity did
establish a discrepancy between habeas corpus and appellate proceed-
ings, one still might ask whether that single discrepancy would over-
come the more numerous and important ways in which the writ is
incompatible with an original action and functions just like an appeal.
But, as discussed earlier, the district court's authorization to hear evi-
dence does not create a discrepancy between direct Supreme Court and
habeas corpus review. Rather, both modes of federal review of state
court determinations adhere to the same pragmatic appellate principle-
namely, a preference for allocating necessary relitigation of evidentiary
questions to the court with evidence-taking capacities nearest the re-
viewing court.23 1 On direct appeal, this principle requires a remand to
the state supreme court to direct the case to the appropriate evidence-
taking forum. On habeas corpus, this requires the district court itself to
undertake the necessary evidentiary proceedings.
In the end, the sometime preference of Justice Thomas, Justice
O'Connor, and the Court generally for an "original civil action" anal-
ogy, and their resistance to an appellate analogy, stand firmly on the
proposition that habeas corpus is neither a surrogate for a criminal trial
nor a substitute for direct appeal within the state system.
This same proposition, however, constrains the Supreme Court's
direct review of state criminal cases on certiorari, not because the
Court's certiorari review is discretionary, but because the Court's juris-
diction is constitutionally and statutorily limited to a small subset of the
legal issues that arise in state criminal proceedings. The proposition
thus supplies no basis for distinguishing between direct review in the
Supreme Court when certiorari is granted and habeas corpus review in
the district courts after certiorari is denied.
Two forms of reasoning from "what is" to "what ought to be" sup-
port retaining de novo review of state court determinations of constitu-
tional law in criminal cases. The first is the traditional principle of stare
decisis. The second is the impulse to explain the uncanny parallels be-
tween direct review on writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court and
postconviction review on writ of habeas corpus in the district courts as
more than accidental, as rather the desire of some institution, be it
Congress, the Court, or the federal judiciary as a whole, for parity be-
tween direct and habeas corpus review-or even, carrying the impulse
a bit further, for using lower federal court adjudication as a surrogate
230. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. Justice O'Connor also refers to the
statutory pleading requirements, Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S. Ct. at 1722
(O'Connor, J., dissenting), but the differences between pleading an original action and
presenting an appeal are sufficiently tenuous that these requirements need not detain
me.
231. See supra notes 20, 36, 48 and accompanying text.
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for the Supreme Court's unifying, concluding, and national-law-pro-
tecting functions. This Part has validated the first rationale, and it
alone may be sufficient to warrant leaving the writ in its current, forty-
year-old form. Still, the power of the stare decisis rationale may be en-
hanced, and the validity of the parity/surrogacy-by-design rationale es-
tablished, by a better understanding of the pre-1953 history of habeas
corpus. It is to that history that I now turn.
III. Two THESES AND Two TESTS OF THE HISTORICAL SCOPE OF
HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Two Theses
Over the last thirty years, judicial and academic analyses of the his-
tory of habeas corpus in the United States have focused on two theories
that provide a useful starting point for my own analysis of the writ's
history. 23 2 Both theories took shape in 1963, one in Professor Bator's
article mentioned above, 233 the other inJustice Brennan's famous, but
since eroded and recently overruled, decision in Fay v. Noia.234 Sub-
jected to scathing academic attack at the time,235 Justice Brennan's the-
sis waited two decades for a thorough academic defense, which was
finally advanced in a 1982 article by Gary Peller.
23 6
1. The Bator Thesis. - Despite being dismissed in a footnote by the
Fay v. Noia majority, 23 7 Professor Bator's article now dominates habeas
corpus jurisprudence and scholarship. 238 According to Professor Ba-
tor, the number of claims cognizable in habeas corpus expanded in five
stages from 1789 to 1953. The 1789 Judiciary Act gave federal courts
the power to grant writs on behalf of federal prisoners "for the purpose
of an inquiry into the cause of commitment." 239 Following English
common law practice, the Supreme Court took this phrase to mean
something like probable cause to detain the petitioner, which, in turn,
meant that proof of conviction by a court of competent jurisdiction
ended the inquiry because it provided sufficient evidence of probable
cause to detain.240 Logically, a competent grand jury's indictment or
even a competent magistrate's arrest warrant following a probable
cause finding deserved the same preclusive effect. As understood by
232. Some of the major historical works are collected in I Liebman, supra note 24,
§ 2.2 n.16.
233. See Bator, supra note 6.
234. 372 U.S. 391 (1963), questioned in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87-88
(1977), and overruled by Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2565 (1991).
235. See, e.g., Lewis Mayers, The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867: The Supreme Court
as Legal Historian, 33 U. Chi. L. Rev. 31, 58 (1965); Dallin H. Oakes, Legal History in
the High Court-Habeas Corpus, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 451, 459-68 (1966).
236. See Peller, supra note 191.
237. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. at 421-22 n.30.
238. See supra notes 74-75, 105 and accompanying text.
239. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82.
240. See Bator, supra note 6, at 466.
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Bator, therefore, the writ's transformation from a method in England of
reviewing pretrial executive detention to a method in this country of
reviewing judicially sanctioned pre- and post-trial incarceration left
nothing for review save the competency-that is, the subject matter and
personal jurisdiction-of the detaining tribunal. 24 1
According to Professor Bator, this state of affairs continued until
the 1870s, when Exparte Lange 24 2 and Exparte Siebold2 43 made the writ
available to remedy unconstitutional sentences and incarceration under
unconstitutional penal laws. 244 As Bator acknowledged, the logic be-
hind this halting step was unclear.245 There was no real difference be-
tween a court's enforcement of a penal statute or its imposition of a
sentence lacking in constitutional authority and, say, a judge's convict-
ing a defendant himself, without the constitutional authority that only a
jury could confer. Yet, on Professor Bator's understanding, the Court
extended the writ only to unconstitutional statutes and sentences and
not, for example, to denials of constitutionally required trial by jury. 246
Tied as it is to the 1789 Act's "cause of commitment" language
and common law lineage, Professor Bator's narrow interpretation of
the antebellum writ would seem to retain little relevance after
Congress' 1867 extension of habeas corpus to a federal-or state-
prisoner's detention "in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or
law of the United States" 247 and its 1885 conferral on the Supreme
Court ofjurisdiction under the 1867 Act.248 According to Bator, how-
ever, Congress' apparent expansion ofjurisdiction had almost no effect
because of the Court's adoption, apparently by fiat, 24 9 of a Catch 22
preclusion doctrine in a series of cases beginning in 1886 with Ex parle
241. See id. at 471-74; see also Paul M. Bator et al., Hart & Wechsler's The Federal
Courts and the Federal System 1427-28, 1465-66 (3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter Hart &
Weschler, 3d ed.]. Because prior to the 1830s, conviction of a crime in England
generally ended incarceration in favor of noncustodial penalties such as execution,
branding, or banishment, Bator is correct to describe early English habeas corpus
practice as largely a pretrial affair. He is wrong to suggest that this was the writ's only
use, however. In the rare instances in which incarceration was used as a punishment-
for example, in contempt cases-the writ served in England to review post-trial,
judicially sanctioned incarceration. See, e.g., Bushell's Case, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P.
1670); Ex parte Kearney, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 38, 41-42 (1822) (Story, J.); Ex parte
Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 74, 91-92, 100 (1807) (Marshall, C.J.).
242. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 166 (1873).
243. 100 U.S. 371, 376-77 (1879).
244. See Bator, supra note 6, at 467-68.
245. See id. at 471-72.
246. See id. at 472-73.
247. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385.
248. See Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 353, 23 Stat. 437. For a discussion of Congress'
1867 conferral, 1868 withdrawal, and 1885 restoration of the Court's jurisdiction under
the 1887 Act, and of the impact of the unified codification of the 1789 and 1867 habeas
corpus provisions in the Revised Statutes of 1874, see infra notes 376, 382-383,
390-393, 415-420 and accompanying text.
249. See Bator, supra note 6, at 478-80; Anthony G. Amsterdam, Criminal
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Royall.250 As described by Bator, Royall's so-called "exhaustion of state
remedies" doctrine required state prisoners to challenge unconstitu-
tional incarceration in state trial and appellate courts before alleging it
on habeas corpus, but then made the state courts' resolution of the is-
sues res judicata in subsequent habeas corpus proceedings unless the
detaining court lacked jurisdiction, had convicted the petitioner under
an unconstitutional statute, or had imposed an unconstitutional
sentence. 2
51
From this low point in the writ's history, according to Professor
Bator, both a modest and a giant step were needed to bring habeas
corpus to its high point in the aftermath of Brown. Taking the penulti-
mate step, Frank v. Mangum252 and Moore v. Dempsey 253 limited Royall's
res judicata doctrine by allowing habeas corpus resolution of federal
claims as to which "full and fair" corrective process was unavailable in
the state courts. 254 Commencing the last step, a series of Supreme
Court decisions in the 1930s and 1940s expanded the range of consti-
tutional claims understood as attacks on the convicting court's jurisdic-
tion.255 Then, exploding the "no jurisdiction" myth, Brown completed
the step, making all constitutional claims fair game on habeas corpus
review.25
6
2. The Brennan-Peller Thesis. - By contrast, Justice Brennan and
Professor Peller argue that habeas corpus had always been a forum for
providing specified classes of prisoners with review of the legality of
their detention under fundamental national law. 25 7 This result oc-
curred naturally under the "cause of commitment" language, which
emerged from proto-due process notions stretching back to the Magna
Carta. The 1867 act simply expanded the range of fundamental claims
from those drawing upon due process notions to constitutional claims
of all sorts.25
8
Recognizing that the Court's relatively rare grants of review and
relief represent too small a proportion of its habeas corpus jurispru-
dence to make the above description complete, Justice Brennan and
Professor Peller identify three limitations that frequently led the Court
to deny the writ. First, because Article III withheld original jurisdiction
Prosecutions Affecting Federally Guaranteed Civil Rights: Federal Removal and Habeas
Corpus Jurisdiction to Abort State Court Trial, 113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 793, 883-92 (1965).
250. 117 U.S. 241 (1886).
251. See Bator, supra note 6, at 478-83.
252. 237 U.S. 309, 331 (1915).
253. 261 U.S. 86, 91 (1923).
254. See Bator, supra note 6, at 486-87, 489.
255. See id. at 493-99 (discussing, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938)).
256. See id. at 500.
257. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 401-02, 409-10, 418 (1963), questioned on
other grounds in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87-88 (1977), and overruled on
other grounds by Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2565 (1991).
258. See id. at 404-10; Peller, supra note 191, at 618-22, 629-30.
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over criminal and habeas corpus cases from the Supreme Court, and
Congress withheld appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases, 259 the Court
felt constrained from using habeas corpus as a substitute for the crimi-
nal jurisdiction it so clearly had been denied. Thus, the theory goes,
only the lower federal courts, with unlimited "original" jurisdiction,
could exercise unlimited jurisdiction to issue the writ.
260
Second, until the incorporation movement of the 1940s-1960s, the
constitutional due process right that was fully enforceable in habeas
corpus meant no more than a "competent" forum-one with subject
matter and personal jurisdiction-proceeding according to the applica-
ble positive or common law and (a later requirement) the right to no-
tice and a chance to be heard.26 ' Thus, what Professor Bator treats as
the writ's limitation was instead the outer reach of contemporary inter-
pretations of the Due Process Clause and the Constitution.
Finally, Justice Brennan and Professor Peller interpret many of the
Court's decisions as relief-delaying, but not, as Professor Bator would
have it, relief-denying applications of the exhaustion doctrine. Injustice
Brennan's view, the exhaustion doctrine was simply an exercise in good
federalist manners-letting the state courts go first and forbearing any
federal interference unless and until the state courts failed to enforce
the Constitution.2 62 In Professor Peller's more ingenious view, the ex-
haustion doctrine was designed to circumvent the longstanding (but
since abandoned) limitation of habeas corpus remedies to letting the
criminal go free, in contrast to direct appeal remedies, which permitted
remand for retrial.
263
3. Both Wrong: The Two Theses Compared. - The most common criti-
cism of Professor Bator's theory is that its preclusive understanding of
the exhaustion doctrine ignores the Court's repeated statements that
state court review need only occur "in the first instance," or "in ad-
vance of" habeas corpus review-as if a "second instance" of federal
259. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2; see also Ex parte Parks, 93 U.S. 18, 22-23 (1876);
Ex parte Kearney, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 38,42 (1822); Ex parte Boliman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch)
74, 94 (1807). Congress did not permit appeals by federal prisoners, the only prisoners
with access to habeas corpus under the 1789 Act, until 1891. See infra note 453 and
accompanying text.
260. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. at 391, 429-30; Peller, supra note 191, at 612-13
(discussing In re McDonald, 16 F. Cas. 23 (D.C.E.D. Mo. 1861) (No. 8,751)); see also
Stephen A. Saltzburg, Habeas Corpus: The Supreme Court and the Congress, 44 Ohio
St. LJ. 367, 370-72 (1983).
261. See Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. 2482, 2493-94 (1992) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in thejudgment); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. at 412-14; Peller, supra note 191, at
628-29 (discussing, e.g., Kennard v. Louisiana ex rel. Morgan, 92 U.S. 480 (1875)).
262. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. at 418-22.
263. See Peller, supra note 191, at 640-41 (discussing, e.g., In re Frederich, 149
U.S. 70, 77-78 (1893)). See generally 1 Liebman, supra note 24, § 8.5 (discussing
modern conditional habeas corpus remedy under which the prisoner is actually released
only if he is not retried within a specified time period).
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review was to occur in the wake of state court review.2 64
Also telling are Professor Bator's difficulties explaining some
landmark habeas corpus cases. Consider, for example, the Court's cel-
ebrated equal protection decision in Yick Wo v. Hopkins.265 In Yick Wo,
the Court adjudicated the claims of two Chinese laundry operators that
San Francisco officials had discriminatorily enforced the city's admit-
tedly constitutional ordinance that made it a crime to operate a laundry
in a wooden building.266 One of the applicants reached the Court on
writ of error from the California Supreme Court; the other on appeal
from a federal habeas corpus ruling. 26 7 Yick Wo thus presented the
Court with the perfect opportunity to prove Bator's thesis-that,
although direct appeal was open to all constitutional attacks on state
court convictions, habeas corpus was open only to attacks on jurisdiction,
statutes, and sentences. The Court, of course, did no such thing, instead
granting relief to both petitioners without any suggestion that their dif-
ferent procedural postures affected the cognizability of their identical
claims. 26
8
Similarly, in a number of other turn-of-the-century cases, the
Court undeniably decided-although it denied- constitutional claims
that were not premised on the detaining court's lack of jurisdiction or
application of an unconstitutional statute or sentence. 269 The best Pro-
fessor Bator could do was to explain these cases as harmless curiosi-
ties-momentary lapses of the Court's concentration in cases in which
relief, in any event, was denied. 270
Consider next the 1915 case of Frank v. Mangum271 and the 1923
case of Moore v. Dempsey.272 In both, the petitioners claimed they were
convicted at a trial at which the judge and jury were under the sway of
angry mobs.273 The Court denied Frank relief, but directed the district
court to hear the Moore petitioners' claims. According to Professor Ba-
tor, at the time of Frank and Moore, habeas corpus relief was available
264. E.g., Urquhart v. Brown, 205 U.S. 179, 181-82 (1907); Cook v. Hart, 146 U.S.
183, 195 (1892); see, e.g., Peller, supra note 191, at 640; Saltzburg, supra note 260, at
377; Wechsler, Habeas Corpus and the Supreme Court, 59 U. Colo. L. Rev. 167, 174-75
(1988).
265. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
266. See id. at 368.
267. See id. at 356.
268. See id. at 365-66 (determinative issue in both cases was "whether the plaintiff
... has been denied a right in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States").
269. See, e.g., Felts v. Murphy, 201 U.S. 123, 129 (1906); Davis v. Burke, 179 U.S.
399, 403-04 (1900); Bergemann v. Backer, 157 U.S. 655, 656-68 (1895); In re
Converse, 137 U.S. 624, 631 (1891); In re Duncan, 139 U.S. 449, 454-61 (1891);
Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86, 92-94 (1890).
270. See Bator, supra note 6, at 480.
271. 237 U.S. 309 (1915).
272. 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
273. See Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. at 88-89; Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. at 324.
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only on constitutional claims that the state courts had not given the
prisoners a fair opportunity to litigate. Yet, because the prisoners in
both cases had the same opportunity to litigate-trials allegedly domi-
nated by mobs, followed by seemingly regular proceedings on motion
for a new trial and appeal274-the Bator theory has no satisfactory ex-
planation for the divergent outcomes in the two cases, just eight years
apart.
The Brennan-Peller explanations for the Court's frequent denials
of habeas corpus review and relief encounter parallel difficulties. First,
Justice Brennan and Professor Peller both assume that, because the
limitation on habeas corpus review imposed by the absence of federal-
prisoner direct appeals emanated from limits on the Court's original
jurisdiction and not on the writ itself, the limitation did not affect the
lower courts' habeas corpus jurisdiction. 275 But the lower federal
courts need a congressional go-ahead to exercise either appellate or
original jurisdiction. 276 If Congress' denial of federal-prisoner direct
appeals narrowed the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction to issue
the writ, it also should have narrowed the lower federal courts' original
and appellate jurisdiction to do the same277-especially given the use
of the same words of the same section of the 1789 Act to grant habeas
corpus power to the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts.
278
Indeed, if Congress' treatment of criminal appeals dictated the
habeas corpus jurisdiction of either the Supreme Court or the lower
federal courts, then neither level of the judiciary should have exercised
any habeas corpus jurisdiction, because Congress forbade both to hear
criminal appeals of any sort. Each time the Court was presented with
this argument, however, the Court rejected it,279 apparently on the the-
ory that section 14 was itself a constitutionally sufficient grant of appel-
late authority for both the Court and the lower federal courts.28 0
274. See Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. at 89; id. at 97-98 (McReynolds, J.,
dissenting); Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. at 312-17.
275. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 429-31 (1963), questioned on other grounds in
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87-88 (1977), and overruled on other grounds by
Coleman v. Thompson, I11 S. Ct. 2546, 2565 (1991); Peller, supra note 191, at 610-16.
276. See, e.g., Ex parte Cabrera, 4 F. Cas. 964, 965 (C.C.D. Pa. 1805) (No. 2278)
(Washington, Cir. Justice) (citing authority); Hart & Wechsler, 3d ed., supra note 241, at
366-79; 393-95.
277. The one lower court case that Peller cites acknowledges that most lower
federal courts on habeas corpus considered themselves bound by the same jurisdictional
constraints as the Supreme Court. See In re McDonald, 16 F. Cas. 17, 23, 25-26, 31
(E.D. Mo. 1861) (No. 8,751).
278. See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82.
279. JusticeJohnson advanced exactly this position in dissents in Ex parte Watkins,
32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 567, 578-80 (1833), and Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 74,
104-07 (1807); accord Ex parte Wells, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 307, 329 (1855) (Curtis, J,,
dissenting). The Court rejected this view in the cited cases and in Ex parte Siebold, 100
U.S. 371, 377 (1879).
280. See, e.g., In re Kaine, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 103, 120-21 (1852) (Curtis, J.,
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Second, the Brennan-Peller thesis encounters denials of the writ
that cannot be explained as narrow contemporary constitutional inter-
pretations. Although Brennan and Peller can easily explain Yick Wo,
they are stumped by the Court's denial of relief in In re Wood,2 8 1 an
important, decision in the Bator chronology. 2 82 In this 1891 case, the
Court, through the first Justice Harlan, denied relief on a scrupulously
preserved, impeccably pleaded, and, if the allegations were true, pa-
tently meritorious jury discrimination claim. 28 3 The Brennan-Peller ex-
planation for this denial fails because the equal protection claim in
Wood enjoys the same explicit constitutional status as the due process
claims that Brennan and Peller believe were consistently cognizable on
habeas corpus.
In addition, Brennan and Peller have the same difficulty Bator has
explaining the divergent outcomes of Frank and Moore. If, as Brennan
and Peller claim, Frank lost because the full and fair appellate affirmance
of his guilt gave him all the process he was due, notwithstanding an
unfair trial, there is no good reason why the Moore petitioners won after
receiving the same appellate treatment.
Additionally, having used the Court's timing-focused, "in the first
instance" language to counter Bator's preclusive interpretation of the
exhaustion doctrine,28 4 Brennan and Peller have difficulty explaining
language in the same cases that "leave[s] the petitioner to the usual and
orderly course of proceeding" through the state process and "by writ
of error from this court."' 28 5 Nor does the Brennan-Peller explanation
of the exhaustion doctrine satisfactorily counter Bator's skepticism
about requiring state proceedings but giving their results no weight in
subsequent federal proceedings. 28 6 The "after you" formality that
Brennan sees in the doctrine does little to avoid the offense that state
judges take when a reviewing federal judge ignores their prior determi-
nations. Moreover, the very decisions in which the Court lamented the
writ's inflexible, unconditional-release remedy began developing the
more flexible alternatives routinely used today.28 7 Thus, pace Peller,
the habeas corpus statute's broad injunction to "dispose of [unconstitu-
concurring); In re Metzger, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 175, 190-91 (1847); Ex parte Bollman, 8
U.S. (4 Cranch) at 95-97.
281. 140 U.S. 278 (1891).
282. See Bator, supra note 6, at 481-82.
283. See In re Wood, 140 U.S. at 283-90. The Court previously recognized the
right to relief on such claims on direct appeal in Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 397
(1880).
284. See Peller, supra note 191, at 635.
285. Whitten v. Tomlinson, 160 U.S. 231, 242 (1895) (relying on New York v. Eno,
155 U.S. 89, 93-95 (1894) and Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 251-53 (1886)) (emphasis
added); see, e.g., Urquhart v. Brown, 205 U.S. 179, 181-83 (1907); Tinsley v. Anderson,
171 U.S. 101, 104-05 (1898).
286. See Bator, supra note 6, at 483.
287. See, e.g., In re Bonner, 151 U.S. 242, 259-62 (1894); Medley, Petitioner, 134
U.S. 160, 173-75 (1890); see also supra note 263.
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tionally convicted prisoners] as law and justice require" 288 gave habeas
corpus courts ample alternatives to putting probably guilty individuals
"back on the streets."
Examination of only a few landmark decisions reveals that neither
Bator nor the Brennan-Peller thesis provides a complete or satisfying
explanation of the Court's habeas corpus jurisprudence. To pose a fur-
ther test for the two theories, and to help introduce my own, I will dis-
cuss two habeas corpus cases decided almost exactly a century ago.
Although both seem to come straight out of Professor Bator's pan-
theon of review- and relief-denying cases, I use them to reveal a regime
of rather broad federal review as of right that, although different from,
is more akin to, the system that Justice Brennan and Professor Peller
envisioned.
B. Two Tests
1. Whitten v. Tomlinson. - In Whitten v. Tomlinson,28 9 petitioner
George Whitten claimed that he had been improperly extradited from
Massachusetts in January 1895 to stand trial for murder in Connecticut
although (1) he had been " 'tried' " and discharged on the same counts
C'after a full hearing' " in a New Haven court in September 1893;
(2) "'no indictment as and for a true bill ever was presented by any
grand jury ... and any pretended indictment was found by mistake or
misconception' "; and (3) he " 'was not, at the time of his extradition
... a fugitive from justice' "as required by federal law.290 Sheriff Tom-
linson's response-that he properly held Whitten under a mittimus
sworn out by Whitten's surety averring that Whitten intended to ab-
scond-prompted Whitten to claim that (4) the mittimus was an unfit
basis for detention because it was directed to "Whitten, 'of the town of
Newton, . . . Massachusetts,'" and Connecticut law authorized a mitti-
mus only by" 'a justice of the peace of the county in which such princi-
pal resides,'" and because the first Tuesday ofJanuary, 1895 specified
for Whitten's appearance "was a day already passed" when the mitti-
mus issued in March 1895.291 The circuit court denied relief, and the
Supreme Court affirmed.
Justice Gray's conscientious effort to locate his analysis in both the
statutory and case law context of federal question jurisdiction as a
whole makes the decision a particularly helpful place to begin consider-
ing the writ's history. According to Gray, "three different methods
have been provided by statute for bringing before the courts of the
United States proceedings begun in the courts of the States" when
"necessary to secure the supremacy of the Constitution, laws and trea-
288. Rev. Stat. § 761, 18 Stat. 143 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2243
(1988)).
289. 160 U.S. 231 (1895).
290. Id. at 233-34.
291. Id. at 235, 246.
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ties of the United States."'292 The first two extended respectively to
judgments allegedly contrary to, and to claims arising under, "the Con-
stitution, laws or treaties of the United States." They were direct
Supreme Court review on writ of error under section 25 of the judiciary
Act of 1789 and section 2 of the Act of February 5, 1867,293 and re-
moval to the lower federal courts under a series of acts passed, during
periods of inter-sectional domestic crisis, in 1815-1817, 1833, and
1863-February 5, 1867.294
Third was habeas corpus:
By section 14 of the old [1789] Judiciary Act, the courts of
the United States .were authorized ... to issue writs of habeas
corpus and other writs necessary for the exercise of their re-
spective jurisdictions; "provided that writs of habeas corpus
shall in no case extend to prisoners in jail, unless when they
are in custody under or by color of the authority of the United
States, or are committed for trial before some court of the
same ....
By subsequent acts of Congress, however, the power of
the courts of the United States to issue writs of habeas corpus to
prisoners in jail has been extended to the case of any person in
custody for an act done or omitted in pursuance of a law of the
United States, or of an order or process of a court or judge
thereof [citing another provision of the 1833 act covered by
Justice Gray's removal discussion]; or [ii] in custody in viola-
tion of the Constitution, or of a law or treaty of the United
States [citing section 1 of the same February 5, 1867 Act cited
in Justice Gray's writ of error discussion]. 295
"By the existing statutes," Justice Gray concluded, now quoting
the 1874 Revised Statutes' unified codification of all habeas corpus pro-
visions, federal judges and courts have "power to grant writs of habeas
corpus ... [to] any prisoner.. . 'in custody in violation of the Constitu-
tion, or of a law or treaty of the United States;' and '... shall forthwith
award a writ of habeas corpus, unless it appears from the petition itself
that the party is not entitled thereto.' "296
292. Id. at 238.
293. See id. (citing, e.g., Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 2, 14 Stat. 385, 385-86; Act
of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85; Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264
(1821); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816)).
294. See Whitten v. Tomlinson, 160 U.S. at 239; and, e.g., Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch.
31, § 3, 14 Stat. 27 (amended, e.g., Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 27, 14 Stat. 385); Act of Mar.
3, 1863, ch. 81, § 5, 12 Stat. 755, 756-57; Act of Mar. 2, 1833, ch. 57, § 3, 4 Stat. 632,
633-34; Act of Feb. 4, 1815, ch. 31, § 8, 3 Stat. 195, 198-99. See also Hart & Wechsler,
3d ed., supra note 241, at 483-84, 1767-69 (discussing the removal acts).
295. Whitten v. Tomlinson, 160 U.S. at 239 (quoting Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20,
§ 14, 1 Stat. 73, 82; citing, e.g., Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385, 385-86;
Act of Mar. 2, 1833, ch. 57, § 7, 4 Stat. 632, 634-35) (other citations omitted).
296. Whitten v. Tomlinson, 160 U.S. at 239-40 (quoting and paraphrasing Rev.
Stat. §§ 751-755, 761, tit. 13, ch. 13, 18 Stat. 142-43 (1878) (recodified and amended at
28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a)-(c), 2243).
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Following Exparte Royall2 97 and later "exhaustion" cases, however,
Justice Gray stated that "in the exercise of this [habeas corpus] power
the courts of the United States are not bound to discharge by writ of
habeas corpus every such prisoner":
We cannot suppose that Congress intended to compel
[federal] courts, by such means, to draw to themselves, in the
first instance, the control of all criminal prosecutions com-
menced in state courts .... The [habeas corpus statute's] in-
junction to hear the case summarily, and thereupon "to
dispose of the party as law and justice require," does not de-
prive the court of discretion as to the time and mode in which it
will exert the powers conferred upon it.298
Thus, out of concern for "'relations existing.., between the judicial
tribunals of the Union and of the States,'" federal courts "except in...
peculiar and urgent cases ... will not discharge the prisoner by habeas
corpus in advance of a final determination of his case in the courts of the
State," and even after determination by the highest state tribunal "will
generally leave the petitioner to the usual and orderly course of proceed-
ing by writ of error from this court."
'299
With this foundation, Justice Gray addressed the merits of Whit-
ten's legal claims. In keeping with the Court's federal-prisoner habeas
corpus precedents, Justice Gray acknowledged that Whitten's double
jeopardy claim might have deserved attention had his prior "hearing
and discharge" taken place at and following "a formal trial and acquit-
tal," but rejected the claim because Whitten's allegations instead
"point[ed] to a hearing and discharge upon an application for his com-
mittal to jail to await prosecution."300 Reflecting the same precedents,
Justice Gray reserved ruling on a claim "'that no indictment was ever
found against him by any grand jury'" but rejected Whitten's alterna-
tive claim "that an indictment, actually presented by the grand jury to
the court, lacked the words 'a true bill,'" and was handed down by
"mistake and misconception."' 30 1 These technical and state-law defects
"afford[ed] no ground for interposition by the courts of the United
297. 117 U.S. 241, 251-53 (1886).
298. Whitten v. Tomlinson, 160 U.S. at 240-42 (quoting Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S.
241, 251-53 (1886)) (emphasis added)).
299. Id. at 240-42 (quoting Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. at 251) (emphasis added).
300. Id. at 243. Compare, e.g., Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 168-78
(1873) (under Double Jeopardy Clause, prior punishment upon conviction or prior
acquittal bars subsequent conviction and punishment) with Ex parte Milbum, 34 U.S. (9
Pet.) 702, 709 (1835) (arrest following release on bail does not warrant habeas corpus
relief because it does not violate double jeopardy principle).
301. Whitten v. Tomlinson, 160 U.S. at 243-45. Compare Ex parte Wilson, 114
U.S. 417, 429 (1885) (granting habeas corpus relief to prisoner tried for serious crime in
federal court without grand jury indictment) with In re Coy, 127 U.S. 731, 753-56
(1888) (denying habeas corpus relief because of the alleged insufficiency of the
indictment to show that a federal crime had occurred and because of other technical
defects in the indictment).
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States by writ of habeas corpus."30 2 Justice Gray similarly rejected Whit-
ten's claim that he was not a "fugitive from justice" within the meaning
of federal law, as contrary to a factual finding, "proper in form," that
the Court on habeas corpus would not revisit.303 Likewise beyond the
Court's power to review was Whitten's claim that the bail-revoking
court lacked personal jurisdiction under a state statute and under the
proper reading of a state court's order, because neither theory arose
under "the Constitution, or... a law or treaty of the United States. 30 4
Having actually reviewed (and found unfit for habeas corpus con-
sideration) all four of Whitten's pretrial, hence unexhausted, claims,
Justice Gray foreswore similar consideration of the merits in the future
should the Court again be presented with unexhausted claims. For
there
could be no better illustration than this case ... of the wisdom
•.. of the rule... that a prisoner in custody under the author-
ity of a State should not... be discharged... upon a writ of
habeas corpus, in advance of any proceedings in the courts of
the State to test the validity of his arrest and detention.30 5
2. In re Tyler. - Exemplifying the writ's surprisingly frequent use
on behalf of state officials,30 6 In re Tyler307 involved the request of South
Carolina sheriff M.V. Tyler for release from detention under a federal
contempt order for violating an injunction against seizing property
under the court's bankruptcy protection to pay state taxes the court
deemed confiscatory.
308
Tyler raised six claims-that (1) the absence of a sufficient amount
in controversy and (2) the existence of an adequate remedy at law de-
prived the district court ofjurisdiction to issue an injunction;30 9 that (3)
the rule forbidding federal interference with state tax collection, (4) the
Eleventh Amendment, or (5) a state law requiring aggrieved taxpayers
to pay first and recoup later immunized Tyler from the injunction; and
that (6) the taxes were not confiscatory.3 10 He prefaced these claims
with an overriding interpretive principle straight out of the Brennan-
Peller lexicon. Hoping to circumvent the cases suggesting "that the
Supreme Court, having no jurisdiction of criminal cases by writ of error
302. Whitten v. Tomlinson, 160 U.S. at 244.
303. Id. at 245.
304. Id. at 240, 246-47.
305. Id. at 247.
306. See, e.g., In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200, 221-22 (1888); In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443
(1887); Ex parte Rowland, 104 U.S. 604, 616-18 (1881).
307. 149 U.S. 164 (1893).
308. See id. at 169-70, 190-91.
309. Habeas corpus clearly lay by this time to release a contemnor detained by a
court without jurisdiction over the lawsuit in which the injunction the prisoner violated
was issued. See, e.g., In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. at 221-22; In re Ayers, 123 U.S. at 485; Ex
parte Rowland, 104 U.S. at 617-18.
310. See In re Tyler, 149 U.S. at 181-83, 186-88, 190.
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or appeal, could not, on habeas corpus, examine into the sufficiency of
the evidence on which the judgment and sentence of the court was
founded," Tyler argued that Congress' authorization of criminal ap-
peals two years earlier had removed any "obstacle" to the use of the
writ to "inquir[e] into the sufficiency of the evidence on which the judg-
ment was founded and into errors of law beyond jurisdictional
errors."311
Because of doubts that the 1891 criminal appeals provision
reached quasi-criminal contempt convictions, the Court excused
Tyler's failure to exhaust federal appellate remedies. Stating in passing
a principle that telegraphs my interpretation of the writ's 200-year his-
tory, ChiefJustice Fuller reasoned that
[t]he writ of habeas corpus is not to perform the office of a writ
of error or appeal; but when no writ of error or appeal will lie,
if a petitioner is imprisoned under a judgment of [a court] ...
which had no jurisdiction of the person or of the subject mat-
ter, or authority to render the judgment complained of, then
relief may be accorded.
1 2
Obviously, the principle that the writ substitutes for an appeal
when the latter is not available is the very opposite of the principle for
which Tyler contended-namely, that the writ duplicates whatever ap-
peals are available. Chief Justice Fuller thus concluded that even if,
under the 1891 act, "a writ of error might be brought to review ... a
[contempt] judgment[,] . . . and ... thereby our appellate jurisdiction
was enlarged, we should still decline to consider the whole record for
error merely, but only to ascertain whether the judgment was abso-
lutely void." '3
18
Next distinguishing "error merely" from an "absolutely void"
judgment-that is, ajudgment rendered in the absence of "jurisdiction
of the person or of the subject matter, or authority to render the judg-
ment complained of"-the Court ruled that the existence of an ade-
quate remedy at law was not cognizable on habeas corpus because it
"goes to the want of equity and not to want of power. 8314 Similarly,
"an apparent defect of jurisdiction for lack of a [sufficient] matter in
controversy... can be availed of only by appeal or writ of error" and
not on habeas corpus because it does not involve "an absolute want of
power" but only "its defective exercise. 8315
Then, after repeatedly noting that the "cause [was] confessedly
within [the federal circuit court's] jurisdiction," 3 16 Justice Gray exten-
311. Id. at 173.
312. Id. at 180.
313. Id. at 180-81.
314. Id. at 180.
315. Id. at 181 (citing Reynes v. Dumont, 130 U.S. 354 (1889); In re Sawyer, 124
U.S. 200, 221 (1888)).
316. Id. at 190; accord id. at 181, 189 ("The property in question was in the
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sively discussed and eventually denied the legal merits of Tyler's claims
that anti-tax-injunction principles and the Eleventh Amendment immu-
nized state officials from the federal court's power, via injunction and
contempt, to protect the property within its jurisdiction from excessive
state taxation.3 17 The Court then brushed aside Tyler's claim under
the state's "pay now, recoup later" provision as outside the Court's ju-
risdiction, and dispatched his claim that the taxes were not unconstitu-
tionally excessive on the ground that the confiscation question was "for
the Circuit Court to determine .... and its action cannot be treated as a
nullity."
3 1 8
3. Analysis. - On the exhaustion of remedies issue, neither the Ba-
tor nor the Brennan-Peller thesis can explain what went on in Whitten
and Tyler. Thus, Bator can explain Whitten's promise to "leave" future
petitioners to remedies besides habeas corpus, but not its explanation
of exhaustion as simply requiring state court consideration "in thefirst
instance." Brennan and Peller's problem is exactly the reverse.
On the cognizability issue, consider first what Whitten and Tyler
said. Whitten could hardly be more explicit, stating the question
presented as whether petitioner's claims placed "the supremacy of the
Constitution, laws and treaties of the United States" at stake.3 1 9 Tyler's
language is less explicit, but its concern for "question[s] of power,"
whether the judgment "was absolutely void," and whether the commit-
ting court "had ... jurisdiction of the person or the subject matter, or
authority to render the judgment complained of" transcends jurisdictional
questions and rather precisely track the era's definition of due
process.3
20
Both the Whitten and Tyler Courts were true to their word. Justice
Gray did not hold-as he much more easily and briefly could have-
that, not being dispositive of the detaining court's subject matter or
personal jurisdiction, the double jeopardy and right-to-indictment
claims were outside the Court's habeas corpus authority. Rather, Jus-
tice Gray was at pains to show that Whitten did not allege a constitu-
tional violation, and at best alleged only technical error. Likewise,
custody of the Circuit Court, in a cause within its jurisdiction, and protected by
injunction.").
317. See id. at 189-91.
318. Id. at 188-91
319. Whitten v. Tomlinson, 160 U.S. 231, 238 (1895).
320. In re Tyler, 149 U.S. at 180-81, 188-89 (emphasis added); accord Tinsley v.
Anderson, 171 U.S. 101, 106 (1898) (due process is not denied "[i]f the committing
court had jurisdiction of the subject-matter, and of the person, and power to make the
order"); In re Converse, 137 U.S. 624, 631 (1891) (due process violation requires "such
an unrestrained and arbitrary exercise of power as to be utterly void"); Kennard v.
Louisiana ex rel. Morgan, 92 U.S. 480, 481 (1875) (to satisfy due process, act must be
"done 'in the due course of legal proceedings' "and be taken by courts with "power...




ChiefJustice Fuller's repeated conclusions that the detaining court had
jurisdiction did not stop him from reviewing Tyler's nonjurisdictional
constitutional defenses based on federalism and anti-tax-injunction
principles.
Even more intriguing are both decisions' limitation of the habeas
corpus power to less than all jurisdictional claims. Thus, the Whitten
Court categorized as nonreviewable "error merely" three claims that, if
true, defeated the detaining court's personal jurisdiction, namely,
(1) that Whitten was not a "fugitive from justice" under federal law,
thus forbidding his extradition; (2) that the state court could not arrest
Whitten, a nondomiciliary, under a state law applying only to "re-
side[nt]s"; and (3) that his detention order, which seemed to terminate
in January, was moot in March. Likewise, in Tyler, the Court placed
beyond the pale of its habeas corpus power the clearly jurisdictional
claim that the lawsuit before the court lacked the jurisdictionally requi-
site amount in controversy.
32'
What emerges from Whitten and Tyler is not a distinction between
jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional claims, but rather a distinction be-
tween more and less fundamental types of claims, be they jurisdictional
or not. On its face, this distinction seems more compatible with Bren-
nan and Peller's theory than with Bator's. Still, the Court's application
of the distinction presents problems for Brennan and Peller. Thus, any
simple and straightforward application of the 1867 statute's grant of
habeas corpus power over claims arising under the "Constitution and
laws of the United States" should have comprehended both Whitten's
claim that he was not a "fugitive from justice" within the meaning of
the federal extradition law and Tyler's claims that the statutorily man-
dated amount in controversy was absent and that the taxes he was col-
lecting were not confiscatory in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Even more troublesome for Brennan and Peller is Tyler's
outright rejection of the argument that gaps in the Court's habeas
corpus jurisdiction could be attributed to gaps in its criminal appellate
jurisdiction.3 2
2
In the end, neither Bator nor Brennan and Peller offer particularly
satisfactory explanations of the Court's habeas corpus cases. The rea-
son may emerge from an aspect of Justice Gray's careful exposition in
Whitten that indicts both theses. Unlike these later theorists, Justice
Gray directs attention not simply to the Court's habeas corpus prece-
dents but also to the legislation governing the writ and, most funda-
mentally, to the precedents and statutes governing all "methods" by
which federal review of state criminal judgments "secure[s] the
supremacy of the Constitution, laws and treaties of the United
321. See supra notes 303-304 and accompanying text.
322. See supra notes 312-313 and accompanying text.
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States. '3 23 Following Justice Gray's lead, let me state my own thesis
and attempt to defend it by placing it within the statutory and federal-
question contexts that Justice Gray emphasized in Whitten.
IV. A NEw HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS IN STATUTORY AND FEDERAL
JURISDICTIONAL CONTEXT
A. A New Thesis
In its 1942 decision in Waley v. Johnston,3 24 the Supreme Court had
the good sense to crib a single, overarching habeas corpus rule from a
brief filed in an earlier case by a young government lawyer named Her-
bert Wechsler:3 25 The writ "extends . . . to those exceptional cases
where the conviction has been in disregard of the constitutional rights
of the accused, and where the writ is the only effective means of pre-
serving his rights."
'32 6
Although Wechsler apparently dated this rule, and the modem era
of habeas corpus jurisprudence generally, from the Court's decision in
Moore twenty years earlier,32 7 I think that, even in 1942, the rule had
more than two decades' worth of explanatory power. With some modi-
fications, it now can claim two centuries' worth. Indeed, a version of
the same rule emerged from Tyler's 1893 statement that "when no writ
of error or appeal will lie, if a petitioner is imprisoned under a judg-
ment of the Circuit Court, which had no jurisdiction of the person or of
the subject matter, or authority to render the judgment complained of,
then relief may be accorded.
'3 28
Combining both versions of the rule, let me state my thesis as fol-
lows: Federal habeas corpus is not a substitute for a general writ of error
or other direct appeal as of right. Since 1789, however, it has provided
statutorily specified classes of prisoners with a limited and substitute fed-
eral writ of error or appeal as of right. That appellate procedure has
been limited because it has lain only to hear claims of particular national
importance-which Congress since 1867 has defined as all constitu-
tional claims. It has been a substitute because it has served only in de-
fault of Supreme Court review as of right.
The limited class of nationally important claims cognizable in
habeas corpus has changed over time under the influence of (1) consti-
tutional and statutory limitations on the federal courts' jurisdiction-
claims arising under state law, even if jurisdictional, have never been
cognizable;3 29 (2) case law identifying the legal defects in civil cases that
323. Whitten v. Tomlinson, 160 U.S. at 238.
324. 316 U.S. 101 (1942).
325. See Wechsler, supra note 264, at 174.
326. Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. at 105.
327. See Wechsler, supra note 264, at 172-73.
328. In re Tyler, 149 U.S. 165, 180 (1893).
329. See, e.g., In re Converse, 137 U.S. 624, 630-31 (1891).
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are subject to collateral attack;330 and (3) developing notions of due
process and constitutional law. 33 1 At no time was the line between ju-
risdictional and nonjurisdictional claims a very good proxy for this line
between important and unimportant claims.
As a substitute for federal direct appeal, habeas corpus has never
duplicated, but has always mirrored the scope of, Supreme Court re-
view on direct appeal. Although the line between legal and factual
questions has changed over time, the scope of both modes of review
has always been de novo on legal claims and deferential-to-nonexistent
on factual findings.
"Innocence" claims and their close cousins, claims that the penal
statute was not intended to reach the particular prisoner's conduct, are
both nationally unimportant because sui generis, and subject to little or
no review because aimed at the central fact determination at trial. For
these reasons, the Court has been particularly careful to exclude such
claims from habeas corpus.3
32
Before embarking on an effort to show how most or all the Court's
cases map onto this rule, let me show how Whitten and Tyler do. My
thesis, unlike Bator's or Brennan-Peller's, explains how the exhaustion
doctrine can be both a rule of timing-requiring that nonpreclusive
state court review precede federal review3 33-and a rule of preclu-
sion-making federal direct review as of right preclusive of later habeas
corpus review. My thesis also explains, as Brennan and Peller cannot,
why Tyler treated Congress' creation of federal-prisoner appeals as of
right to the Supreme Court as an occasion not for expanding but in-
stead for contracting habeas corpus review.
Likewise, the thesis does a better job than Bator's or Brennan-
Peller's of explaining the treatment of the claims in the two cases.
Although jurisdictional and federal-statutory, Whitten's "fugitive from
justice" and Tyler's "amount in controversy" claims were fact-bound,
so that the prior courts' determinations were binding. The same goes
for Tyler's constitutional claim that the taxes were not confiscatory.3 34
330. See, e.g., Cuddy, Petitioner, 131 U.S. 280, 284-85 (1889); Ex parte Lange, 85
U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 177-78 (1874); Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 203-07
(1830).
331. See, e.g., Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 326-28 (1915); Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369-70, 373-74 (1886); Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at
176-77; see also Ex parte Parks, 93 U.S. 18, 21 (1876) (the writ "is one of the modes in
which this court exercises supervisory power over inferior courts and tribunals; but it is a
special mode, and confined to a limited class of cases") supra note 41 (discussing the
liberty interests definitive of "important" or "fundamental" national laws).
332. But see Herrera v. Collins, 112 S. Ct. 1074 (1992) (mem.) (granting certiorari
in Herrera v. Collins, 954 F.2d 1029 (5th Cir. 1992), to decide whether petitioner's
innocence by itself is cognizable on habeas corpus as a constitutional defense to
execution).
333. A final judgment by the highest state court with jurisdiction is a statutory
prerequisite to federal direct review. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
334. Confiscation was not then, or even as late as 1920, a mixed question of law
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Whitten's jurisdictional claims attacking the state trial court's authority
to order his detention and alleging the detention order's mootness, as
well as Tyler's claim based on South Carolina's "pay now, recoup later"
statute, were noncognizable state law claims, while Whitten's bail-revo-
cation and defective-indictment claims alleged "mere" or technical er-
ror at best. Only, therefore, the Fifth Amendment indictment and
double jeopardy claims hinted at but not established by Whitten's peti-
tion and Tyler's Eleventh Amendment and federalism-based-immunity
claims rose to a level of national importance sufficient to warrant the
federal courts' attention on habeas corpus.3 3 5
Thus far, I have implicitly used my thesis, in Parts I and II, to ex-
plain the habeas corpus cases from 1953 to the 1990s, and have explic-
itly used it, in Part III.B, to explain two 1890s cases. In the remainder
of this Part, I use the thesis to generate a new history of habeas corpus
in statutory and federal jurisdictional context, in the process assimilat-
ing the rest of the cases.
B. Federal Question Writs of Error and Habeas Corpus Review Under the
1789 Judiciary Act
As we already know fromJustice Gray's summary in Whitten,336 sec-
tion 25 of the First Judiciary Act of 1789 extended writs of error as of
right to state prisoners (and other state litigants) who, within the pre-
ceding five years, had been denied relief "in the highest court of law...
of a State in which a decision in the suit could be had" on claims chal-
lenging a state statute or other state authority "on the ground of [its]
being repugnant to the constitution, treaties or laws of the United
States" or questioning "the construction of... the constitution, . . . a
treaty, or statute of ... the United States. ' 33 7 Reflecting the common
law use of the writ of error as a means of bringing up for review only
some of the issues in a case,338 section 25 stated that:
no other error shall be assigned or regarded as a ground of
reversal in any such case as aforesaid, than such as appears on
the face of the record, and immediately respects the before men-
tioned questions of validity or construction of the said consti-
tution, treaties, statutes, commissions, or authorities in
dispute.33 9
Although section 25 provided without limitation that the state
and fact. See Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287, 299 (1920)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
335. See supra notes 300-304, 314-318 and accompanying text.
336. See supra notes 292-293 and accompanying text.
337. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20 § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85-86; see id. § 22, 1 Stat. at 84,
incorporated by reference in id. § 25, 1 Stat. at 86 (five-year period in which to file).
338. See supra note 51.
339. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 86-87 (emphasis added).
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court 'judgment . may be re-examined and reversed or affirmed, '3 40 the
Court, following common law appellate practice, interpreted its writ of
error power to permit de novo review only of legal claims and to forbid
review of purely factual determinations.34 1 This inclination took on
something of a constitutional imperative in 1791, when the Seventh
Amendment became law, forbidding the federal courts to overturn the
factfinding of a jury except according to these same common law
usages.3
42
Sections 9 and 11 of the 1789 Act gave federal district and circuit
courts jurisdiction to try criminal cases arising under federal penal stat-
utes.3 43 Sections 21 and 22 established the appellate jurisdiction of the
federal circuit courts and the Supreme Court, but made no provision
for appeals in criminal cases.
3 4 4
Section 14 of the 1789 Act gave federal, but expressly withheld
from state, prisoners the right to petition for writs of habeas corpus to
review the "cause of commitment. '3 45 Although the statute did not
expressly give the Supreme Court itself-only its individual Justices
(along with lower federal courts and judges)-the power to issue the
writ, the Court quickly held that the statute accorded the entire Court
the power to grant habeas corpus relief.3 46 In so holding, Justice Mar-
shall rejected the Government's double-barreled claim that the Court,
as a court, had no habeas corpus jurisdiction (i) because, citing Marbury
v. Madison,347 the Constitution's strict limits on the Court's original ju-
risdiction forbade the Court to hear habeas corpus petitions filed di-
rectly before it, and (ii) because the 1789 statute failed to authorize
appeals from lower federal courts in habeas corpus cases, thus denying
the constitutionally required authorization of appellate power.3 48 In a
ruling that reverberated throughout the Court's nineteenth century
habeas corpus cases, the Court avoided both claims by ruling (1) that
habeas corpus was "clearly appellate" because it involved "the revision
of a decision of an inferior court, by which a citizen has been committed
to jail," and (2) that Congress through section 14 had given the full
Court the constitutionally requisite authorization, in the exercise of its
340. Id. § 25, 1 Stat. at 85-86 (emphasis added).
341. See supra note 51.
342. See U.S. Const. amend. VII; The Justices v. Murray, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 274,
277-80 (1869); Hart & Wechsler, 3d ed., supra note 241, at 19-20; supra note 51.
343. See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, §§ 9, 11, I Stat. 73, 76-79.
344. See id. §§ 21, 22, 1 Stat. 73, 83-85.
345. Id. § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82.
346. See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 110 (1866); Ex parte Boliman, 8
U.S. (4 Cranch.) 75, 96, 100 (1807); see also Ex parte Burford, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 448,
452-53 (1806) (exercising the power the Court explicitly affirmed in Bollman); United
States v. Hamilton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 17, 18 (1795) (same).
347. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
348. See Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 96-101.
2058 [Vol. 92:1997
HABEAS CORPUS
appellate jurisdiction, to hear "original" habeas corpus petitions.3 49
Essentially until 1885, therefore, the Court routinely heard habeas
corpus petitions arising in one of two postures-filed initially in the
Supreme Court with no lower court action on habeas corpus,350 or filed
in a lower federal court followed by the filing in the Supreme Court of
an "original" habeas corpus petition and a petition for a writ of certio-
rari to bring the lower court's record before the Supreme Court.3 51
The 1789 Act's authorization to inquire into the "cause of commit-
ment" powered the Court's entire habeas corpus jurisprudence be-
tween 1789 and at least 1874.352 Contrasting the nine federal-prisoner
habeas corpus cases during the period in which the Court granted re-
view, including the six in which it granted relief, with the two in which it
denied review based on substantive limits on the scope of the writ
3 53
reveals that, pace Bator, the 1789 Act cases did not limit habeas corpus
review either to jurisdictional claims or to claims attacking pretrial as
opposed to postconviction detention. In three of the cases in which the
Court granted relief, and in at least one of those in which it granted
review but denied relief, the detaining authority clearly had jurisdiction
to detain the petitioner.354 And in two of the cases in which it granted
349. Id. at 100-01; accord Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 374 (1879); Ex parte
McCardle I, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318, 324 (1867); Ex parte Watkins II, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 568,
572-73 (1833); supra notes 275-278. Sections 13 and 14 of the 1789 Act may
themselves identify habeas corpus as appellate. After laying out the Court's original
jurisdiction, § 13 says that "[t]he Supreme Court shall also have appellate jurisdiction
from the circuit courts and courts of the several states, in the cases herein after specially
provided for" and is followed immediately by § 14, which "[tiherein after specially
provide[s]" for writs of habeas corpus. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, §§ 13, 14, 1 Stat. 73,
80-82.
350. See, e.g., Ex parte Kearney, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 38, 39-44 (1822). But cf. In re
Metzger, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 176, 191-92 (1847) (forbidding review of executive detention
as not appellate and beyond the Court's constitutionally specified original jurisdiction).
351. See, e.g., Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 99-101 (1868); In re Kaine, 55
U.S. (14 How.) 103, 116 (1852).
352. See infra notes 390-392 and accompanying text (gradual replacement of 1789
Act by 1867 Act during 1874-1885 period).
353. Granting habeas corpus review and relief are United States v. Hamilton, 3 U.S.
(3 Dall.) 17 (1795); Ex parte Burford, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 448 (1806); Ex parte Bollman, 8
U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807); Ex parte Watkins II, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 568 (1833); Ex parte
Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866); Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1874).
Granting review but denying relief are Ex parte Milburn, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 704 (1835); In
re Kaine, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 103 (1852); Ex parte Wells, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 307 (1855).
Denying review based on substantive limits on the scope of the writ are Ex parte
Kearney, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 38 (1822); Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830).
354. Granting relief on nonjurisdictional claims are Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18
Wall.) at 175 (curing double jeopardy violation); Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at
135 (overturning lower court's arrest warrant for lack of probable cause although
issuing court had jurisdiction); Ex parte Hamilton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 18, (similar).
Hearing but denying relief on a nonjurisdictional claim is Ex parte Milburn, 34 U.S. (9




relief, the Court overturned what amounted to criminal convictions.355
On the other hand, in the famous case of Ex parte Watkins,356 the
Court denied habeas corpus review of two challenges to the jurisdiction
of the detaining Court-that the petitioner's conduct lay outside the
proscription of the federal statute under which he was convicted, hence
outside the detaining court's subject-matter jurisdiction, and that the
petitioner's actions took place in another state, thus depriving the court
of personaljurisdiction.3 57 Nor did Watkins and the Court's other cases
claim to limit habeas corpus review to jurisdictional claims, but instead
identified as equally critical whether the detaining court acted without
"authority" or "unlawfully. 3 5 8
What the Justices instead did during this period was to grant relief
on the basis of legal claims of national importance-mainly constitu-
tional claims-including whether the court that ordered the petitioner's
arrest lacked probable cause to believe a crime had been committed, in
violation of the Fourth Amendment;3 59 whether a court convicted the
petitioner without the rudiments of a trial, or at least without ajury and
a life-tenured judge as required by Article III and the Sixth Amend-
ment;360 whether the detaining court had twice placed the petitioner in
jeopardy by imposing two punishments for a single offense, in violation
355. See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 122-23 (civilian's conviction by
military court violated constitutional right to trial by jury before a life-tenured judge);
Ex parte Burford, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) at 453 (summary incarceration and fine imposed by
justices of the peace after finding the petitioner to be of "ill fame" overturned for lack of
"proceedings [that] are regular").
356. 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830).
357. See id. at 197, 201 (claims "that no offence was charged in the indictments,
which was within the jurisdiction of the circuit court for the county of Washington" and
"that the indictment charges no offense for which the prisoner was punishable in that
court, or of which that court could take cognisance; and consequently, that the
proceedings are coram non judice").
358. See, e.g., Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 166 ("whether th[e detaining]
court has exceeded its authority"); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 116, 118
("lawfulness of... imprisonment"); In re Metzger, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 176, 191 (1847)
("legality of the commitment"); Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 202 (same).
359. The dissenting judge in the lower court in Bollman, whose conclusion the
Supreme Court accepted on appeal, see supra note 354 (summarizing Bollman),
described the claim in that case as arising under the Fourth Amendment. United States
v. Bollman, 24 F. Gas. 1189, 1192 (C.C.D.C. 1807) (No. 14,622) (Cranch,J., dissenting);
see also Ex parte Milburn, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 704, 705 (1835) (district attorney's issuance
of arrest warrant violated Fourth Amendment requirement of action by magistrate); Ex
parte Burford, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 448, 452, 453 (1806) (granting relief in part "for want
of [a warrant] stating some good cause certain, supported by oath").
360. See, e.g., Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 122; Ex parte Burford, 7 U.S.
(3 Cranch) at 452, 453 (apparently treating lack ofjury trial as reason to grant writ and
order trial "de novo" with "regular" proceedings); United States v. Hamilton, 3 U.S. (3
DalI.) 17 (1795); see also Ex parte Randolph, 20 F. Gas. 242, 254-55 (C.C.D. Va. 1833)
(No. 11,558) (Marshall, Cir. Justice) (assuming cognizability of claim that statute
violated Article III and the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Amendments).
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of the Fifth Amendment;3 61 and whether the statute under which the
petitioner was convicted was unconstitutional.3 62 And when the Court
denied relief on the merits, it did so only after satisfying itself that no
constitutional violation had occurred.
3 63
Furthermore, in the two cases in which the Court denied review, in
both cases because the writ could not substitute for a plenary appeal,36
4
it did so expressly on the ground that habeas corpus instead provided
review that, although concededly "in the nature of a writ of error," only
reached a limited range of claims.3 65 And its holdings demarcate that
limit precisely according to the important-unimportant line hypothe-
sized above. Thus, the Court refused to hear even jurisdictional claims
that merely challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to convict or as-
serted that the particular conduct for which the petitioner had been
convicted fell outside the penal statute.3 66
Moreover, the scope of review that the Court afforded on habeas
corpus precisely tracked that available on direct appeal. Thus, as sec-
tion 25 expressly required on writ of error review,3 67 the Court limited
its habeas corpus review to reexamination of legal determinations3 68 ap-
361. See Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 169.
362. See Ex parte Randolph, 20 F. Gas. at 253-56 (dicta by Marshall, Cir.Justice).
363. Ex parte Wells, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 307, 310-15 (1855) (President's pardoning
power authorizes commutation of a death sentence on condition that petitioner accept
life imprisonment); In re Kaine, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 103, 110 (1852) (federal statute
constitutionally permitted foreign government to move in court to extradite petitioner
without President's concurrence); Ex parte Milburn, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) at 708-10.
364. See Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 203 (1830); Ex parte Kearney, 20
U.S. (7 Wheat.) 38, 44-45 (1822).
365. Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 202-03. The thesis presented here thus
explains the puzzling juxtaposition of statements that habeas corpus does not
comprehend the "power to examine the proceedings, on a writ of error" but is "in the
nature of a writ of error, to examine the legality of the commitment." Id. ChiefJustice
Marshall was not contradicting himself: habeas corpus does not "examine [all] the
proceedings," as might occur on an appellate court's plenary writ of error, but only a
limited set of issues, namely, "the legality of the commitment." As to cognizable issues,
however, review is "in the nature of a writ of error."
366. See, e.g., Ex parte Watkins II, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 568, 574 (1833) (refusing
review of claim that statutorily permissible $3000 fine was excessive); Ex parte Watkins,
28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 207 (refusing review of claims that federal penal law did not
comprehend the charged embezzlements, and that crime of paying out money in Boston
and New York embezzled from government in Washington did not take place in
Washington); Ex parte Kearney, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) at 45 (refusing to review lower
court's finding that witness was in contempt for refusing to answer questions).
367. See supra notes 338-342 and accompanying text.
368. See, e.g., Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 112-13, 118 (1866); Ex parte
Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 203-07; Ex parte Kearney, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) at 42
(reviewing de novo question whether "commitment was made by a court of competent
jurisdiction... in the exercise of an unquestionable authority"); Ex parte Bollman, 8
U.S. (4 Granch) 75, 114, 125, 135-36 (1807) (defining scope of review as "do[ing] that
which the court below ought to have done," Court "fully examine[d] and attentively
consider[ed]" whether probable cause existed).
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pearing "on the face" of the record.3 69
In short, the experience under the 1789 Act was entirely consistent
with the writ's use as a substitute for direct Supreme Court review of
nationally important questions as of right on the merits in situations in
which the latter review was not meaningfully available. Having with-
held from federal prisoners any right to a plenary direct appeal, the Act
granted them instead the more limited, but still appellate, remedy of
habeas corpus review of fundamental (typically, constitutional) legal
claims. Having granted state prisoners a writ of error as of right to
challenge the state court's adverse constitutional decisions, the Act ex-
plicitly withheld substitute habeas corpus review.
C. The Antebellum Removal and Habeas Corpus Acts
In 1815-1817 and 1833, when the New England states and then
South Carolina threatened to "nullify" national revenue legislation by
prosecuting federal officers who enforced it, Congress suddenly found
that forcing this class of state prisoners to await their postconviction
and post-appeal writ of error remedies would indeed nullify nationally
important laws.37 0 Congress accordingly authorized federal officers de-
tained by state courts for acts undertaken "in pursuance of a law of the
United States"371 to seek either removal or habeas corpus redress in
the lower federal courts in advance of their inadequate writ of error
remedies.372 Moreover, in the 1850s, when state prosecutions of fed-
eral marshals threatened the enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act, the
lower federal judiciary, often acting through Supreme CourtJustices on
circuit, repeatedly interpreted the 1833 habeas corpus provisions to
permit review de novo37 -- after conviction as well as before 374-of the
officials' "pursuance of federal law" defenses. For the first time, more-
over, habeas corpus review was understood to permit inquiry beyond
369. See, e.g., Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 176 (1873); Ex parte
Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 202-03. Drawn from common law constraints on the ability
of one court to attack collaterally the judgment of another, the "on the face" limitation
on habeas corpus (and writs of error) strongly reinforced the Court's reluctance to
consider sufficiency claims and claims that the petitioner's particular conduct lay outside
the penal statute's proscription, which perforce required the reviewing court to "look
behind" thejudgment of conviction to the evidence or at least to the indictment. See id.
at 203-07.
370. See authority cited supra notes 292-296.
371. Act of Mar. 2, 1833, ch. 57, § 7, 4 Stat. 632, 634.
372. See supra notes 294-296 and accompanying text.
373. See, e.g., Ex parte Sifford, 22 F. Cas. 105, 107-08 (D.C.S.D. Ohio 1857) (No.
12,848) (citing cases); Ex parte Robinson, 20 F. Gas. 965, 966, 968 (C.C.S.D. Ohio
1856) (No. 11,934); Ex parte Jenkins, 13 F. Gas. 445, 447 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (No.
7,259) (Grier, Cir. Justice); id. at 451, 459-60 (Kane, D.J.).
374. See, e.g., Electoral College Case, 8 F. Cas. 427, 431, 433, 434 (C.C.S.C. 1876)
(No. 4336) (Bond, Cir.J.); Ex parte Robinson, 20 F. Cas. at 965-66 (granting relief after
conviction); Ex parteJenkins, 13 F. Gas. at 451 (granting relief pretrial and saying that
the same result would occur post-trial).
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the face of the commitment papers, into the substance of the federal
officials' "pursuance" claims.3
75
D. The Reconstruction Era Accretions to the Federal Courts' Writ of Error,
Removal, and Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction
The use of the 1833 habeas corpus and removal powers to enforce
the hated Fugitive Slave Law fresh in its members minds, the Recon-
struction Congress adapted both techniques to its own purposes in a
series of acts passed in 1863, 1866, and on February 5, 1867.376 One of
the two acts passed on this last day also broadened the Supreme
Court's writ of error jurisdiction to review federal questions arising in
state courts.377 Through these acts, Congress made a series of parallel
expansions of all three modes of federal court review of state court
criminal actions.
The legislation widened the range of claims cognizable in all three
types of proceedings up to Article III's federal-question maximum.
378
The new removal and habeas corpus provisions expanded the range of
prisoners protected to all those with federal claims.3 79 The new habeas
corpus and writ of error provisions expressly overturned case law (in
the case of habeas corpus) and legislation (in the case of writs of error)
that previously had limited those modes of review to federal "error...
as appears on the face of the record."380 Accordingly, what the
Supreme Court said of the February 5, 1867 habeas corpus legislation
when it first interpreted it that same year might just as well have been
said of all three types of legislation that Congress passed that day:
"This legislation is of the most comprehensive character. . . . It is impos-
375. See authority cited supra note 373. The Supreme Court later validated these
interpretations of the 1833 Act. See In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 42, 53, 69-74 (1890).
376. See supra notes 292-295 and accompanying text.
377. See supra note 293 and accompanying text.
378. See Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, §§ 1, 3, 14 Stat. 27 (removal rights
available to all persons seeking to enforce "full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings" for the enforcement of various civil rights); Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28,
§ 1, 14 Stat. 385 (claims cognizable on habeas corpus expanded to include "all cases
where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution,
or of any treaty or law of the United States" (emphasis added)); id. § 2, 14 Stat. at
386-87 (broadening cognizable claims in ways catalogued in Hart & Wechsler, 2d ed.,
supra note 38, at 439-40 & nn.2-5).
379. See supra notes 293-296, 378 and accompanying text. The February 5, 1867
removal act was particularly designed to facilitate the use of the procedure by criminal
defendants, as opposed to other litigants with federal claims. See Act of Feb. 5, 1867,
ch. 27, 14 Stat. 385.
380. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 86-87, repealed by Act of Feb.
5, 1867, ch. 28, § 2, 14 Stat. 385, 386-87 (discussed in Hart & Wechsler, 2d ed., supra
note 38, at 440 & n.7); accord Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385-86; see also
Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 330-32 (1915) (discussing impact of 1867 habeas
corpus act's jettisoning of "face of the record" limitation); cf. supra notes 338-342,
363-369 and accompanying text (pre-1867 practice).
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sible to widen this jurisdiction. '381
Congress' desire to save Reconstruction from judicial invalidation
in the famous Exparte McCardle3 8 2 affair prompted its 1868-1885 with-
drawal of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction under the 1867 habeas
corpus provision.383 Still, the Court's few initial interpretations of the
provision around that period confirmed the wide range of claims and
broad scope of review available under the provision.3 84 The provi-
sion's breadth also is confirmed by its (sparse) legislative history,38 5 the
lower federal courts' early interpretations of it-as having:
clothed the district and circuit court judges of the United
States with power to annul the criminal processes of the states,
to reverse and set aside by habeas corpus the criminal judg-
ments of the state courts, to pass finally and conclusively upon
the validity of the criminal codes, the police regulations, and
even the constitutions of the states38 6
-and the broader historical context of the Reconstruction Congress'
reconstruction of federal judicial power.38 7
The clincher, though, is a point inexplicably ignored by the 1867
provision's historiography, namely, the immediate statutory context-
Congress' February 5, 1867, simultaneous expansion of all three modes
of reviewing state court determinations of federal questions in criminal
cases. Taken together, the writ of error, removal, and habeas corpus
provisions adopted that day leave little doubt as to Congress' goal. Ar-
ticle III defines the maximum constitutional extent ofjurisdiction with
which Congress may invest the federal courts on review of state court
determinations of federal questions. The writ of error, removal, and
habeas corpus provisions all used language tracking the same constitu-
tional maximum to ensure enforcement in actions "begun in the courts
of the States"388 of the myriad of constitutional provisions and federal
381. Ex parte McCardle I, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318, 325-26 (1867) (emphasis added).
382. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868).
383. See Act of March 27, 1868, ch. 34, 15 Stat. 44, repealed by Act of March 3,
1885, ch. 353, 23 Stat. 437.
384. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 366, 373-74 (1886); Ex parte Royall,
117 U.S. 241, 247-53 (1886); Ex parte Tom Tong, 108 U.S. 556, 560 (1883); Ex parte
Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 106 (1868); Ex parte Bridges, 4 F. Cas. 98, 106 (N.D. Ga.
1875) (No. 1,862) (Bradley, Cir. Justice).
385. See Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 4151 (1866) (Rep. Lawrence) (habeas
corpus provision is designed to "enforce the liberty of all persons .... It is a bill of the
largest liberty, . . . [not] restrain[ing] the writ of habeas corpus at all"); id. at 4229 (Sen.
Trumbull).
386. Seymour D. Thompson, Abuses of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 6 A.B.A. Rep.
243, 260-63 (1883); see also Seymour D. Thompson, Annotation, 18 F. 68, 81-86
(1883) (comprehensive review of the 1867-1883 habeas corpus cases in the lower
federal courts).
387. See William M. Wiecek, The Reconstruction of Federal Judicial Power
1863-1875, 13 Am.J. Legal Hist. 333, 342-48 (1969).
388. Whitten v. Tomlinson, 160 U.S. 231. 238 (1895).
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laws just then taking effect. Whatever ambiguities one might endeavor
to read into the words of the habeas corpus portion of the second Act
of February 5, 1867, no one has ever suggested that the almost identi-
cal words in the writ-of-error portion of the same Act permit anything
less than plenary appellate review of alleged violations of "any title,
right, privilege, or immunity ... claimed under the constitution, or any
treaty or statute of... the United States. 38 9 Through all three modes
of review, Congress sought to assure prisoners of one full opportunity
to enforce their newly given national rights in a national court, whether
via expanded writ of error review on appeal in the Supreme Court, or-
lest the state courts' expected systematic resistance negate rights before
writ of error remedies matured-via the extension to all prisoners of
full-fledged, pre-writ-of-error habeas corpus and removal protections.
E. Post-Reconstruction Limitations on Removal and Habeas Corpus Review
1. Federal Prisoner Habeas Corpus. - Congress' 1874 adoption of the
Revised Statutes united all pre-existing habeas corpus legislation in one
set of sections.390 This revision encouraged federal prisoners, who
technically had access to the Supreme Court under only the 1789
Act,391 to rely as well-with the Court's tacit acquiescence-on por-
tions of the revised statutes derived from the 1867 Act. Federal pris-
oner access to the 1867 Act's grant of authority over constitutional
claims and claims not visible on the face of the record3 92 thus ushered
in the Golden Age of federal prisoner habeas corpus review. This
trend lasted until 1891, when the onset of federal prisoner writs of er-
ror as of right largely superseded habeas corpus review.3 9
3
The Court's treatment of the federal prisoner habeas corpus cases
during this period paralleled that in the 1789-1874 period, although
here the larger number of cases provided a much clearer picture of the
Court's inclinations and particularly of its location of the fundamental-
nonfundamental line. The Court continued to hold itself out as ad-
dressing claims questioning not only the detaining court's jurisdiction
but also, and distinctly, the "lawfulness" of the detaining court's ac-
tions, its "authority to give the judgment it did," and whether it acted
389. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 2, 14 Stat. 385, 386.
390. See Act ofJune 22, 1874, ch. 13, §§ 755-766 (originally codified as Rev. Stat.
§§ 751-766).
391. See supra notes 382-383 and accompanying text (Congress' withdrawal of the
Court's jurisdiction under the 1867 act in the Ex parte McCardle affair).
392. Early references to claims arising under the Constitution include Ex parte
Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 572 (1883); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 374 (1879); Ex
parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 728 (1877). Early forays beyond the face of the record
include Ex parte Clarke, 100 U.S. 399, 401 (1879); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 343
(1879); Ex parteJackson, 96 U.S. at 736-37 (dicta). But see In re Snow, 120 U.S. 274,
281, 286 (1887); Ex parte Bigelow, 113 U.S. 328, 331 (1885) (emphasizing need for
cognizable violations to be visible from record).
393. See infra notes 453-459 and accompanying text.
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"beyond the powers conferred upon it.''394 During this period, more-
over, the line between lack of jurisdiction and lack of constitutionality
almost entirely blurred, as when the Court held that a "sentence given
was beyond the jurisdiction of the court, because it was against an ex-
press provision of the Constitution, which bounds and limits all juris-
diction." 95  In other instances, the Court went directly to the
constitutional point, enforcing "the positive and restrictive language of
the great fundamental instrument by which the government is organ-
ized"396 and, throughJustice Bradley, rejecting any distinction between
''a conviction and punishment under an unconstitutional law" and "an
unconstitutional conviction and punishment under a valid law."
39 7
What the Court did during this period was to award habeas corpus
review and, when merited, relief on claims that a penal statute or an
action by the detaining court or official violated the prisoner's First,398
Fourth,399 Fifth,400 or Sixth401 Amendment rights, Eleventh Amend-
ment or other constitutional federalism principles, 40 2 or an applicable
394. Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 99 (1868); accord In re Bonner, 151
U.S. 242, 256 (1893); Nielsen, Petitioner, 131 U.S. 176, 184 (1889); Ex parte Parks, 93
U.S. 18, 23 (1876); see also In re Mills, 135 U.S. 263, 265-69 (1890) (review justified
"[i]f it appears . . .apart from any questions as to jurisdiction .... detention ... is in
violation of the laws of the United States" (emphasis added)); Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S.
417, 420-21 (1885) (whether "the sentence exceeds the jurisdiction of th[e] court or
there is no authority to hold him under the sentence" is a question to be addressed by
the Court on habeas corpus).
395. Nielsen, Petitioner, 131 U.S. at 185; see also In re Bonner, 151 U.S. at 257
(equating 'jurisdiction to render a particular judgment" with "keep[ing] within the
limitations prescribed by the law, customary or statutory" which in turn is equated, e.g.,
with not taking action that the Constitution "specifically prescribe[s]"); Ex parte Wilson,
114 U.S. at 422 ("[I]f the crime of which the petitioner was accused was an infamous
crime, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, no court of the
United States had jurisdiction to try ... him except upon . . . indictment by a grand
jury.").
396. Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 6 (1887)
397. Nielsen, Petitioner, 131 U.S. at 183; accord Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 301
(1888); Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 541 (1888).
398. See, e.g., Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342-45 (1890) (free exercise claim);
Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371, 372-73 (1882) (reviewing law forbidding political activity
by federal employees); Ex parteJackson, 96 U.S. 727, 736-37 (1877) (free press claim).
399. See, e.g., Ex parteJackson, 96 U.S. at 733 (illegal search claim).
400. Decisions granting relief include Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 585
(1892) (self-incrimination); Nielsen, Petitioner, 131 U.S. at 188 (double jeopardy); Ex
parte Bain, 121 U.S. at 5-6, 12-13 (right to indictment); Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. at
422-26 (same). Decisions granting review but denying relief include Ex parte Terry,
128 U.S. at 311-14 (due process claim of inadequate notice and violation of right to be
present when convicted of contempt); In re Coy, 127 U.S. 731, 753-55 (1888) (due
process claim that penal statutes must require proof of intent).
401. Decisions granting relief include In re Bonner, 151 U.S. 242, 257-59 (1893)
(jury clause); Homer v. United States, 143 U.S. 207, 213-14 (1892) (trial in district in
which offense occurred); Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. at 549-57 (same).
402. See, e.g., In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 485-87, 507-08 (1887) (unlawful
contempt conviction for violating injunction that offended Eleventh Amendment); Ex
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federal statute.403 Faced with a parade of claims that the detaining
court acted without subject matter jurisdiction by convicting the peti-
tioner of conduct that federal law did not prohibit, the Court also found
it necessary to draw a line separating these uniformly "jurisdictional"
claims into ones that were and ones that were not cognizable.40 4 The
Court's distinction neatly modeled its more general important-unim-
portant line: the Court would decide on habeas corpus whether entire
broad "classes" of conduct fell within the court's jurisdiction under a
penal statute-whether, for example, actions occurring outside a court-
room could constitute contempt,40 5 or whether different classes of con-
spiracies fell within a penal statute4 O6-but would not decide whether
conduct falling within "a well defined class of offences" over which a
criminal statute generally gave the court jurisdiction actually fit within
the particular elements of the statutorily defined crime.40 7 When the
Court denied review it did so on manifestly unimportant, typically sui
generis claims-whether, for example, the indictment was "defective in
form" or was pleaded with sufficient specificity,40 8 the evidence was suf-
ficient to convict,40 9 or the trial court's allocution at sentencing con-
tained a "technical defect."' 410 As to claims the Court considered, its
parte Rowland, 104 U.S. 604, 616-18 (1881) (unlawful contempt conviction for
violating injunction requiring state officials to act outside their statutory powers); Ex
parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 374-77 (1879) (reviewing but denying relief on claim that
federal conviction of state officials for actions in pursuance of state law is
unconstitutional).
403. See, e.g., In re Mills, 135 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1890) (violation of statute
reserving penitentiary for individuals with sentences greater than one year); Ex parte
Wilson, 114 U.S. at 422 (alleged violation of statutory right to indictment); Ex parte
Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 571-72 (1883) (violation of statutory exemption for intratribal
crimes).
404. See In re Coy, 127 U.S. at 755; see also In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200, 220-21
(1888) (denying review of jurisdictional insufficient-amount-in-controversy claim).
405. See Cuddy, Petitioner, 131 U.S. 280, 284-86 (1889).
406. See Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 657 (1884); see also Ex parte Virginia,
100 U.S. 339, 346-49 (1879) (whether state judge may be prosecuted under federal
statute prohibiting discrimination in jury selection).
407. In re Coy, 127 U.S. at 758; accord In re Bonner, 151 U.S. 242, 257 (1893).
Compare In re Mayfield, 141 U.S. 107, 112-16 (1891) (reviewing whether victimless
crimes by Indians should be treated under statute proscribing certain acts by one Indian
against another or by statute proscribing certain acts by Indian against non-Indian); In
re Coy, 127 U.S. at 755 (reviewing question whether federal penal statute required
proof of intent) with Ex parte Parks, 93 U.S. 18, 23 (1876) (refusing to review claim that
document on which petitioner forged bankruptcy official's signature fell outside
proscription of federal statute forbidding forgery of certain documents in course of
bankruptcy proceedings).
408. See, e.g., In re Coy, 127 U.S. at 759; Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. at 654.
409. See, e.g., In re Wight, 134 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1890); Ex parte Carll, 106 U.S.
521, 523 (1882).
410. See, e.g., Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 428-29 (1885).
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review was de novo on the law, 4 1 1 deferential on the facts. 4 12
With access to federal question review as wide as permitted by the
Constitution, and with no available alternative mode of federal appel-
late review as of right, federal prisoner habeas corpus was in its heyday
in the 1874-1890 period. Grants of review outstripped denials by a
ratio of about four to one, and grants of relief occurred in over a third of
the cases.4
13
2. State-Prisoner Removal and Habeas Corpus. - On the state-prisoner
front, the Reconstruction-era consensus that, although available, writs
of error were systematically inadequate, and that other modes of review
accordingly were necessary, began to fade as Reconstruction ended. In
an 1879 decision, Virginia v. Rives,4 14 the Supreme Court interpreted
the post-war federal question removal statutes narrowly, ending their
availability as a meaningful method of securing review and expressly
relegating litigants to their state and federal writ-of-error remedies. 41 5
Beginning in 1885, Congress and the Court jointly undertook a
parallel deconstruction of habeas corpus. That year, Congress re-
pealed the McCardle act's restriction on the Court's appellate jurisdic-
tion under the 1867 statute.4 16 Because the 1874 codification had
implicitly made the 1867 Act's cognizable claims and admissible evi-
dence procedures available to federal prisoners in the Supreme Court,
the restoration ofjurisdiction simply extended the same type of review
to state prisoners.
Although apparently expanding habeas corpus jurisdiction, Con-
gress intended its 1885 action as something of a limitation. At the time,
Congress had before it a number of proposals to repeal the 1867
habeas corpus law entirely or at least "to curtail and restrain to a cer-
tain extent the powers assumed by the Federal judges under the
act .... ',417 Fearful that "[tihe special causes which were deemed to
suffice to make the act of 1867 necessary"-the inability of African
Americans "to get fair and impartial justice at the hands of local tribu-
nals"-"may exist yet to some extent," Congress decided for the time
being "to do no more than to recommend the restoration of the right
of appeals to the Supreme Court." 4 18 Through this mechanism, Con-
gress assured that any "overthrow of the final judgments of the State
courts of general jurisdiction, by the inferior Federal judges .... thus
making them a court of errors over the highest tribunals of the States,"
411. See decisions cited supra notes 398-403, 405-406.
412. See, e.g., Cuddy, Petitioner, 131 U.S. 280, 286 (1889); Savin, Petitioner, 131
U.S. 267, 276 (1889); Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 299-300, 305 (1888).
413. See decisions cited supra notes 394-412.
414. 100 U.S. 313 (1879).
415. See id. at 319, 322.
416. See Act of March 3, 1885, ch. 353, 23 Stat. 437.
417. H.R. Rep. No. 730, 48th Cong., 1st Sess., at 5 (1884).
418. Id. at 3, 5.
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would not "be final" and instead could occur only with the concurrence
of the Supreme Court.4 19 In addition, however, while acknowledging the
need to "extend to [emancipated African Americans] as far as possible
under the Constitution, the protection of the Federal courts," Congress
also invited the Supreme Court, "[w]ith this right of appeal restored [to
define] the true extent of the act of 1867, and the true limits of the
jurisdiction of the Federal courts and judges under [the act]," so that it
could "then be seen whether further legislation is necessary. '"420
Exparte Royall,42 1 the Court's first state-prisoner habeas corpus de-
cision under the 1885 Act, did indeed identify "the true extent of the
act of 1867." "The grant ... of jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas
corpus," Justice Harlan concluded for the Court, "is in language as
broad as could be well employed." 422 On cognizability, this meant
"that it was the purpose of Congress to invest the courts of the Union
*.. with power ... to restore to liberty any person ... who is held in
custody, by whatever authority, in violation of the Constitution of the
United States. '423 A contrary state determination, the Court contin-
ued, expressly addressing the standard of review, "cannot affect the
question, of the power or jurisdiction of the Circuit Court to inquire
into the cause of his commitment, and to discharge [the prisoner] if he
be restrained of his liberty in violation of the Constitution. ' 424
Having held (by reversing the lower court's contrary conclusion)
that Congress left the federal courts with no choice but to review all
constitutional and other federal law claims arising in state criminal
courts, Justice Harlan then reached Royall's more famous conclusion
that the federal courts do have "discretion" as to the "time and mode" of
that review.42 5 Heeding Congress' invitation to see that "further legis-
lation [was not] necessary"-thus giving the Court's actions more the
feel of a delegated judicial rulemaking than the fiat traditionally as-
sumed-and also heeding Congress' desire that the Court itself, and
not "the inferior Federal judges," be the statutorily mandated "court of
errors over the highest tribunals of the States," Justice Harlan identi-
fied the preferred "mode" of federal review as its own "writ of error
from the highest court of the State." 426 That preference as to "mode"
419. Id. at 5.
420. Id. at 3, 6 (emphasis added).
421. 117 U.S. 241 (1886).
422. Id. at 247.
423. Id. at 248.
424. Id. at 249; accord In re Ah Fong, I F. Cas. 213, 215 (C.C.D. Cal. 1874) (No.
102) (Field, Cir. J.) ("The decision of ... the supreme court of the state, although
entitled to great respect and consideration from the acknowledged ability and learning
of the[ ] judges is not binding upon this court.").
425. Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. at 251 (emphasis added).
426. Id. at 253. Practicing what it preached, the Court in fact gave Royall his day in
court-and granted him constitutional relief-on his writ of error to the state courts,
which the Supreme Court heard simultaneously with and decided a month earlier than
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dictated an additional preference as to "timing," namely-as the writ of
error statute required427 -that federal review wait until "the State
court[s] shall have finally acted upon the case."1428 By preference, that
is, the Court simply substituted its own de novo review of constitutional
claims, under section 2 of-the February 5, 1867 Act, for like review by
lower federal courts under section 1.
Probably spurred on by an alarming bulge in the Court's habeas
corpus docket-from two to four cases a year during the preceding dec-
ade to at least fourteen cases in 1890 and eight in 1891429 -the Court
transformed what was announced in Royall as a discretionary rule of
preference 430 into a near-mandatory rule of practice. In the 1893 case
of In re Frederich,431 the Court announced that state prisoners hence-
forth would be left to their writ of error remedy. 43 2 In New York v.
Eno,43 3 the next year, the Court made the concomitant 43 4 exhaustion-
of-state-remedies doctrine mandatory.435 And in Tinsley v. Anderson
436
in 1898, the Court made clear that the writ of error was exclusive.
4 37
From the mid-1890s onward, therefore, state prisoners were precluded
from receiving subsequent federal consideration if they either sought
Royall's habeas corpus appeal presenting the same claims. See Royall v. Virginia, 116
U.S. 572 (1886).
427. See supra note 337 and accompanying text.
428. Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. at 253.
429. See the 1890 and 1891 cases cited infra notes 430, 437-438, 446-448, 452.
430. See Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. at 252-53. Contributing substantially to the
1890-1891 bulge, the Court often ignored the exhaustion rules prior to 1892, but
almost never afterwards. See, e.g., In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545 (1891); Crowley v.
Christensen, 137 U.S. 86 (1890); Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313 (1890); Savage,
Petitioner, 134 U.S. 176 (1890); Ex parte Harding, 120 U.S. 782 (1887); Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
431. 149 U.S. 70 (1893).
432. See id. at 77-78; see, e.g., Baker v. Grice, 169 U.S. 284, 290-91 (1898); In re
Eckart, 166 U.S. 481, 484-85 (1897); In re Belt, 159 U.S. 95, 100 (1895) ("Ordinarily
the writ will not lie where there is a remedy by writ of error or appeal."); Andrews v.
Swartz, 156 U.S. 272, 276 (1895); In re Chapman, 156 U.S. 211, 217-18 (1895); Pepke
v. Cronan, 155 U.S. 100, 101 (1894).
433. 155 U.S. 89 (1894).
434. Suggesting that the main purpose of requiring exhaustion of state remedies
was to satisfy the prerequisite to writ of error review are, e.g., Urquhart v. Brown, 205
U.S. 179, 181-83 (1907); United States ex rel. Drury v. Lewis, 200 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1906);
Davis v. Burke, 179 U.S. 399, 401-02 (1900).
435. See New York v. Eno, 155 U.S. at 96-98; United States ex rel. Drury v. Lewis,
200 U.S. at 6-7; Minnesota v. Brundage, 180 U.S. 499, 500-01, 503, 505 (1901).
436. 171 U.S. 101 (1898).
437. See id. at 104-05; see also United States ex rel. Kennedy v. Tyler, 269 U.S. 13,
17 (1925); Reid v.Jones, 187 U.S. 153, 154 (1902); Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U.S. 516, 533
(1899). Another factor contributing to the 1890-1891 bulge in the Court's habeas
corpus case load was that, prior to 1892 (but not afterwards), the Court occasionally
granted habeas corpus review of claims previously rejected on writ of error. See, e.g.,
McElvaine v. Brush, 142 U.S. 155, 157-60 (1891); In re Wilson, 140 U.S. 575, 583-84




writ of error review or waived it (for example, by waiving the state ap-
peals that had to be exhausted in order to permit direct Supreme Court
review).438 Pace Bator yet again, these rules applied without distinction
to claims challenging the detaining court's jurisdiction, a penal statute's
constitutionality, or the lawfulness of a sentence.
43 9
The Court did not reject habeas corpus review, however, but only
replaced it whenever possible with its own review on the merits as of
right.4 40 Clearly revealing the commensurability and the sub-
stitutability of writ of error and habeas corpus review441 are the three
exceptional situations in which the Court regularly afforded habeas
corpus review-when (1) a writ of error remedy was not meaningfully
available,442 (2) exhausting State remedies prefatory to federal review
would unduly delay federal review,443 or (3) state remedies were ex-
hausted before the case reached the Supreme Court so that dismissal in
preference for a writ of error would simply require the meaningless
gesture of substituting writ of error papers for the habeas corpus pa-
pers already before the Court.444
As the above analysis of Whitten v. Tomlinson reveals,445 in the sig-
nificant number of cases during the period in which habeas corpus re-
view remained available, the Court continued to apply its longstanding
rules distinguishing fundamental-including all constitutional 446 -
438. See, e.g., Ex parte Spencer, 228 U.S. 652, 660-61 (1913); Glasgow v. Moyer,
225 U.S. 420, 429-30 (1912); In re Wood, 140 U.S. 278, 286-87, 289-90 (1891).
439. See, e.g., Knewel v. Egan, 268 U.S. 442, 445-46 (1925) (jurisdictional and
unconstitutional-statute claim); Minnesota v. Brundage, 180 U.S. at 500-01
(unconstitutional-statute claim); Tinsley v. Anderson, 171 U.S. 101, 104-06 (1898)
(jurisdictional claim); In re Eckart, 166 U.S. 481, 483-85 (1897) (same); In re Belt, 159
U.S. 95, 99-100 (1895) (unconstitutional-statute claims not an exception to rule
preferring writ of error review).
440. The Court justified its preference for writ of error review on the ground that
the writ of error was available as of right. See, e.g., Urquhart v. Brown, 205 U.S. 179,
182-83 (1907); Markuson v. Boucher, 175 U.S. 184, 185-87 (1899).
441. See In re Chapman, 156 U.S. 211, 216-18 (1895) (characterizing habeas
corpus and direct review as alternative "modes" of "appellate jurisdiction").
442. See, e.g., Pettibone v. Nichols, 203 U.S. 192, 202 (1906) (interlocutory
extradition proceedings); Felts v. Murphy, 201 U.S. 123, 128-30 (1906) (petitioner
could not afford to pay for transcript necessary to permit exhaustion of state, then writ-
of-error remedies); In re Chapman, 156 U.S. at 216-18 (if, after exhaustion, Court
deemed that writ of error statute did not apply to District of Columbia courts, then
habeas corpus review would be permitted).
443. See, e.g., Storti v. Massachusetts, 183 U.S. 138, 142-43 (1901) (apparent need
for immediate review of impending execution); Baker v. Grice, 169 U.S. 284, 293 (1878)
(dicta).
444. See, e.g., Rogers v. Peck, 199 U.S. 425, 434-36 (1905); Davis v. Burke, 179
U.S. 399, 401-02 (1900).
445. See supra notes 300-304, 319-323 and accompanying text.
446. See, e.g., Pettibone v. Nichols, 203 U.S. at 201; Felts v. Murphy, 201 U.S. at
130; Rogers v. Peck, 199 U.S. at 433-34, 435 ("When a prisoner is in jail he may be
released upon habeas corpus when held in violation of his constitutional rights"); see
also In re Converse, 137 U.S. 624, 624-25, 631 (1891) ("an unconstitutional conviction
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claims, which were cognizable, 447 from nonfundamental and state law
claims, which were not,448 and affording de novo review of legal,4 49 but
little or no review of factual, 450 determinations. Exemplifying the
cognizability of constitutional claims on undisputed facts is the Court's
grant of relief in Yick Wo v. Hopkins;451 exemplifying the lack of review
of state court factual determinations is the Court's denial of review of
the jury discrimination claim in In re Wood.
4 52
F. Late Nineteenth Century and Early Twentieth Century Revisions of the
Supreme Court's Writ of Error Jurisdiction
1. Federal-Prisoner Appeals and Habeas Corpus. - As I have already
noted, Congress dramatically rearranged the appellate map in the Ev-
arts Act of 1891, for the first time affording federal criminal defendants
writ of error review in the Supreme Court.453 Then, in 1897, Congress
and punishment under a valid law would be as violative of a person's constitutional
rights as a conviction and punishment under an unconstitutional law"); supra notes
421-423, and accompanying text.
447. Among the fundamental claims litigated during this period were the
applicability to the states of the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments (the Court's
answer uniformly being negative), see, e.g., Davis v. Burke, 179 U.S. at 401-04;
McElvaine v. Brush, 142 U.S. 155, 158-59 (1891); Ex parte Harding, 120 U.S. 782,
783-84 (1887); the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment due process protection, see,
e.g., Valentina v. Mercer, 201 U.S. 131, 132, 138-39 (1906) (right to instruction on self-
defense and voluntary manslaughter); Felts v. Murphy, 201 U.S. at 124-26, 129-30
(constitutionality of convicting deaf prisoner in proceedings he could not understand);
Andrews v. Swartz, 156 U.S. 272, 275 (1895) (right to appeal in capital cases);
Bergemann v. Backer, 157 U.S. at 656-58 (right to notice in indictment of degree of
murder being charged); In re Converse, 137 U.S. at 628 (constitutionality of procedures
used to take guilty plea); the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment right to equal
protection, see, e.g., Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86, 92-94 (1890); and ex post
facto claims, see, e.g., Medley, Petitioner, 134 U.S. 160, 171-73 (1890).
448. See, e.g., Storti v. Massachusetts, 183 U.S. 138, 138-39, 142 (1901)
(governor's power to stay execution under state law); In re Eckart, 166 U.S. 481, 482
(1897) (sufficiency of form and legal meaning of indictment under state law); Kohl v.
Lehlback, 160 U.S. 293, 299-300 (1895) (propriety under state law of seating alien on
grand jury); In re Jugiro, 140 U.S. 291, 292-93, 297 (1891) (variance between
indictment (alleging stab wound in breast) and proof (showing stab wound in neck)).
449. See cases cited supra notes 442-444, 446.
450. See, e.g., Crossley v. California, 168 U.S. 640, 642 (1898) (sufficiency of
evidence); In re Jugiro, 140 U.S. at 297-98 (finding that no jury discrimination
occurred); In re Converse, 137 U.S. at 631 (finding that prisoner understood he was
pleading guilty to felony and not, as he claimed, to a misdemeanor).
451. 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886); see supra notes 265-268 and accompanying text.
452. 140 U.S. 278, 285-87 (1891). Pace Bator and Justice Thomas, Wood is not a
case in which the Court treated the state court's judgment as resjudicata, cf. supra notes
281-284 and accompanying text, but rather one in which it treated as unreviewable the
state court'sfactual determination that no discrimination in the selection of the jury had
occurred, see In re Wood, 140 U.S. at 285-86, precisely the same treatment the Court at
the time accorded the same type of claim on direct review, see, e.g., Thomas v. Texas, 212
U.S. 278, 281-82 (1909).
453. See Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, § 5, 26 Stat. 826, 827-28. Congress gave
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routed appeals as of right in noncapital cases (and in 1911 in capital
cases) through the newly created Circuit Courts of Appeals to the
Supreme Court on certiorari. 454 Drawing an analogy to the exhaustion
of state remedies doctrine, the Court immediately created an exhaustion
of federal appellate remedies doctrine, requiring resort to direct review
in the Supreme Court (and, after 1897, in the courts of appeals) on writ
of error when meaningfully available. 455 Judgments attained on writ of
error in the Court precluded subsequent habeas corpus review,
456
while the failure to appeal waived claims that could have been ap-
pealed.457 In cases in which habeas corpus remained available for lack
of meaningful appellate remedies,458 exhaustion of lower federal court
habeas corpus remedies was required before coming to the Supreme
Court.45 9 The Golden Age of federal prisoner habeas corpus consider-
ation had passed.
2. Expanded Fact Review. - In 1912, the Supreme Court substan-
tially expanded the scope of its appellate review of federal questions
arising in the state courts by inventing two doctrines that let it review de
novo questions previously denominated as "factual" and, as such, given
no review.460 Henceforth, the Supreme Court would independently re-
view findings of facts (1) "'where a Federal right has been denied as
the result of a finding shown by the record to be without evidence to
support it,'" or (2) "'where a conclusion of law as to a Federal right
and a finding of fact are so intermingled as to make it necessary, in
order to pass upon the Federal question to analyze the facts.' "461
capital prisoners a right of appeal two years earlier. Act of Feb. 6, 1889, ch. 113, § 6, 25
Stat. 655, 656.
454. See Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, §§ 128, 238, 36 Stat. 1087, 1133-34, 1157;
Act of Jan. 20, 1897, ch. 68, 29 Stat. 492.
455. See, e.g., In re Lincoln, 202 U.S. 178, 182 (1906) ("[T]he ordinary procedure
for the correction of errors in criminal cases is by writ of error, and that method should
be pursued unless there be special circumstances calling for a departure
therefrom...."); Riggins v. United States, 199 U.S. 547, 548-50 (1905); In re Lancaster,
137 U.S. 393, 395 (1890).
456. See cases cited supra notes 436, 437.
457. See, e.g., Craig v. Hecht, 263 U.S. 255, 277 (1923); Glasgow v. Moyer, 225
U.S. 420, 429-30 (1912); Toy Toy v. Hopkins, 212 U.S. 542, 548-49 (1909) (waiver for
failure to appeal; no exception for jurisdictional claims).
458. See, e.g., Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U.S. 378, 379-80, 384 (1919); Dimmick v.
Tompkins, 194 U.S. 540, 541, 546 (1904) (challenge to conditions of confinement); In
re Schneider, 148 U.S. 162, 166 (1893) (no writ of error available to District of
Columbia courts).
459. See, e.g., Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U.S. at 379-80, 384; In re Huntington, 137
U.S. 63, 64 (1890); Ex parte Mirzan, 119 U.S. 584, 586 (1887).
460. Invented seems appropriate given the abruptness with which the doctrines
arose in 1912 and the paucity of antecedents. See, e.g., Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S.
587, 589-90 (1935) (tracing doctrines to 1912 decisions). So powerful were the new
doctrines that they superseded the Seventh Amendment's immunization ofjury findings
from de novo review. See, e.g., Thomas v. Arizona, 356 U.S. 390, 393 (1958); Ashcraft v.
Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 147-48 (1944).
461. Robertson & Kirkham, supra note 14, § 108, at 198-99 (footnotes omitted)
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For a time, the Court applied the two doctrines exclusively in civil
cases, typically using them to review (and often to overturn) state court
determinations that state or local business regulations did not interfere
with contracts or impose confiscatory rates. 462 Only in Fiske v.
Kansas4 63 in 1927 and in Norris v. Alabama4 64 in 1935 did the Court ex-
plicitly use the doctrines to expand the scope of its direct review of
state criminal cases, 465 although, as we will see, Justice Holmes pre-
saged these developments in 1915.
From the beginning, the Court justified both doctrines on the
ground that the questions affected were not "factual" at all but were
"legal" questions masquerading as factual ones, and that preservation
of the Court's power to settle the meaning of national law and rights
required it to be able to look through the "factfinding" disguise.
466
Thus, as Professor Monaghan has shown with regard to the "mixed
question" doctrine, there are certain "factual" concepts-the voluntari-
ness of confessions, for example-that are so difficult to define once for
all time and so dependent for their evolution on a constant progression
of new fact situations, that giving lower courts unreviewable authority
not only to find the historical facts but also to determine whether the
facts satisfy the definition is tantamount to giving those courts the
power to define the concept-and make the law.4 67 Moreover, even
when a legal rule turns on the existence of some more readily and per-
manently definable fact, the prior court's "finding" of that fact in the
quote Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 385-86 (1927) and cite Cedar Rapids Gas Light Co.
v. Cedar Rapids, 223 U.S. 655 (1912), and Creswill v. Knights of Pythias, 225 U.S. 246,
261 (1912), as originating the first exception, and cite Kansas City S. Ry. v. C.H. Albers
Comm'n Co., 223 U.S. 573, 591 (1912), as originating the second. See supra note 15
(same doctrines applied to review of lower federal court factfinding).
462. See, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dunken, 266 U.S. 389, 394 (1924); Truax v.
Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 324-25 (1921); Ward v. Board of County Comm'rs, 253 U.S.
17, 22-23 (1920); New York & Queens Gas Co. v. McCall, 245 U.S. 345, 348-49 (1917);
Norfolk & W. Ry. v. West Virginia, 236 U.S. 605, 609-10 (1915); Cedar Rapids Gas
Light Co. v. Cedar Rapids, 223 U.S. at 668-69; Kansas City S. Ry. v. C.H. Albers
Comm'n Co., 223 U.S. at 591-94.
463. 274 U.S. 380, 385-86 (1927).
464. 294 U.S. 587, 589-90 (1935) (reviewing de novo question whether state
officials discriminated against blacks in composingjury venire); cf. In re Wood, 140 U.S.
278, 285-86 (1891) (discussed supra note 452 and accompanying text).
465. See, e.g., Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 228-29 (1940) (voluntariness of
confession "determine[d] independently"); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354, 358
(1939) (jury discrimination); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286-87 (1936)
(voluntariness of confession).
466. See, e.g., Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 61 (1951); Norris v. Alabama, 294
U.S. at 590 (de novo review of mixed question required so that "appropriate enforcement
of the federal right may be assured"; "[o]therwise, review by this Court would fail of its
purpose in safeguarding constitutional rights"); Ward v. Board of County Comm'rs, 253
U.S. at 22; Kansas City S. Ry. v. C.H. Albers Comm'n Co., 223 U.S. at 591, 594.




absence of any evidence suggests that the prior court's definition of
that fact must differ from the reviewing court's-hence that the prior
court made a mistake of law.4
6 8
3. Certiorarification of Supreme Court Direct Review. - In 1914, after a
quarter century of modest erosion in the Supreme Court's mandatory
writ of error and appeal jurisdiction and accretion to its discretionary
certiorari jurisdiction, 469 and of greater erosion in the number of cases
actually granted plenary review on writ of error,470 Congress enacted
the first in a series of laws that almost entirely replaced direct Supreme
Court review as of right on writ of error with discretionary direct review
on writ of certiorari. The 1914 law allowed litigants aggrieved by deci-
sions of the state courts in favor of federal rights to seek review by certi-
orari.471 A 1916 law made review of state court decisions in favor of or
against a claim of federal right reviewable only on certiorari, unless the
party seeking review attacked the "authority" of the state or federal
governments to act as opposed to the constitutionality of an action
within the authority of the official actor.472 And a 1925 law located all
requests for review within the Court's certiorari jurisdiction, save re-
quests for review of state court decisions striking down federal or up-
holding state statutes under the Constitution.47
3
4. State-Prisoner Habeas Corpus. - Given the Court's prior treatment
of direct Supreme Court review as of right, when available, as a pre-
ferred alternative to habeas corpus, and, when not available, as a model
for proceedings under the writ, the early twentieth century decrease in
the as-of-right availability, and increase in the scope, of direct Supreme
Court review should have expanded the use and widened the scope of
habeas corpus review. And so it did in Frank v. Mangum4 74 in 1915 and,
especially, in Moore v. Dempsey475 in 1923.
Frank and Moore are puzzles. On the basis of the plenary review
afforded the petitioner's legal claims, Professor Bator considers Frank
468. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 545 n.8 (1965); Stein v. New York,
346 U.S. 156, 182 (1953).
469. See Judiciary Act of 1891, ch. 517, § 6, 26 Stat. 826, 828 (limiting Supreme
Court's review as of right of decisions of newly created Circuit Courts of Appeals to
cases in which matter in dispute exceeded $1000; other cases heard on certiorari);
provisions cited supra note 454 and accompanying text.
470. See, e.g., Ex parte Frank, 235 U.S. 694 (1914) (mem.); In re Kemmler, 136
U.S. 436, 438 (1890); Spies v. Illinois, 123 U.S. 131, 164 (1887).
471. See Act of Dec. 23, 1914, ch. 2, 38 Stat. 790. Previously, the Supreme Court
could not review such decisions at all.
472. See Act of Sept. 6, 1916, ch. 448, § 2, 39 Stat. 726.
473. See Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, § 237, 43 Stat. 936, 937. In 1928, the Court
renamed the residual right to review as of right an "appeal" rather than a "writ of
error," although the confines of that right remained the same as in 1925. Act ofJan. 31,
1928, ch. 14, 45 Stat. 54; accord Hart & Wechsler, 3d ed., supra note 241, at 501-03;
supra note 51.
474. 237 U.S. 309, 329-32 (1915).
475. 261 U.S. 86, 90-92 (1923).
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one of the great advances in the scope of the writ.476 Yet the outcome
of the case-approving an apparently mob-terrorized jury's conviction
and condemnation of a Jewish man for raping and murdering a young
Christian woman-led ChiefJudge Oakes recently to call Frank one of
the Court's great failures of nerve, on a par with Dred Scott and Plessy.
4 7 7
The outcome of Moore is easier to understand, but difficult to square
with Frank.478
In both cases, the presence of a mob threatening the courtroom
was admitted, and the evidence supporting the petitioners' allegations
of mob influence on the judges and juries was substantial. 479 In both
cases, the trial courts under cooler circumstances denied new trial mo-
tions on the basis that the mobs' influence had not affected the pro-
ceedings.480 In both, the state supreme courts affirmed, finding, in
effect, that the mobs had not influenced the verdicts.481 In both, the
petitioners unsuccessfully sought direct review in the United States
Supreme Court before seeking and being denied habeas corpus relief
in the lower federal courts.48 2
On appeal from the denial of habeas corpus in both cases, the
Supreme Court treated "the writ of habeas corpus [as available] ...
only in case the judgment under which the prisoner is detained is
shown to be absolutely void."' 483 Although Frank ostensibly tied this
concept to a "want of jurisdiction in the court that pronounced [the
judgment]," it understood that concept to be dictated by the Due Pro-
cess Clause as well as by the habeas corpus statute, and defined it to
include cases in which jurisdiction "was lost in the course of the pro-
ceedings" through mob influence on the jury or other due process vio-
lations.484 In the end, the Court in both cases clearly and repeatedly
said that all due process and constitutional claims were cognizable on
habeas corpus.485 In both cases, the Court concluded that due process
476. See Bator, supra note 6, at 484-87.
477. See Violent Crime Control Act of 1991, Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary
Comm., 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. 312 (1991) (testimony of Chief Judge Oakes). Frank
almost certainly was innocent. See Wendell Rawls, Jr., After 69 Years of Silence,
Lynching Victim Is Cleared, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1982, at A12.
478. See supra text accompanying notes 271-274, 283-284 and accompanying
text.
479. See Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. at 87-90; Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309,
332-34 (1915).
480. See Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. at 91-92; id. at 96-99 (McReynolds, J.,
dissenting); Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. at 333.
481. See Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. at 91; Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. at 313-14.
482. See Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. at 87; Moore v. Arkansas, 254 U.S. 630
(1920); Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. at 311, 317; Ex parte Frank, 235 U.S. 694 (1914).
483. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. at 327; accord Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. at
91-92.
484. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. at 327; accord id. at 334-35; id. at 347 (Holmes,J.,
dissenting).
485. See id. at 326, 328, 330, 331, 335, 345 (habeas corpus lies to relieve petitioner
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also demanded a fair "corrective process" either at trial or on appeal in
which to litigate a claim that trial by mob had occurred, and that habeas
corpus was available to redress the absence of fair corrective pro-
cess. 486 And the Court found the same state corrective process in both
cases-a new trial proceeding followed by an appeal, neither affected
by a mob-which it ruled adequate in Frank487 and did not clearly rule
inadequate in Moore.4
88
Three questions arise: First, and most puzzling, why did both deci-
sions abandon the Court's practice of treating its direct review as pre-
ferred over and preclusive of later habeas corpus review? Second, why
did the Court deny relief under the aggravated circumstances of Frank?
Third, given that denial, why did the Court remand for further pro-
ceedings in Moore?
In Frank, the majority and dissent clearly describe both the exhaus-
tion of state remedies doctrine and the exhaustion of Supreme Court rem-
edies doctrine as only preliminary to, and not preclusive of, later
federal habeas corpus review.489 The Moore Court proceeded accord-
ing to the same rule. The only evidence bearing on the Court's myste-
rious departure from its previously preclusive doctrine requiring
exhaustion of Supreme Court review is (1) the Court's one-line sum-
mary memoranda reporting its denial of Frank's writ of error applica-
tion and of the Moore petitioners' certiorari petition on direct
review490 and (2) Justice Holmes' comment in dissent in Frank that he
and Justice Hughes had voted to grant Frank's writ of error application
and thereby to afford him plenary review rather than just a summary
denial. 4
9 1
Sparse as they are, these data seem to me to solve the puzzle. Both
exemplify the unofficial (in Frank) and then official (in Moore) "certi-
orarification" of direct Supreme Court review. In both cases, the
Court's plenary review on habeas corpus seems to have responded to a
recognition that, by then, the Court could not supply the plenary re-
"shown to have been deprived of any right guaranteed to him by the Fourteenth
Amendment or any other provision of the Constitution or laws of the United States");
Moore, 261 U.S. at 87-88 ("question [is] whether their constitutional rights have been
preserved").
486. See Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. at 335; Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. at 91.
487. See Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. at 335-36.
488. See Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. at 91-92.
489. See Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. at 328-29 ("[T]he writ in the absence of very
special circumstances, ought not to be issued until the state prosecution has reached its
conclusion, and not even then until the Federal questions arising upon the record have
been brought before this court upon writ of error.") (emphasis added); id. at 348
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
490. See Moore v. Arkansas, 254 U.S. 630 (1920) (mem.); In re Frank, 235 U.S. 694
(1914) (mem.) (denying cert. in Frank v. State, 83 S.E. 645 (1914)).
491. See Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. at 346 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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view as of right that previously had permitted a preference for its own
direct review.
The answer the Frank Court gave to the second question was sim-
ple: the Georgia Supreme Court determination that the mob had not
intimidated the jury was one of fact, hence beyond the Court's power to
overturn unless tainted by an independent constitutional violation,
namely, the denial of an adequate corrective procedure for litigating
the mob-domination claim.4 9 2 Because the state courts had provided
such a procedure, no fair-process violation had occurred, and the
factfinding stood.
On the way to stating this conclusion, the Court first rejected the
argument that the state courts' legal determinations bound the court.
Thus, although seeing logic in the view that state court determinations
as to both law and fact ought to be "resjudicata " in habeas corpus pro-
ceedings, Justice Pitney (pace Bator) rejected that view for lack of sup-
porting precedent (except insofar as a prior court'sfactual determinations
were concerned) and "in view of the impropriety of limiting in the least
degree the authority of the United States in investigating an alleged
violation by a state of the due process of law guaranteed by the Four-
teenth Amendment. '493
Noting that the inapplicability of resjudicata "does not mean that
[the state] decision may be ignored or disregarded," 494 Justice Pitney
then inserted perhaps the most fought-over passage in habeas corpus
law.4 95 Justice Pitney began by recognizing that a trial "in fact domi-
nated by a mob so that the jury is intimidated and the trial judge yields"
violates due process as long as the "state suppl[ies] no corrective pro-
cess [and] carr[ies] into execution" the judgment produced thereby.496
Whether that in fact had happened here was the matter to which Justice
Pitney turned, beginning with the decision of the Georgia Supreme
Court which, "upon a full review, decided appellant's allegations offact,
so far as matters now material are concerned[,] to be unfounded. '49
7
And it was just there, as well, thatJustice Pitney's analysis ended-as he
said in a passage that, fought over or not, could not be clearer:
[W]e hold that such a determination of the facts as was thus made
by the court of last resort of Georgia respecting the alleged
interference with the trial through disorder and manifestations
of hostile sentiment cannot in this collateral inquiry be treated
as a nullity, but must be taken as setting forth the truth of the
matter, certainly until some reasonable ground is shown for an
inference that the court which rendered it either was wanting
492. See id. at 335-36 (majority opinion).
493. Id. at 334.
494. Id.
495. See, e.g., Bator, supra note 6, at 484-87; Peller, supra note 191, at 608-10.
496. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. at 335 (emphasis added).
497. Id. (emphasis added).
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in jurisdiction, or at least erred in the exercise of its jurisdic-
tion; and the mere assertion by the prisoner that the facts of the
matter are other than the state court, upon investigation deter-
mined them to be, will not be deemed sufficient to raise an
issue respecting the correctness of that determination .... 498
Ajury dominated by a mob cannot, without violating due process, adju-
dicate the defendant's guilt. And a judge dominated by a mob cannot,
without also violating due process, vitiate the first violation by "find-
ing" on the spot that no mob domination occurred. But an appellate
court that was not even arguably threatened by the mob can vitiate the
first violation by finding, "upon a full review," free of any independent
due process violation, that "in point of fact" 4 99 no mob domination
occurred.
For Justice Holmes in dissent, the problem was that the "whole
structure" of the majority's decision turned on its characterizing as a
matter of pure fact what he instead recognized as at least partly a mat-
ter of law. 50 0 In what for the next several decades was one of the ger-
minal statements of the "mixed question" doctrine, 50 1 Justice Holmes
wrote:
When the decision of the question of fact is so interwoven with
the decision of the question of constitutional right that the one
necessarily involves the other, the Federal court must examine
the facts. Otherwise, the right will be a barren one. It is sig-
nificant that the argument for the state does not go so far as to
say that in no case would it be permissible, on the application
for habeas corpus to override the findings of fact by the state
courts. It would indeed be a most serious thing if this Court
were so to hold, for we could not but regard it as a removal of
what is perhaps the, most important guaranty of the Federal
Constitution. If, however, the argument stops short of this,
the whole structure [of the majority opinion] built upon the
state procedure and decisions falls to the ground.
5 0 2
That, pace Peller, the Frank majority did not deny relief on the due
process ground that mob rule at trial is permissible as long as the guilty
verdict is affirmed on appeal should now be clear. What the state
supreme court's decision instead provided was an unassailable "no
mob influence"fact finding of the sort the judge at trial could not pro-
vide because he, too, may have succumbed to the mob. That, pace Ba-
tor, the Court did not deny relief on the resjudicata ground that, the
state courts having fairly spoken, the federal courts were entirely bound
498. Id. at 335-36 (emphasis added).
499. Id. at 344.
500. See id. at 348 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
501. See, e.g. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 546 (1961); Marsh v. Alabama,
326 U.S. 501, 510 (1946); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 238 (1942).
502. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. at 347-48 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (citing, e.g.,
Kansas City S. Ry. v. C.H. Albers Comm. Co., 223 U.S. 573, 591 (1912)).
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also should be clear from the Court's express resolution not to "invoke
the doctrine of res judicata ." 503 The collection of doctrines on which
both the Court and the dissent undertook to decide the case was
neither due process nor habeas corpus doctrine, but, instead, familiar
principles governing federal appellate review of a prior court's factual
and mixed factual and legal determinations. Pitney looked backwards
to the pre-1912 days in which fact review, of any sort, meant no review.
Justice Holmes looked forward to the importation of the Court's
mixed-question and no-evidence doctrines into the realm of personal,
as well as economic, liberties.
That the principles over which Pitney and Holmes disagreed are
more usually known as direct appeal, not habeas corpus, principles sim-
ply proves my point: following the certiorarification of the Court's di-
rect appellate docket, the Court's inability to satisfy by itself the federal
courts' statutory obligation to conduct review as of right, according to
those principles, of the constitutionality of state detention thrust the obli-
gation on the lower federal courts on habeas corpus. All that remained,
therefore, was for the Court to finish the fight over the application of
those principles to putative mixed questions of constitutional law and
fact arising in the criminal setting.
And that is exactly what Justice Holmes did in his opinion for the
Court in Moore. Remanding the case to the lower court to examine the
dispositive "fact" of mob influence, in order to see whether there was
an uncorrected "wrong" denying "the petitioners constitutional
rights," Justice Holmes ordered that examination to proceed de novo:
"We shall not say more concerning the corrective process afforded to
the petitioner"-as, in Frank, a new trial and appeal proceeding 5°4-
"than that it does not seem to us sufficient to allow a judge of the
United States to escape the duty of examining the facts for himself
when, if true as alleged, they make the trial absolutely void." 50 5
503. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. at 334. Both the Peller and the Bator theses are
even more forcefully refuted by the Court's treatment of Frank's second claim. Frank
originally claimed that his right to attend his trial was violated when fear of the mob led
him to absent himself from the courtroom during the announcement of the verdict. The
state courts concluded that he waived any right-to-presence claim by failing to include it
in his motion for a new trial. Frank countered by arguing that due process forbade
treating the right to presence as waivable. The state courts disagreed. Far from treating
the state court's determination of this entirely legal question as dispositive, the majority
and the dissent both considered it de novo, and rejected it on the merits. See id. at
340-43; id. at 346 (Holmes, J., dissenting). The discrepancy between the Court's
deferential review of the mob domination issue and its de novo review of the presence
issue belies both the Peller thesis, which brooks no deference, and the Bator thesis,
which brooks no de novo review of a question fairly, even if erroneously, adjudicated in
the state courts.
504. See supra notes 480-481 and accompanying text.
505. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 92 (1923). Justice Holmes clearly said what
was to be done but not so clearly why. Two reasons appear: that, as Holmes argued in
Frank, the mob influence question was sufficiently interwoven with law to require de novo
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From Royall to Frank and Frank to Moore, it was not habeas corpus
or due process that changed, but rather federal question appellate re-
view. That habeas corpus review on the merits suddenly re-emerged
from the periphery was a function of the increasing unavailability of
alternative review as of right in the Supreme Court. That the scope of
federal habeas corpus review of mixed questions expanded so quickly
and substantially after Frank was a function of the Court's expansion of
its own direct review of fact-affected federal questions after 1912. That
muscular review of partly factual questions reached criminal cases on
habeas corpus before those on direct review is a function of both
trends-as increasingly during the 1920s and afterwards, what federal
question review of state criminal cases took place did so in the habeas
corpus context.50 6
G. Moore to Brown: Criminal Procedure Revolution and Direct Review
Devolution
Just as the Court's mixed question and allied fact review doctrines
expanded the scope of review on habeas corpus between Frank and
Moore, so did the Court's emerging Criminal Procedure Revolution ex-
pand the reach of the constitutional claims cognizable on habeas corpus
in the thirty years between Moore and Brown-both trends impelled by
the run-off from the Court to the lower federal courts of cases in which
the Court's discretionary review was unavailable or denied.
On the federal prisoner side, the Court's recognition of a group of
constitutional rights whose violation created exceptions to the other-
wise preclusive exhaustion-of-appellate-remedies doctrine 50 7 set off vir-
tually a second Golden Age of federal-prisoner review. The Court soon
recognized, for example, that prisoners denied their newly recognized
right to counsel could not be blamed for failing to pursue timely and
complete appeals;50 8 that prisoners coerced into pleading guilty typi-
review; or that the Arkansas Supreme Court determination (little more than "that it
could not say 'that [mob influence] must necessarily have been the case' ") did not settle
the determinative question. Id. at 91; cf. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. at 313-14 (detailed
state court factfindings).
506. See cases cited infra notes 508-514. With this devolution of review as of right
from the Court to the lower federal courts came the question whether an initial federal
habeas corpus proceeding precluded successive federal review, as did writ of error
review in the Supreme Court. In Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1924),
decided the year after Moore, the Court ruled that prior habeas corpus consideration
should have effect, but not quite a resjudicata effect, on whether successive review was
warranted. Accord Wong Doo v. United States, 265 U.S. 239, 241 (1924) (upholding
denial of writ of habeas corpus as exercise of "sound judicial discretion," but declining
to rely on "the inflexible doctrine of resjudicata").
507. For general statements of the exhaustion of appellate remedies doctrine, see,
e.g., Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 177-78 (1947); Craig v. Hecht, 263 U.S. 255, 277
(1923); supra notes 455-457 and accompanying text.
508. See, e.g. Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 274-75 (1942);
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cally could not be understood to have thereby waived an appeal;50 9 and
that prisoners convicted on the basis of government-tolerated perjury
could not be expected to discover that fact in time to make it the basis
of a timely appeal. 510 The result was a spate of Supreme Court re-
mands for de novo habeas corpus review in cases in which lower federal
courts, applying pre-existing exhaustion and constitutional doctrine,
had denied review altogether.511 As before, the Court consistently de-
scribed the range of claims cognizable on habeas corpus as all constitu-
tional claims 5 12-only sometimes with a bow in the direction of the
"jurisdiction"-withdrawing effect of such violations 513 -and when, in-
stead of remanding, it conducted review itself, it did so de novo on the
law but deferentially on the facts.
5 14
On the state-prisoner side, the range of available constitutional
rights grew as slowly as incorporationism, but all rights that did exist
were enforced on habeas corpus, as on appeal, with de novo legal re-
view.5 15 Accordingly, when Congress undertook to codify existing
habeas corpus practice in the new Judicial Code of 1948, it made all
constitutional claims cognizable, adopted no qualifications on the tradi-
tional scope of review of legal and factual questions, and made exhaus-
Walker v.Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 286-87 (1941);Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,465,
467 (1938).
509. See, e.g., Waley v.Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104-05 (1942).
510. See Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. at 177-78 (dicta); see also Adams v. United States
ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. at 272-73 (nonexhaustion excused where prisoner could not
afford transcript needed to perfect appeal); Bowen v.Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 26 (1939)
("rule requiring resort to appellate procedure" suspended in order to resolve conflict
among courts on important question of federal jurisdiction); Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S.
490, 494 (1935) (excusing requirement that other remedies be exhausted, in challenge
to parole revocation, because none existed).
511. See, e.g., United States ex rel. McCann v. Adams, 320 U.S. 220, 222 (1943);
Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. at 105; Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. at 287; Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 469.
512. See, e.g., United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 212 (1952); Sunal v. Large,
332 U.S. at 178-79; Waley v.Johnston, 316 U.S. at 105; see also Salinger v. Loisel, 265
U.S. 224, 232-33 (1924) (Sixth Amendment); Baender v. Barnett, 255 U.S. 224, 226
(1921) (Fifth Amendment and Article I, § 8); Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U.S. 378, 379
(1919) (Fifth Amendment).
513. See, e.g., Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. at 23-24 (citing cases); Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 467-68.
514. See, e.g., Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. at 28 (de novo legal review); Escoe v.
Zerbst, 295 U.S. at 429-39 (same); Matter of Gregory, 219 U.S. 210, 214 (1911) (no
review of insufficiency of evidence claims); Harlan v. McGourin, 218 U.S. 442, 448,
451-52 (1910) (de novo review of claim that prisoner's sentence violated federal law but
no review of insufficiency of evidence claim).
515. See, e.g., Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672, 677 (1948); Hawk v. Olsen, 326 U.S.
271, 276 (1945) ("When ... error, in relation to the federal question of constitutional
violation, creeps into the record, we have the responsibility to review the
proceedings."); Ashe v. United States ex rel. Valotta, 270 U.S. 424, 425-26 (1926);
supra notes 113-115 and accompanying text.
2082 [Vol. 92:1997
HABEAS CORPUS
tion of state remedies a matter of timing, not preclusion.51 6
The defining issue for the Court during this period was one that
Moore implicitly decided but did not explicitly settle: if direct Supreme
Court review on the merits as of right precluded subsequent federal
review on habeas corpus, what, then, was the effect of the Court's newly
certiorarified direct appeal? As did Moore, some pre-Brown cases as-
sumed or concluded that the Court's denial of certiorari did not supply
the statutorily mandated review as of right, which, accordingly, only
habeas corpus could afford.5 17 Other decisions did give the denial of
certiorari effect, although, in keeping with the newly established succes-
sive-federal-petition principle of Salinger v. Loisel,518 it was only a par-
tial, and not a fully resjudicata, effect.5 19
H. The Brown "Revolution" The Impact of Certiorarification Realized
It should now be clear that Brown is anticlimax. True, between two
majority opinions, the case did nicely catalogue the governing habeas
corpus principles. 520 But those principles already were long estab-
lished, to anyone with the patience to search them out from among the
literally hundreds of individually unimportant cases in which they lay
dispersed. The only revolution Brown worked, therefore, was one that
seems so obvious today that we can hardly imagine anyone having
thought the law different-its holding that a denial of certiorari was not
a ruling on the merits.521
Brown did serve a critical function. For years following Congress'
1885 warning and the Court's 1886 response in Royall, the Court had
largely shut down habeas corpus by giving itself the federal review-as-
of-right burden the Reconstruction Congress previously had en-
couraged the Court to share with the lower federal courts on habeas
corpus and removal. It took the Court time to come to grips with the
fact that the certiorarification of its direct appeal docket made the
Royall compromise untenable. Although Frank and especially Moore ad-
umbrated the Court's eventual resolution, only Brown forthrightly
adopted it: all prisoners deserve one federal-court appeal as of right of
516. See Act ofJune 25, 1948, ch. 646, pt. VI, ch. 153, §§ 2241-2255 62 Stat. 869,
964-68 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2256 (1988)); H.R. Rep. No. 308, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. A177-78 (1947) (1948 codification of habeas corpus provisions not
intended substantively to change existing practice); infra notes 528-529 and
accompanying text. The 1948 statute did codify Salinger v. Loisel's modified resjudicata
rule on successive habeas corpus petitions. See supra note 506.
517. See, e.g., Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. at 677-78; White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760,
764-65 (1945); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 115 (1935) (dicta); see supra notes
489-491 and accompanying text.
518. 265 U.S. 224 (1924).
519. See supra note 506.
520. See supra notes 108-158 and accompanying text.
521. The court's holding is in Justice Frankfurter's opinion. Justice Reed
dissented. See supra notes 119, 129 and accompanying text.
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their federal constitutional claims, if not on direct review in the
Supreme Court, then on habeas corpus in the lower federal courts. As
in other appeals, the scope of review was to be de novo on the law, defer-
ential on the facts. In the federal prisoner context, the appeal generally
would be a direct appeal to a United States Court of Appeals, unless the
prisoner could not reasonably be expected to raise his claims in the
immediate wake of trial. In the state-prisoner context, with direct
Supreme Court review on the merits as of right having gone the way of
the snow leopard-but a few sightings each year-the bulk of the re-
view responsibility would fall to the lower federal courts (and, at times,
the Supreme Court) on habeas corpus.
One question remained: Now that the force of its 1885 nudge had
run out, would Congress prod the federal courts again?
I. Congressional Affirmation: The 1966 Amendments
Congress did no such thing. Although "[ijn 1966, Congress care-
fully reviewed the habeas corpus statutes and amended their provi-
sions ... weigh[ing] the interests of the individual prisoner against the
sometimes contrary interest of the State,"' 522 in doing so it only con-
firmed and, indeed, strengthened the parity between and sub-
stitutability of direct and habeas corpus review.
Consider first what Congress, although asked, refused to do. Just as
in 1867, 1885,523 1948,524 and at least twenty-eight times between
1968 and 1992,525 Congress between 1953 and 1966 repeatedly re-
fused to withdraw the lower federal judiciary from de novo review of
some or all state and federal court constitutional determinations in
criminal cases. 526 The emphasis in these proposals on curbing in-
522. Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 449 (1986) (plurality opinion of Powell,
J.).
523. See supra notes 417-420 and accompanying text.
524. See, e.g., Report of the Judicial Conference 22-23 (1943) (proposing that
state determinations of law and fact be conclusive unless the prisoner could show that
state law provided no "adequate remedy" for his constitutional claims); Report of the
Judicial Conference 22 (1944) (renewing recommendations of 1943 report); S. 1451,
79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1948) (same); John J. Parker, Limiting the Abuse of Habeas
Corpus, 8 F.R.D. 171 (1948).
525. See Biden/Edwards Amicus Brief, supra note 4, at 10-16 (cataloguing
1968-1992 proposals).
526. Bills to curb habeas corpus were introduced at the beginning of all six
Congresses between Brown's announcement and the enactment of the 1966
amendments. The most important proposal, which was periodically reintroduced,
would have forbidden federal habeas corpus redetermination of legal and factual
conclusions made by state courts in proceedings affording a "fair and adequate
opportunity" to litigate such questions. The bills and the hearings and debates on them
are summarized in Civiletti Amicus Brief, supra note 3, at 15-28; Biden/Edwards
Amicus Brief, supra note 4, at 7-8; Bruce W. Ewing, Habeas Corpus Legislation in the
United States Congress, 1955-1966 (Jan. 28, 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with Columbia Law Review); infra note 527.
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dependent federal review reveals that Brown's endorsement of de novo
review, which eluded Justice Thomas in Wright, was clear enough to the
writ's legislative opponents from 1953 to 1966, and since.527
Congress instead adopted a set of amendments that, to be sure,
addressed the standard of review on habeas corpus, but in a way that
thoroughly confirmed the Court's practice before 1963 and cut back
only on its short-lived innovations of the mid-1960s that anomalously
accorded broader review to habeas corpus petitioners than the Court it-
self could provide on direct review.
The 1948 codification of the 1867 act, which the 1966 amendments
revised, made the habeas corpus cognizability of constitutional claims
and the default de novo standard of review repetitively mandatory. The
mandate the statute's plain language imposed was precisely the one
under which both Justices Reed and Frankfurter explicitly operated in
Brown (somewhat to the discomfort of the latter):528 District courts
"shall entertain" applications "on the ground that [the applicant] is in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States" and "shall forthwith award the writ... unless.., the applicant
•. , *is not entitled thereto. ' 529 The 1966 amendments left all the
mandatory language intact. Today, as in 1948 (and in 1867 and 1874),
the statute's default position is that a prisoner in custody in violation of
the Constitution "shall" have the writ.
Onto this default rule, however, the 1966 amendments engrafted
three standard of review qualifications. First, Congress provided that,
with one exception, a prisoner whose unconstitutional-incarceration
claims the Supreme Court previously had rejected on the merits on ap-
peal or certiorari shall not have the writ; in the rare instances in which it
is granted, review by the Supreme Court on direct appeal is both pre-
ferred and, once it occurs, resjudicata.530
527. The legislative history is filled with statements that proposals to curb habeas
corpus were inspired by Brown, and particularly by its confirmation that "a defendant
[who] has been convicted in a State court, [had the] conviction affirmed . . . [in] an
intermediary court in the State... and affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United
States or certiorari denied.... still ... has the right under the present... law to go into
a Federal trial court and have the whole thing reviewed." Proposed Amendments to
§ 2254 of Tit. 28 of the U.S. Code in Reference to Applications for Writs of Habeas
Corpus by Persons in Custody Pursuant to the Judgment of a State Court: Hearings
before Subcomm. No. 3 of the HouseJudiciary Comm., 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1955)
(testimony of ChiefJustice Weygandt of the Ohio Supreme Court); accord id. at 3-4, 10
(testimony of ChiefJudge John Parker); 102 Cong. Rec. 936 (1955) (statement of Rep.
Celler); id. at 939 (statement of Rep. Quigley); Biden/Edwards Amicus Brief, supra note
4, at 7-16 (collecting similar statements from 1950s to 1990s); supra note 159.
528. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 460-61 (1953) (opinion of Reed, J.) (citing
28 U.S.C. § 2243); id. at 505 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.) (citing same); supra notes 113
and 139-140 and accompanying text.
529. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(a), 2241(c)(3), 2243 (1988).
530. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(c) (1988). The one exception occurs when "the
applicant ... shall plead and the [habeas corpus] court shall find the existence of a
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Second, Congress provided that, with one exception, a prisoner
whose claims to be in state custody in violation of the Constitution a
federal habeas corpus court had previously heard and denied on the
merits "need not"-but, in the discretion of the court, may-have the
writ. 531 Thus, although not resjudicata, prior review by another federal
court on habeas corpus is generally a sufficient reason for a court hear-
ing a second or successive petition to deny relief.
Third, Congress provided that, with eight exceptions relating to
the "full[ness] and fair[ness]" of the prior proceeding, a prisoner
whose claims to be in state custody in violation of the Constitution a
state court had previously heard and denied on the basis of a determi-
native finding of historical fact must be denied the writ except on a
showing "by convincing evidence" that the finding is erroneous.5 2 In
other words, a prior "full and fair" determination of the facts by a state
court is due the same deference the clearly erroneous rule affords
factfindings in other appellate settings.
If these three qualifications sound familiar, that is no surprise. The
first qualification is simply the Royall-Frederich-Eno rule codified, "leav-
ing" prisoners to their appellate remedies in the United States
Supreme Court when available as of right.533 The second qualification
is simply the Court's post-Moore successive petition rule announced in
Salinger v. Loisel.534 And the third qualification is simply the 200-year-
old rule, applied, for example, in Frank, requiring deferential habeas
corpus review of issues of "pure fact."153 5 Taken as a whole, the three
qualifications simply reprise the catalogue of standards of review that
Justices Reed and Frankfurter, each in his own way, included in their
respective summaries in Brown of pre-existing habeas corpus
practice.5
3 6
Once engrafted onto the 1948 recodification of the 1874 codifica-
tion of the 1867 statute, the 1966 amendments say simply this: A pris-
oner in "custody in violation of the Constitution" "shall" have the writ
(1) unless the Supreme Court previously said the prisoner was not in
custody in violation of the Constitution, in which case the Court's deci-
material and controlling fact which did not appear in the record of the proceeding in the
Supreme Court and the court shall further find that the applicant for the writ of habeas
corpus could not have caused such fact to appear in such record by the exercise of
reasonable diligence." Id.
531. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (1988). The one exception arises when "the
application alleges and is predicated on a factual or other ground not adjudicated on the
hearing of the earlier application for the writ, and . . . the court, justice, or judge is
satisfied that the applicant has not on the earlier application deliberately withheld the
newly asserted ground or otherwise abused the writ." Id.
532. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1988).
533. See supra notes 425-439 and accompanying text.
534. 265 U.S. 224 (1924). See supra note 506.
535. See supra notes 334, 366, 409, 412, 450, 498, 514 and accompanying text.
536. See supra notes 121-124, 142-145 and accompanying text.
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sion is conclusive on "all issues of fact or law"; or (2) unless another
federal court in a prior habeas corpus proceeding said the same thing,
in which case the prior court's decision is persuasive on the facts and
law, though not quite conclusive; or (3) unless a state court fully and
fairly found facts that are inconsistent with unconstitutional incarcera-
tion, in which case, the state court's decision is dispositive on the facts as
long as it is not clearly erroneous.
But, it might be said, the statute does not specify how a court is to
determine whether a violation exists; the words "de novo review" are
nowhere to be found. More particularly, it might be asked, if Congress
in 1966 set about codifying the prior law that it approved, why did it
not explicitly codify the de novo review rule? There are three answers to
this question.
First, as the Court recently noted in Tamayo-Reyes v. Keeney, 53 7 the
1966 amendments did not quite codify prior law. More accurately, they
restored prior law against some of the controversial changes the Court
made in its famous 1963 trilogy of habeas corpus cases 53 8- changes
that in each instance (1) were resisted by Justice Harlan and others in
forceful dissenting opinions;53 9 (2) spoiled direct-appeal/habeas-
corpus parity by giving more review to habeas corpus petitioners than
they would have received had the Court granted certiorari in their cases
on direct review; (3) have been identified for that reason by Professor
Wechsler and others as among the Court's most egregiously wrong-
headed innovations in recent memory;540 and (4) have since been erad-
icated by the Court, to the extent that they were not previously
eradicated by Congress.
The 1966 Congress' curious need to codify rules already estab-
lished in 1886 thus derived from the intervening 1963 decisions. The
amendments' limits on post-Supreme Court review and on successive
lower federal court review responded directly to Sanders v.
United States, 541 which risked undermining the Royall-Frederich-Eno and
537. 112 S. Ct. 1715, 1717 n.2 (1992).
538. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963),
questioned in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87-88 (1977), and overruled by
Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2565 (1991); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293
(1963); accord H.R. Rep. No. 1892, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1966) (describing the
Supreme Court's announcement of the 1963 decisions as prompting a demand for
legislation "with respect to applications for habeas corpus by persons confined under
judgments of State courts"); 110 Cong. Rec. 14680 (1964) (statement of Rep. Wyman)
(opposing the proposal that ultimately became the 1966 amendments because it was
"legislation to undo decisions of the Supreme Court, particularly Fay v. Noia").
539. See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. at 23-32 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Fay v.
Noia, 372 U.S. at 448-76 (Harlan,J., dissenting); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. at 325-34
(Stewart, J., dissenting, joined by Harlan, J.).
540. See Wechsler, supra note 264, at 178; see also Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. at 448
(referring to decision as "one of the most disquieting that the Court has rendered")
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
541. 373 U.S. 1 (1963).
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Salinger rules by inviting (without defining) such successive federal re-
view as "the ends ofjustice demand." The amendments' limits on re-
determination of state-court fact finding responded just as directly to
the liberalization in Townsend v. Sain542 of the rule of Brown and prior
cases that federal habeas corpus courts generally should defer to state
court factfindings.5 4s
One thing the 1963 cases did not do was change prior law on the
standard of review of legal and mixed legal and factual questions. On
that question, two of the 1963 decisions reiterated prior law.5 44 More-
over, Justice Harlan and the other dissenters concurred in this restate-
ment 545-which explicitly maintained parity between habeas corpus
and the Court's direct review546 -and the Federal Courts titans such as
Hart and Wechsler saw nothing objectionable in the restatement.5 4
7
The juxtaposition of Congress' action on both successive federal
review and review of state courtfactual determinations with its inaction
on review of state court legal and mixed determinations is thus double
proof of Congress' intention to endorse the existing de novo review rule,
which (1) the Court did not find it necessary to change in the process of
changing other aspects of existing law, and (2) which preserved the
longstanding prior law whose restoration was the principal product of
the amendments Congress did make. Congress' silence thus is its con-
sent to the pre-existing de novo review rule, not only because "[t]he nor-
mal rule of statutory construction is that if Congress intends for
legislation to change the interpretation of a judicially created concept,
it makes that intent specific,"' 548 but more importantly because Con-
gress' manifest goal of maintaining the longstanding rule of parity be-
tween habeas corpus and direct review could only be achieved by
preserving de novo review.
Were this a statutory interpretation examination, and not an arti-
cle, the simple question presented might read as follows:
A statute says that 'a [federal] district court shall entertain an
application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person
... in custody in violation of the Constitution,' and that the
542. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
543. On Townsend's liberalization of prior law, see Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S.
Ct. 1715, 1717-18 n.2 (1992); Smith v. Yeager, 393 U.S. 122, 125 (1968) (per curiam).
544. See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. at 318, 326 n.1 ("[Tihe districtjudge... may
not defer to [the state court's] findings of law... [and] must apply the applicable federal
law to the state court fact findings independently.").
545. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 460-68 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (1963),
questioned in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87-88 (1977), and overruled by
Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2565 (1991); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. at
325-27 (Stewart, J, dissenting); supra notes 167-168 and accompanying text.
546. See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. at 313, 326 n.1.
547. See supra note 159.




federal district court 'shall. . .award the writ' to such a per-
son.5 49 By way of qualification of that statement, the statute
says only that the 'State court' shall control the 'determination
... of... factual issue[s]' decisive of the existence of a viola-
tion of the Constitution. 550 Whose decision controls the de-
termination of legal issues decisive of the existence of a
"violation of the Constitution"-(A) the federal district court's
decision; or (B) the state court's decision?
Am I wrong that a "(B)" answer would merit a failing grade?
Let me use yet another question to introduce my next point. If, by
omitting any explicit standard of review, the drafters of the statute did
not intend de novo review of decisive constitutional legal questions, then
what other standard of review did they intend? Assumedly, the answer
to this question is that, by not specifying de novo review, the drafters
intended to adopt some other standard of review of legal questions that
was accepted in the broader legal culture at the time. But, in 1789,
1867, 1948, or 1966, the only accepted standards governing one
court's review of another court's resolution of questions denominated
as legal (including, after 1912, "mixed" questions) were de hiovo review
and no review (e.g., because a prior determination was resjudicata).551
Clearly, Congress could not have intended the mandate that "a district
court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf
of a person.., in custody in violation of the Constitution" 552 to mean
that the district court shall not entertain that application because the
state judgment is dispositive of (i.e., is resjudicata as to) the existence of
custody in violation of the Constitution. The answer, then, to the ques-
tion "If not de novo review, then what?" must be "There is no answer;
Congress intended by its silence to adopt a standard of review that had
never before been accepted in the sphere of courts reviewing courts."
Finally, the history of the 1966 legislation reveals its intent to
maintain the pre-existing de novo review rule. To begin with, state-
549. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(a), 2241(c)(3), 2243 (1988).
550. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (emphasis added) (1988).
551. Cf. Monaghan, supra note 12, at 229-39, 247-54 (assuming that courts must
choose between de novo and no review). True, the notion of deferential judicial review of
an administrative agency's interpretations of its organic laws had arisen by the 1940s,
although the extent of its acceptance prior to Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resource
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), is unclear. See Walter Gellhorn et al.,
Administrative Law 379-404 (7th ed. 1987). But no similar notion had arisen, much
less been accepted, for courts reviewing courts. Moreover, the reasons for a court's
deferring to an administrative agency do not apply in the current context. Compare
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. at 843, 865-66
(judicial deference is warranted by Congress' implied intent, in adopting the agency's
organic law, to give the agency superior interpretive authority, and by the agency's
superior technical and political expertise) with Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1
Wheat.) 304, 351 (1816) (Constitution gives state courts no immunity from federal court
review of their determinations of federal law and makes federal court interpretations of
federal law superior to state court interpretations).
552. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1988).
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ments about the remedial553 and deterrent 54 purposes of the writ sim-
ply will not jibe with a rule forbidding district courts to remedy
constitutional violations and validating "reasonable" state court deci-
sions that make and affirm constitutional violations. Second, the legis-
lators and the sources to whom they were listening most closely-
principally, the Judicial Conference, the Eisenhower Justice Depart-
ment, and ChiefJustice Warren on behalf of the federal judiciary-fre-
quently described habeas corpus and Supreme Court direct review on
the merits as substitutes.5 55 From this understanding, it is, of course,
no leap at all to infer that the review available in the substitute forums
was to be the same.
But nothing needs to be inferred. A Judicial Conference Commit-
tee drafted the amendments Congress passed in 1966 in order to block
an anticipated proposal by the state chiefjustices and attorneys general
to "make the finding of fact of a State court conclusive in a proceeding
in habeas corpus."'556 What the Judicial Conference most strongly op-
posed in the state officials' proposal was the possibility that it would
require deference to state court determinations of mixed questions of fact
and law. To that extent, theJudicial Conference concluded, the propo-
sal "would be wholly incompatible with the duty of Federal courts to determine
Federal constitutional questions."' 55 7 That duty, the committee explained,
quoting Brown, meant affording state court legal determinations "'the
weight that federal practice gives to the conclusion of a court of last
resort in anotherjurisdiction on Federal constitutional issues,' " that is,
" 'respectful attention to [its] reasoning and conclusion,' " but not
deference. 558
Even more to the point, the committee relied on three classic direct
appeal decisions in which the Supreme Court extended its " 'duty to
determine constitutional questions' " to mixed questions of law and
fact.55 9 Lest the point be missed, the committee concluded by quoting
a passage from Townsend v. Sain560 describing the Court's de novo review
obligation on direct appeal in mixed question cases and saying that
" '[t]he duty of the Federal district court on habeas is no less
exacting.' -561
553. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 1892, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, 9 (1966).
554. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 1797, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1966).
555. See, e.g., 1963 Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on Habeas
Corpus, 33 F.R.D. 367, 371 (1963) (views of Judicial Conference and Chief Justice
Warren); Justice Department Memorandum-H.R. 8361: Federal Habeas Corpus for
State Prisoners, reprinted in 104 Cong. Rec. 19432-44 (1958).
556. H.R. Rep. No. 1384, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-3, 6, 22-23 (1964) (appending
and adopting the analysis of the Judicial Conference report).
557. Id. at 23 (emphasis added).
558. Id. at 24 (quoting Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 335 (1946)).
559. Id. (quoting Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 205 (1960)).
560. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
561. H.R. Rep. 1384, supra note 556, at 24 (quoting id. at 316).
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Perhaps most to the point, however, is a bottom-line exchange be-
tween two members of Congress and the Judicial Conference's spokes-
person, Judge Orie Phillips, about the Judicial Conference proposal
then being developed. When asked in congressional hearings whether
the proposal that ultimately became the 1966 amendments "would re-
sult in curbing the right to the great writ on a meritorious case" or, if it
would not "abrogate it[,] . .. would actually disturb the right," Judge
Phillips, answered, "I do not think that [the bill] changes present
practice." 5
62
In short, Congress seems to have known exactly what it was doing
in 1966. As the House Judiciary Committee concluded in approving
the 1966 amendments, "[t]he substitute [bill] . .. creates reasonable
presumptions and fixes the party on whom the burden of proof, as to
certainfactual issues, shall rest in such proceedings, without impairment of
any of the substantive rights of the applicant."
'5 63
All interpretive roads lead to the same conclusion: Congress knew
that federal habeas corpus courts were reviewing pure and mixed legal
questions de novo and aimed to preserve that standard of review.
Hence, when the drafters of the 1966 amendments left intact the 1948
(and 1867) provisions requiring that "a district court shall entertain an
application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person . . . in
custody in violation of the Constitution," 564 they meant what they said:
that it was the "district court," and not the state court, that had the duty
to determine the constitutional question.
J. Summary
Since 1789, Congress has provided federal appellate review as of
right of all fundamental federal questions-and since Reconstruction,
constitutional questions-raised by the government's or a state's deci-
sion to incarcerate an individual. When meaningfully available, federal
appellate review as of right in the Supreme Court on writ of error has
been the preferred mode of federal review, at least for state prisoners.
But when Supreme Court review as of right on writ of error has been
unavailable or has provided insufficient protection of federal law
562. Habeas Corpus: Hearings before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1959) (exchange between Reps. Willis and
Libonati and Judge Orie L. Phillips). Ohio ChiefJustice Weygandt, a strong proponent
of legislation to make state court legal and factual determinations decisive in federal
habeas corpus proceedings, similarly described the bill about which Judge Phillips was
testifying: "The present . . . bill accomplishes none of the objectives sought by the
Conference of Chief Justices. In fact, it does the opposite in that it would afford
permanent statutory approval of the misuse of the writ resulting from the decisions of the
Federal Supreme Court." 105 Cong. Rec. 14635-36 (1959) (statement of Rep. Feighan,
appending letter of Chief Justice Carl W. Weygandt) (emphasis added).
563. H.R. Rep. No. 1892, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1966) (emphasis added); accord
S. Rep. No. 1797, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 6 (1966).
564. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1988).
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against state court resistance, Congress has authorized the federal
courts to employ habeas corpus, along with removal and (in the fed-
eral-prisoner context) appeals as of right to the United States Courts of
Appeals, as surrogates for the Court's direct review as of right.
5 5
On the state prisoner side, Supreme Court review on writ of error
sufficed for all prisoners from 1789 until 1815 and 1833. At these lat-
ter points, state court threats to nullify federal duties and tariffs by
prosecuting their collectors led Congress to give federal employees re-
moval and habeas corpus rights, lest hostile state proceedings indeed
nullify federal law before an opportunity for federal writ-of-error re-
view became available. In 1867, Southern courts' threats to nullify
newly given federal rights led the Reconstruction Congress to extend
the federal courts' removal and habeas corpus authorizations to inter-
vene in, rather than await the end of, state court proceedings whenever
necessary to protect any prisoner's federal rights.
With Reconstruction's close and a strong signal from Congress in
1885, the Court restored the preference for its own review as of right-
in the habeas corpus context, by requiring state prisoners to exhaust
the Court's writ of error remedy when meaningfully available. The mo-
ment Supreme Court review as of right was not meaningfully available,
however, following the Court's unofficial, then Congress' official, certi-
orarification of the Court's appellate docket, the Court reinvigorated
habeas corpus review. This reinvigoration culminated in Brown's 1953
acknowledgement and Congress' 1966 confirmation that the Court's
certiorari denial did not supply the requisite review on the merits and
that habeas corpus review- commensurate in substance and scope with
the Court's unavailable direct review-would have to fill the breach.
On the federal prisoner side, the story is similar, if simpler. In lieu
of federal appellate rights, Congress in 1789 afforded habeas corpus
review, which for a century the Court consistently used to remedy viola-
tions of fundamental (after the Civil War, constitutional) rights in crim-
inal trials. The onset of federal appellate rights in 1891 (first on writ of
error in the Court itself; later, in the newly created courts of appeal),
and the Court's immediate conclusion that those rights, when meaning-
fully available, superseded the writ, placed federal-prisoner habeas
corpus on ice until the Criminal Procedure Revolution of the 1930s and
1940s expanded the number of situations in which appellate remedies
565. Treating removal as a form of writ of error is, e.g., McKee v. Rains, 77 U.S. (10
Wall.) 22, 25-26 (1869); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 319-20,
349-50 (1816); treating the writ of error as a form of removal is, e.g., Dower v. Richards,
151 U.S. 658, 665 (1894); treating habeas corpus as "in the nature of a writ of error" is,
e.g., Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 202 (1830); treating habeas corpus as a form
of removal is, e.g., Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 97-98 (1807); treating
removal and habeas corpus as substitutes is, e.g., Hart & Wechsler, 2d ed., supra note
38, at 423; treating removal and writs of error as substitutes is, e.g., The Mayor v.
Cooper, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 247, 253-54 (1867); treating habeas corpus and writs of error
as substitutes is, e.g., In re Chapman, 156 U.S. 211, 216-18 (1895).
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were understood to be inadequate, and surrogate review in the lower
courts on habeas corpus was accordingly understood to be necessary.
Professors Bator and Peller, then, were both right, and both
wrong. Bator was right to tie changes in the availability of habeas
corpus review and relief to changes in the level of attention federal
habeas corpus courts paid to determinations of prior courts, but was
wrong (1) in describing federal question review on habeas corpus as
limited to less than all fundamental questions, (2) in perceiving the ex-
haustion doctrine as making state court, rather than prior federal court,
review preclusive, (3) in using the resjudicata analogy of a prior lawsuit's
effect on a subsequent one, when the analogy of a subsequent court's
appellate review of another was more robustly explanatory, and (4)
overlooking the difference between federal court deference to state
court determinations offact (which, as in any appeal, was routine) and
federal court deference to state court judgments (which, as on appeal,
did not occur). Bator thus got habeas corpus wrong because he forgot
his federal jurisdiction-and thus lost sight of the analogy to writ of
error and removal review thatJustice Gray so elegantly had laid out in
Whitten .566
Likewise, Professor Peller correctly discerned Bator's error in un-
derestimating the range of cognizable claims, but erred in ignoring the
large number of denials of habeas corpus review that are not explained
by limits on the reach of the Constitution. Peller thus failed to tie those
denials to the preference for direct Supreme Court review as of right,
when available, and to limits on the Court's direct review (and thus on
its surrogate, habeas corpus review) of questions of fact. By remaining
agnostic on whether res judicata or appellate analogies best explain
habeas corpus, Peller's thesis is incomplete.
What, though, of Professor Bator's conundrum: Except as an inci-
dent to the application of resjudicata, what good is an exhaustion-of-
state-remedies doctrine?
The reason a nonpreclusive exhaustion doctrine seemed inexplica-
ble to Professor Bator is that he mistook his metaphor for reality. On a
"separate civil action" view of habeas corpus, the denial of relief on a
claim in a prior action surely should have res judicata effect in a later
action. But switch analogies, and place the exhaustion doctrine in an
appellate context. Indeed, the exhaustion doctrine need not be analo-
gized to an appellate context, for it literally creates that context by forbid-
ding a litigant to seek review in an appellate court until she first has
raised the claim in a lower one-thus giving the reviewing court some-
thing to review. And indeed, throughout most of the nineteenth cen-
tury, the Supreme Court was careful to construe habeas corpus
jurisdiction as consisting of one court's "appellate" review of




Understood this way, the exhaustion doctrine serves three very real
functions. First, it forces litigants to seek satisfaction in the more nu-
merous prior courts, leaving only a smaller number of claims for appeal
to the smaller number of appellate courts. Second, it defines the issues,
so that by the time the case reaches the appellate stage, a pristine set of
legal issues can be extracted and presented for efficient appellate re-
view. Third, it resolves factual questions, which, from the beginning of
habeas corpus review, have been singled out as singularly unworthy of
habeas corpus relitigation on the mundane grounds that have always
made trial courts superior when it came to the facts. 568 Thus, as Justice
Gray was very careful to say in Whitten, habeas corpus, like direct ap-
peals, is a "method[] ... for bringing before the courts of the United
States proceedings [that were] begun in the courts of the States," but
that end in the federal courts. 569
V. CONCLUSION: THE WRIGHT STUFF VERSUS THE RIGHT STUFF
At least two cases this Term present anew the question the Court
presented itself in Wright, then dodged.570 It seems inevitable that in
those cases or in later ones, the opening skirmish in Wright will escalate
into all-out Armageddon over the future of de novo habeas corpus re-
view-in essence, the future of habeas corpus review itself. The ques-
tion this Article poses is whether Justice O'Connor's analysis-
intellectually victorious in Wright -has the right stuff to win the coming
war over habeas corpus.
Justice O'Connor's position seems credible on its face. The habeas
corpus remedy she describes has the virtues of at least forty years of
precedential backing and of parity with the Court's own review on di-
rect appeal.
Moreover, Justice O'Connor can use the same analysis to explain
the Court's entire habeas corpus jurisprudence over the past fifteen
years-which in large measure has been her own, with contributions
from Justice Kennedy. A simple and inclusive explanation of that juris-
prudence is that it finishes the work-that the Court made for itself in
its 1963 trilogy of habeas corpus cases and that Congress began in its
1966 habeas corpus amendments 57 1-of restoring habeas corpus to its
longstanding parity with direct review.
Via the exhaustion doctrine, the Court recently has assured that
habeas corpus petitioners, like direct appellants, cannot seek the re-
567. See supra note 349 and accompanying text.
568. See supra note 48 and accompanying text; see also I Liebman, supra note 24,
§ 5.2 (more detailed presentation of this argument).
569. Whitten v. Tomlinson, 160 U.S. 231, 238 (1895) (emphasis added); see 1-2
Liebman, supra note 24, §§ 5.2, 35.1b.
570. See supra note 5.
571. See supra notes 537-547 and accompanying text.
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viewing court's consideration before seeking the prior court's judg-
ment. Most importantly, Justice O'Connor's 1982 "total exhaustion"
decision in Rose v. Lundy 572 assured that habeas corpus petitioners, like
direct appellants, have only a single unified review of all their claims, not
many piecemeal reviews following claim-by-claim exhaustion in the
state courts. 573 Rose's "total exhaustion" rule having required habeas
corpus petitioners, like direct appellants, to aggregate all their claims in
proceedings in the prior courts before bringing any of their claims to
the federal courts, Justice Kennedy's successive-petition decision in
McCleskey v. Zant,574 then required habeas corpus petitioners, like direct
appellants, to aggregate all their now exhausted claims in one federal
review.
The Court's procedural-default cases-Justice O'Connor's deci-
sions in Engle v. Isaac,575 Murray v. Carrier,57
6 and Smith v. Murray,5 77
and, most importantly, her 1991 decision in Coleman v. Thompson 57 8-
then used a "cause and prejudice" test, which provides a nearly perfect
proxy for the "adequate and independent state grounds" doctrine on
direct appeal,579 to restore the direct appeal/habeas corpus parity that
Fay v. Noia abolished in 1963.580
Finally, Justice O'Connor's nonretroactivity decision in Teague v.
Lane 58 1 and her application of the Teague doctrine in later cases58 2 de-
stroyed the last existing vestige of the mid-1960s assault on direct ap-
peal/habeas corpus parity. Under Linkletter v. Walker 583 and other
1960s cases, the Court had held, once again overJustice Harlan's vehe-
ment dissent, 58 4 that federal habeas corpus petitioners frequently could
take advantage of newly created legal rights that did not exist at the
time of their direct appeal proceedings. Teague's nonretroactivity doc-
trine restores parity by ensuring that the sum total of the law that the
572. 455 U.S. 509 (1982).
573. See id. at 520.
574. 111 S. Ct. 1454 (1991).
575. 456 U.S. 107 (1982).
576. 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
577. 477 U.S. 527 (1986).
578. 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991).
579. See Hart, supra note 108, at 118-19 (proposing just this solution 30 years
before Court adopted it); supra notes 21, 37 and accompanying text.
580. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 429-34, 438-39 (1963) (allowing habeas corpus
courts to ignore adequate and independent state grounds for state court's determination
except those premised on the prisoner's deliberate waiver of federal rights), questioned
in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87-88 (1977), and overruled by Coleman v.
Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2565 (1991); see supra note 540 and accompanying text.
581. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
582. Stringer v. Black, 112 S. Ct. 1130 (1992) (opinion for the Court of Kennedy,
J.); Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (1990) (opinion for the Court of Kennedy, J.). See
Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 277 (1990); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
583. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
584. See, e.g., Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 256-57 (1969) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
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prisoner can draw upon in seeking release on habeas corpus is the same
as would have been available on direct appeal in the Supreme Court.
585
Simply recognizing that the scope and nature of habeas corpus re-
view almost exactly parallel, and substitute for, the Court's own review
on direct appeal may satisfy some that federal-question review in crimi-
nal cases should remain as it is. For others the system's existence for
forty years, whatever its rationale or logic, also may be enough. Justice
Kennedy concluded in Wright, for example, that the existence of this
system even since 1985 was enough for him.586 For still others, how-
ever, including perhaps the two Justices who were silent in Wright, more
in the way of explanation may be necessary.587 Indeed, one (in my view
anomalous) facet ofJustice O'Connor's habeas corpus jurisprudence is
itself an obstacle to acceptance of the existing system's rationality,
namely, her view, in Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes,588 that habeas corpus is not
an appeal, but rather is an original civil action.
This Article has tried to reveal the fallacy in this one, anomalous
and seemingly minor, aspect ofJustice O'Connor's habeas corpus juris-
prudence. The fallacy appears not only from the "original civil action"
theory's contradiction of everything the Court and especially Justice
O'Connor recently have accomplished in habeas corpus cases. Even
more vividly, the fallacy appears from the "original action" theory's
contradiction of 204 years of congressional and judicial action in regard
not only to habeas corpus but to all federal court review of federal
questions. Since 1789, Congress has entitled federal and state prison-
ers incarcerated in violation of any fundamental legal (typically, any
constitutional) principle to one meaningful federal court review as of
right. The model for that review, and its preferred "mode" when avail-
able, has been direct review on the merits as of right in the Supreme
Court on writ of error or appeal. When direct federal appellate review
has not been meaningfully available, however, habeas corpus has con-
sistently filled the breach. Filling the breach, however, has meant filling
it all-providing the same review that the Court itself would have pro-
vided on direct review had it been able to do so.
One question remains, of course. Granted that habeas corpus is
recognizable as a substitute for limited direct Supreme Court review of
nationally important issues for which the Constitution permits federal
question jurisdiction. Granted that habeas corpus has functioned that
way since 1789. But why should it function that way? I have tried, willy
nilly, to provide some answers to this question, as have others.589 But,
585. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
586. See Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. 2482, 2498-2500 (1992) (Kennedy, J..
concurring in the judgment).
587. See id. at 2493 (WhiteJ., concurring in the judgment); id. at 2500 (Souter.J..
concurring in the judgment).
588. 112 S. Ct. 1715, 1722-25 (1992) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
589. The classic explanation of the need for federal court review of controversial
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once the appellate understanding of habeas corpus-so long obscured
by Professor Bator's flawed tour deforce-emerges from the history, so
does the final answer to this question-the one Justice Story gave in
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 590 when presented with precisely the same
question directed not at habeas corpus review, but at its model and
mentor, writ of error review of federal questions as of right:
It is further argued, that no great public mischief can result
from a construction which shall limit the appellate power of
the United States to cases in their own Courts . . . because
State judges are bound by an oath to support the constitution
of the United States, and must be presumed to be men of
learning and integrity .... [A]dmitting that the judges of the
State Courts are, and always will be, of as much learning, in-
tegrity, and wisdom, as those of the courts of the United
States, (which we very cheerfully admit,) it does not aid the
argument. It is manifest that the constitution has proceeded
upon a theory of its own .... The constitution has presumed
• . . that State attachments, State prejudices, State jealousies,
and State interests, might sometimes obstruct, or control, or
be supposed to obstruct or control, the regular administration
ofjustice.... In respect to ... cases arising under the consti-
tution, laws, and treaties of the United States .... reasons of a
higher and more extensive nature, touching the safety, peace,
and sovereignty of the nation, might well justify a grant of [fi-
nal, federal] . . . jurisdiction.59 1
Federal law is supreme, as is federal adjudication of that law when
mandated by Congress. Throughout the nation's history, moreover,
Congress has mandated final federal adjudication of important federal
law whenever life or liberty has depended on the outcome. By prefer-
ence, this adjudication as of right has been the Supreme Court's on
direct appeal. By necessity, however, it also has been the lower federal
court's on habeas corpus. Nothing in this system of personal rights and
judicial responsibilities seems strange to me. But even were the system
strange, it nonetheless is the one towards which "the Constitution has
proceeded upon a theory of its own."
questions of federal law is Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1105
(1977). See also supra notes 40-41, 370-372, 388-389, 418, 553-554.
590. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 349 (1816).
591. Id. at 346-47, 349; accord The Mayor v. Cooper, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 247, 253
(1867) (same justification for federal-question removal jurisdiction).
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